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The primary intent of this study is to analyze contract 
systems and other wage incentives utilized at underground, 
metallic mining operations. This research was conducted 
with the cooperation of 33 mines employing a spectrum of 
incentive programs. Emphasis is focused on the different 
types of existing production contracts, the role of these 
contracts with respect to employee compensation, and the 
underlying factors which determine the contract system most 
appropriate for a given set of operating characteristics.
In addition, a model is constructed to illustrate the 
process of integrating specific operating and managerial 
considerations into an equitable and productive wage 
incentive program. This model is based on data obtained 
from mines located in the Spanish Bar District of Colorado.
Contract systems are introduced by management as a tool 
to motivate employee performance, enhance productivity, 
and/or achieve other managerial goals and objectives. 
Traditionally, contract mining referred to supplemental wage 
agreements, negotiated between mine administrators and 
specific employees, covering predetermined tasks and 
projects. These agreements are based upon some measurement 
of productivity, such as tons excavated per man-shift,
iii
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where financial incentives are contingent upon labor 
performance as defined within a prescribed set of 
guidelines. These programs have evolved into elaborate 
systems incorporating unique characteristics associated with 
the corporate philosophies and operating circumstances of 
individual mines. Furthermore/ incentives can influence 
employee attitudes and achieve a multitude of other 
strategies. As such, these systems play vital roles in 
influencing operating factors that have direct bearing on 
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Contract and other types of incentive systems have been 
utilized in the underground mining of metallic deposits for 
over a century. The evolution of these contract incentives 
reflects the dynamic characteristics of social, economic, 
and technologic change, and their subsequent impact on the 
mining industry. While these systems remain a vital facet 
in the operational management of numerous mines throughout 
North America, little has been documented or published 
addressing their basic concepts and philosophies. It is the 
goal of this thesis to present an accurate account of the 
general types of incentive systems, to enumerate the factors 
that contribute and influence the success or failure of 
these systems, and to establish a preliminary set of 
guidelines that will aid in the evaluation of different wage 
incentives for specific site characteristics.
Definition of Problem
Despite recent technical advances in equipment design, 
the use of recycled fill, and the improved expertise 
associated with hydraulic and mechanized systems, there have 
been few conceptual changes in the underground mining of 
traditional lode deposits in seven decades. The industry,
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however, has been forced to weather periods of adversity 
generated by constantly changing social, political, and 
economic conditions, particularly in the last twenty years. 
Examples include the introduction of stringent regulatory 
legislation, long-term environmental liability, and volatile 
metal markets. These conditions, coupled with declining ore 
grades, deeper deposits, and large increases in direct 
operating costs, have caused many operators to lose the 
economic stability they once possessed. Figures 1-1 and 1-2 
illustrate the detrimental impact of these factors upon the 
viability of underground metal mines in the United States 
measured with respect to the number operating mines and 
total employment. To insure an accurate representation, 
these figures reflect only operating mines that employ 2 0 or 
more people. It is readily apparent that changes occurring 
in the late 1960's and early 1970's have precipitated a 
operating climate that has led to the steady decline of 
underground metal mining. It was during this period that 
federally mandated policies regarding metal markets, 
environmental standards, and labor regulations were 
introduced.
The influence of metal prices upon this scenario is an 
important factor in the degradation of the industry. With 






















Figure 1-1 Operating U.S. Underground Metal Mines With 20 
or More Employees (1962 - 1989)
Source: MSHA, Injury Experience in Metallic Mineral Mining,
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1-2 Number of People Employed in Operating U.S. 
Underground Metal Mines with 2 0 or More 
Employees (1962 - 1989)
Source: MSHA, Injury Experience in Metallic Mineral Mining,
Informational Reports, i960 - 1988.
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these commodities have experienced dramatic price swings in 
world markets. When viewed in constant dollars, however, 
there has been a continued deterioration of the price of 
these metals over the last decade (Appendix A ) . Similar 
trends are also found with respect to most base metals, 
including zinc, lead, and copper (Appendix B ) . Between 1980 
and 1989, the cumulative percentage decline in the real mean 
annual market price for gold, silver, lead, and copper was 
approximately -48 percent (USBM, Commodity Summaries 197 9- 
89). Furthermore, with the possible exception of zinc, the 
future outlook for significant growth in most metal markets 
appears to be bleak. This is particularly evident for 
silver, lead, and copper where substitution, shrinking 
markets, and increased metal production from foreign and 
domestic sources should inhibit near-term price increases 
(BOM, Commodity Summaries, 1975-90).
In addition, dramatic increases in the cost of labor 
continue to play an integral role in the current dilemma 
confronting the industry. Figure 1-3 illustrates the 
escalation in the average annual base pay for metal miners 
with respect to the national industrial average for all 
production and nonsupervisory workers. Other labor-related 
issues emanating from this period include: the shrinking 
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Figure 1-3 Average Annual Earnings for Production and 
Non-supervisory workers in Metal Mining 
(1917 - 1989) and for Nonagricultural Industries 
(1947 - 1989) in Actual U.S. Dollars.
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T—389 4 7
federal regulations regarding employee welfare, and indirect 
labor costs attributed to insurance, training, and 
liability.
The impact of these factors has effectively eliminated 
the marginal producer of two decades ago and has severely 
impaired the profitability of labor intensive operations.
To insure economic survival, these operations have been 
forced to develop production techniques that mitigate the 
influence of these factors. The problem, however, resides 
in the slow technical progression of mining systems and 
equipment amenable to the mining of veins and/or similar 
deposits. Until the development of more productive systems, 
companies mining these types of deposits will be faced with 
the challenges of finding techniques that will promote and 
encourage higher productivity and operating efficiency 
within the given operating constraints of their individual 
mine and orebody. The success or failure of these 
techniques will dictate the future of this country's 
underground metal mining industry.
Purpose and Scope
Underground hard rock mining, by its very nature, is a 
unique industry. With the exception of bulk mining systems, 
operations are generally characterized by the utilization of
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mining methods that are extremely dependent upon the 
productivity of skilled labor to perform repetitive tasks in 
adverse environments. This is particularly evident in vein 
mining where methods such as cut and fill, shrinkage and 
open stoping, or square set mining are employed (McClelland, 
Lynch, and Judd, 1956). In these methods, production is a 
function of the cyclical performance of specific unit 
operations which comprise the mining cycle and are largely 
dependent upon the specific operating conditions unique to 
an individual operation. In most applications, four 
distinct components comprise the unit operations associated 
with production: drilling, blasting, mucking, and the 
utilization of some form of rock support system. During 
development, additional activities, such as the installation 
of utilities, the laying of rail, or timbering, are often 
performed. Each of these unit operations are interdependent 
and directly influence the proceeding activities. Each must 
be performed in sequential order, where the cyclical 
progression of this order represents the rate of production 
for a heading or stope. As such, production is contingent 
upon the productivity of each unit operation. Unit 
operations that require intensive manual labor, high degrees 
of skill, and/or incorporate low mechanization are 
indicative of mining methods exhibiting low productivity.
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Table 1-1 illustrates a relative comparison of mining 
methods with respect to productivity, measured in tons per 
man-shift.
TABLE 1-1 Mining Method Productivities
Method Normal High
Sublevel Caving 20-40 40-50
Block Caving 15-40 40-50
Sublevel Stoping 15-30 30-40
Cut and Fill 10-20 30-40
Shrinkage Stoping 5-10 10-15
Square-set Mining 1-3 —
Source: After Hamrin, H., 1982
A great many factors influence the manner in which a 
specific deposit is mined. These factors include the 
geologic, geometric, and geotechnical characteristics of the 
deposit and surrounding host rock, as well as economic, 
social, and political considerations (Boshkov, Wright,
197 3) . Assuming conventional mining systems are employed, a 
relationship between productivity and these operating 
parameters can generally be established. Mining systems 
that display low productivity are indicative of smaller 
deposits that possess high intrinsic value and are dependent 
upon the utilization of skilled labor in lieu of 
mechanization. The potential for higher productivity 
increases as geologic parameters enable larger and more
T-3894 10
specialized pieces of equipment to be utilized. In these 
mechanized applications, the direct influence of labor upon 
daily production is minimized and becomes more dependent 
upon the operating capabilities of the equipment.
In operations that utilize labor intensive mining 
systems, labor is one of the few operational factors that 
mine management can control. Geology, metal markets, and 
government generated policies are beyond the control or 
influence of most operating companies. For most properties, 
after the initial capital expenditure associated with the 
predevelopment, it becomes extremely difficult for a 
operation to economically justify changing mining methods, 
equipment selection, and/or production capacity. Labor 
directly influences the operating capability of these 
systems and comprises a large percentage of the immediate 
and variable production costs. Changes in labor 
productivity also effect the economic return and fixed unit 
costs of an operation. This is particularly evident in vein 
deposits, where labor is commonly the swing variable between 
economic success or failure. Table 1-2, for example, 
illustrates the relationship between labor and direct 
operating costs for a production stope in a medium sized, 
narrow vein gold mine. While this cost breakdown does not 
include indirect costs, it represents the degree of
T-3894 11
TABLE 1-2 Direct Operating Costs for an Underground, 
Narrow Vein Production Stope
Stope Parameters: Average Stope Width - 5 feet
Stope Geometry - 240 ft x 135 ft 
Double Breasted Backstope (Shrinkage) 
6 ft Cut Height, 10 ft Sill Pillars 
3 Draw Chutes Per Stope Breast 
I-Drift Dimensions - 5 ft x 10 ft 




Develop Develop Mining Total
($) ($) ($) ($)
Timber/Materials 16,265 7 ,290 5,225 28,780
Explosives 3,490 5,860 48,135 57,485
Drill Supplies 700 1,280 9, 650 11,630
Slusher Costs 0 420 4 ,280 4,700
Bolts/Mats/Stulls 810 930 12,370 14,110
Utilities 2 ,665 60 1,825 4 ,550
Labor 34,365 23,975 128,450 186,790
TOTAL COST ($) 58,295 39,815 209,935 308,045
Note: These costs reflect the direct operating costs
incurred while mining a specific stope and do not 
include haulage, hoisting, general mine utility, 
development (other than specified), and indirect 
costs.
Total Operating Cost/Ton Ore = ($ 308,045)/(11,020 Tons)
= $ 27.9 5/Ton Ore
Labor Cost as a Percent of the Total Operating Mining Cost:
% Labor Cost = Labor Cost (Production)/Total Operating Cost 
= ($ 186,790)/ ($ 308,045) = 61 Percent
Source: Personal Communication, 1990.
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influence attributed to labor in many operating scenarios.
In this stope/ labor accounts for 61 percent of the total 
direct operating cost.
The impact of skilled labor upon the economic viability 
of an operation is the essence of developing techniques that 
influence the productivity of a given work force. 
Traditionally, these systems were structured in the form of 
economic incentives and based upon individual or group 
performance. The primary intent was to increase the 
efficiency of labor intensive operations by constructing 
financial and psychological inducements which would motivate 
employees to achieve higher than normal productivities.
With the complexities of today's labor market and the 
economic adversity facing most operations, the 
implementation of incentive programs is no longer solely 
intended to enhance employee productivity. Rather, most 
systems now incorporate elements related to the managerial 
strategies associated with individual operations. These 
programs have effectively been utilized to influence 
parameters that are generally viewed as independent of 
labor, such as dilution, equipment utilization and 
availability, and recovery (Per. Com., 1988). Furthermore, 
incentives based upon nonmonetary rewards have also been 
widely used to motivate employees to achieve specific
IR ijkm UBRf COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINE& GOLDEN, CO 80401
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objectives. The adoption of these innovative techniques 
have produced systems that are vital in management1s ability 
to control specific operating parameters, influence employee 
attitudes, and optimize efficient, innovative methods of 
working in adverse environments.
The vast majority of all underground, metallic mining 
operations in North America practice some form of wage 
incentives. It is, therefore, surprising that little has 
been documented or published addressing the basic concepts 
of these systems. This is largely due to the confidential­
ity that individual operators associate with these programs. 
Without information on these systems being readily 
available, operations wishing to adopt incentives are forced 
to implement programs that are based upon the experiences of 
its mine management, corporate policy, or other company 
mines. Although the consideration of these elements are 
fundamentally important in the design of a specific program, 
the potential ramifications attributed to imitating a system 
without regard to the individual characteristics of the 
operation are indicative of systems that fail to accomplish 
their original objectives. It is the intent of this thesis 
to present a concise analysis of the types of contract and 
wage incentives systems utilized in the industry, the 
underlying factors that contribute to their success or
T-3894 14
failure, and a set of procedures that will aid in the 




The general concept of ••productivity11 refers to the 
relationship between the quantity of goods, services, or 
materials produced with respect to the quantity of resources 
employed during production (Fabricant, 1969). This ratio of 
output to input is the foundation for measuring operating 
efficiency and gauging performance. Comparisons in 
productivity are derived as a function of how this ratio 
deviates. For example, productivity is said to increase in 
three fundamental scenarios (Branson, 1972):
Output increases, Input remains constant.
Output remains constant, Input decreases.
Output increases, Input decreases .
Similarly, declining productivity is merely the reciprocal 
of this relationship. The definitions of input and output, 
and ultimately productivity, are largely dependent upon 
their application and industrial utilization.
The two most widely accepted classifications of
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productivity are single and multifactor measurements (USBLS, 
Bui. 217 8, 1983). Single factor productivity simply relates 
output to the combined influence of all the inputs. The 
input, therefore, is viewed as a single entity. A common 
example includes labor productivity, which in mining is 
often measured in the amount of production versus the 
quantity of labor utilized (i.e., tons per man-shift). The 
obvious shortcoming of this type of measurement is that the 
individual factors contributing to the input are not 
specified. Different operating conditions, the quality of 
labor, and other production parameters are not taken into 
consideration. To alleviate this problem, the U.S. 
Department of Labor has adopted a measurement of 
productivity that collectively weights the individual 
components comprising production. This method is called 
multifactor productivity and is occasionally used in the 
mining industry.
Due to the complexity associated with determining 
individual elements comprising production, measurements 
utilized in this thesis are based on single factor 
productivity. Furthermore, labor productivity will only 
reflect the work hours contributed by production personnel 
and output in units of standard tons (avoir).
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Incentives
In the context of this thesis, incentives will be 
defined as inducements offered as part of a structured 
system to influence future employee performance and/or 
achieve other managerial goals and objectives. These 
systems can vary in duration and can incorporate individual 
employees, groups of employees, entire operations, or any 
combination thereof. Usually based upon specific 
performance standards, these programs utilize financial 
rewards to encourage employee participation in obtaining 
desired objectives. Performance standards can include any 
multitude of factors ranging from employee productivity to 
corporate revenues (Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler, 1990). 
Through time, these systems have evolved into elaborate 
programs incorporating characteristics reflecting the 
corporate philosophies and operating circumstances of 
individual operations. There are two distinct categories of 
incentives widely employed in the underground mining, 
individual and group bonus systems. It is the primary 
intent of this thesis to address the fundamental programs 
affiliate with each category.
Contract Mining
The most common form of individual incentives
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implemented in the underground mines surveyed in this study 
was that of Contract and Gypo mining programs. In essence, 
these systems can be characterized as a supplemental wage 
agreement between mine administrators and specific employees 
to perform predetermined tasks or projects, where financial 
remuneration is contingent upon production, the rate of 
project completion, and/or other tangible performance 
standards. Such systems are introduced as a managerial tool 
to enhance productivity, influence employee attitudes, 
and/or achieve other specific goals and strategies (Per. 
Com., 1989). These programs are predicated on the premise 
that psychologically an employee will work more efficiently 
for himself than for an employer (Peale, 1919).
As with all incentive programs, contract systems 
incorporate a guaranteed base pay level that is earned, 
irrespective of employee performance. Contract mining has 
been utilized in the underground mining of lode deposits for 
over a century and remain a vital facet in the daily 
operation of metal mines throughout North America.
Bonus Systems
The implementation of Group-Bonus Systems is perhaps the 
most rapidly expanding form of incentives in the underground 
mining industry today. These systems, commonly called
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Group-Sharing Programs, distribute monetary rewards in 
recognition of achieving some level of success in obtaining 
specific organizational goals and objectives. Although 
bonuses, like Contract Mining, are generally linked to 
performance standards, such as production; these systems 
have successfully been implemented in conjunction with 
programs associated with safety, absenteeism, and training 
(Per. Com., 1989). Bonus Systems, however, differ from 
Contract Programs in both application and intent. The major 
utilization of these systems are in operations where the 
performance of individual employees can not be ascertained 
and/or where employee performance does not greatly influence 
mine production. Generally, these systems incorporate 
groups of employees that possess similar characteristics 
(e.g., job classification), where financial benefits are 
used to augment employee wages. In addition, Bonus Systems 
can be adopted to fit any duration and, because they 
supplement base incomes, can be dispensed in a multitude of 
ways (e.g., in lump-sums, during regular pay periods, or 
deferred until some future date, like retirement).
Historical Perspective
The introduction of incentive systems in this country 
originated in the manufacturing sector prior to 1860 (Certo,
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1984). During this period of rapid industrialization, a 
movement to scientifically analyze the role of management in 
optimizing productivity through an eguatable means was born. 
It was the contention of early researchers, like Fredrick 
Taylor, that the utilization of financial incentives would 
encourage employees to exceed established standards of 
productivity and would mitigate the detrimental production 
oscillations common to heavy industry at that time (Chruden, 
Sherman, 1972). Taylor devised the first comprehensive 
incentive program, called a differential piece rate system, 
whereby the amount of compensation attributed to production 
personnel directly correlated to the ability of these 
employees to achieve specific production levels (Certo,
1984). This program provided objective performance 
standards through which production could be measured and 
bonuses distributed (Longenecker, 1964). Taylor's incentive 
program was emulated by a diverse variety of systems 
developed by a number of distinguished business leaders, 
including Gilreth, Emerson, Halsey, Bedeaux, and Gantt 
(Certo, 1984). While these systems evolved from Taylor's, 
each embodied the individual author's attempt to 
characterize the relationship between compensation and 
productivity for specific industrial applications (Certo, 
1984) .
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A major advocate of bonus and wage incentives during 
this period was Henry Gantt, a renowned businessman and 
economist. He believed that the foundation of an equatable 
and efficient wage system was based on intangible factors 
inherent to the psychological make up of its employees 
(Gantt, 1961). To successfully increase worker efficiency, 
he felt it was imperative for labor to possess a genuine 
interest in their work and feel a sense of selfworth and 
accomplishment (Gantt, 1961). Gantt wrote:
11 The manager of today under any reputable system of 
management is not a driver. When he asks the workmen to 
perform tasks, he makes it to their interest to accomplish 
them " (Certo,1984).
Wage incentives and monetary rewards, Gantt theorized, 
provided an avenue to promote this type of interest. He 
devised successful piece rate manufacturing systems, based 
on Taylor's original design, that encouraged higher levels 
of productivity through the utilization of innovative 
production rewards (Spriegel, 1947).
The inception of incentive programs in underground 
mining had immediate applications, particularly before the 
industrial adoption of mechanical equipment. At that time, 
a large component of production was greatly dependent upon 
the efforts of skilled employees doing strenuous labor in
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extreme environmental conditions (Wallace, 197 6). A 
majority of the early incentive programs possessed a strong 
resemblance to the piece rate systems that were publicized 
by Taylor and Gantt in the manufacturing sector. However, 
these systems reflected the unique characteristics endemic 
to underground mining at that time. The idiosyncrasy and 
cultural influences of the different mining districts 
produced a wide variety of systems. In addition, different 
operating parameters, methods of mining, and managerial 
philosophies of individual mines caused these systems to 
become even more diverse. Fundamentally, most systems of 
this era could be categorized into two principle types: 
production bonuses and ,,pay-by-resultM wage systems.
Production bonuses were seen throughout the industry in
both metallic and coal operations. Typically called "muck 
bonuses", the concept was fairly straight forward. Over a 
specific period of time, a production standard or quota was 
established. If production for that period exceeded the 
standard, a monetary bonus was given (Anaconda, 1919). The
standard of productivity could be based on tons of 
production, on piece rate standards (e.g., the number of 
cars mucked per shift), or on a multitude of other 
production criteria. These systems generally incorporated 
small groups of employees and were based upon extremely
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small time intervals, usually a day or a week (Lingenfelter, 
1974).
The introduction of pay-by-result systems appear to have 
originated in the silver-rich lode deposits of the Comstock 
during the late 1860's (Lord, 1959). By the early 1890's, 
these types of systems were widely utilized in both base and 
precious metal mining districts throughout the west, 
including Eureka, Butte, Leadville, Cripple Creek, and 
Idaho's Silver Valley (Lingenfelter, 1974). The structure 
of these systems is the basis through which Contract and 
Tribute incentive programs were developed. The 
determination of employee's compensation was solely dictated 
by some measure of their productivity. Because these 
systems proceeded any type of governmental legislation 
mandating standards for labor, the miner's received no 
minimum base rate or salary.
The contract systems which were first implemented 
mimicked the piece rate systems utilized in other 
industries. It was literally a true piece rate system were 
every mining activity possessed an associated value 
(Anaconda, 1945). At the end of a shift, the cumulative 
value of these activities represent the salary for that 
employee during that shift. Variations of this system were 
implemented to incorporate groups of miners in the same
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stope or on the same level. Other Contracts methods that 
evolved during this era included systems based on tons of 
production and linear feet of drift advance (Spence, 1970).
Tributing was a method that was introduced to this 
country by Cornish miner*s during the late 1870*s (Rowe, 
1974). A popular wage system in England, it was highly 
amenable to the high value ores found in the west. A miner 
was allocated specific work area in which he was 
responsible. For each ton of ore the miner produced, he 
received a percentage of the assay in excess of a specified 
minimum amount (Lingenfelter, 1974). For example, tributes 
in the mines around the Eureka District of Nevada in the 
late 1870*s paid 10 - 15 percent of the assay above $40 per 
ton. Therefore, if one miner could excavate 1 ton of ore in 
a shift that assayed $70/ton, the miner would receive wages 
between $3.00 - $4.25 for that shift. Because these wages 
varied with the nature and grade of the ore, most companies 
utilized tributing as a tool for exploration and for the 
mining low grade deposits (Lingenfelter, 1974). Rarely was 
this method utilized on known ore bodies that exceeded the 
minimum assay standard or were there was a chance the miners 
could strike high grade mineralization. These abuses caused 
most miners on tribute to earn significantly less than day's 
pay and they, therefore, would only take a tribute contract
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when wage work was scarce (Lingenfelter, 1974). Through 
union intervention, tribute systems in most districts were 
ousted by the early 19201 s.
Mining operations during this period were fairly 
dynamic, hiring and laying off employees often became a 
daily occurrence. This, in conjunction with the number and 
close proximity of mines within the traditional districts, a 
surplus of miners generated by a large immigrant population, 
and the demand for experienced underground labor, made a 
majority of the mining work force highly mobile (Magnuson,
19 68). This aspect greatly influenced many of the 
parameters associated with wage incentives, including 
limiting the applications of group bonus systems and 
shortening the average duration for pay periods.
The emergence of mechanized equipment had a pronounced 
impact on the structure of most incentive systems. The 
resulting increase in productivity precipitated the need for 
companies to reevaluate the role of incentives in their 
operations and to develop new standards for employee 
productivity. Along with the increases in productivity 
associated with equipment mechanization, innovations in 
operating systems and mining methods have also necessitated 
the need for making refinements in established wage 
incentive systems. The integration of these technologies
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into the operating routine of most mines took a considerable 
length of time and did not encompass all aspects of unit 
operations. Therefore/ most mines modified individual parts 
of their original incentive programs rather than make 
dramatic changes in entire systems (Per. Com., 1988). This 
process of amending production incentives and wage systems 
became a continuous procedure due to the constant 
availability of new innovations. The accumulative impact of 
these factors promoted incentive systems that were unique to 
each operation and reflected the operation's technical 
progression through time (Per. Com., 1988).
The application of these new technologies prior to the 
early 1940's had a diverse impact on underground mining as a 
whole. In the decades that followed, however, a division 
occurred in the technical development between different 
classes of underground operations. Largely attributed to 
the evolution of equipment, the technical disparity between 
these classes has a pronounced effect on the operating role 
of the miners. For example, there have been few conceptual 
changes in the operating methods of small to medium sized 
mines (less than 1000 tons/day) in fifty years. This is 
particularly the case for vein deposits with high grade 
mineralization and low tonnages. The equipment employed in 
a majority of these mines was developed prior to the 1940's,
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such as slushers, overshot and cavo muckers, and pneumatic 
drills. Production from these mines is significantly more 
dependent upon the capabilities of its miners than that of 
production equipment. The inverse is true for mines 
utilizing bulk methods and/or large scale production 
equipment. These mines have seen constant growth in terms 
of equipment technology and innovative operating techniques. 
The increase in mechanization has become synonymous with 
productivity, where large scale production equipment, like 
LHD muckers and multiple boom drill jumbo's, have changed 
the complexion of underground mining in regards to operating
methods and labor requirements. In these types of
operations, production is determined by the capacity of the 
equipment and to a lessor degree the expertise of the 
operators. These factors have greatly influence the 
development of incentive systems and the effect of their
application on different types of operations.
The hardrock mining industry of the 1980's was in a 
period of technical and social transition. Extremely 
volatile metal prices, stringent environmental liability, 
and a rapidly declining skilled labor pool were just a few 
of the factors that pose a threat to the long term economic 
viability of most underground operations. Of these factors, 
most were and continue to be beyond the immediate influence
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of the vast majority of western mines. In an effort to 
promote economic survival, most mines have tried to maximize 
the operating efficiency of the factors they can control 
(i.e., labor, equipment, and operating costs). A trend 
among mine operators has developed within the last decade to 
modify incentive programs to achieve a multitude of 
operating strategies in conjunction to labor productivity 
(Per. Com., 1989). In addition, the emergence of 
nontraditional companies, including the participation of 
foreign corporations, into precious metal mining have 
instigated new managerial philosophies in many western 
operations. These philosophies toward business are often 
reflected in their wage systems and the structure of their 
production incentives.
Through the history associated with underground 
incentives, it becomes apparent that the evolution of these 
systems reflect the influence of a great many factors. The 
cumulative effect has been the development of fairly 
elaborate incentive programs that incorporate the unique 
characteristics of specific operations.
Thesis Data Acquisition
The information compiled within this thesis was acquired 
through five distinct and independent phases. The first
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phase comprised an investigation of existing material on 
mine incentive and wage programs, their potential 
correlation with operational productivity, and the 
cumulation of relevant production related data (including 
wage rates, safety programs, labor productivity for specific 
mining methods, etc.)* The bulk of this information was 
derived from technical sources and included data from coal, 
industrial minerals, and metal production.
The limited success of phase one precipitated the next 
phase to incorporate a literature search of incentive and 
wage systems developed and utilized outside of the mining 
industry. A wealth of information regarding these systems 
exists within the fields of industrial engineering, 
operational management, and labor relations. Although the 
preponderance of this material is inappropriate for 
utilization in most mining applications, the basic 
philosophies and design objectives derived in the 
manufacturing sector are representative of elements found in 
nearly all underground systems.
The third phase acquired data from sources in the public 
domain, including the Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(•'MSHA"), the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS” ), the Bureau 
of Mines (,,BOMM ), and numerous regulatory state agencies in 
the western United States. The information compiled from
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these sources provided empirical data on production-related 
topics and commodity price modeling. The contribution by 
individual state agencies provided supporting information on 
production characteristics and labor related issues. The 
agencies surveyed included those responsible for mining, 
labor, and accident compensation.
The next phase examined published material that was 
explicitly written on individual mining operations and 
companies. This information was compiled from Corporate 
Annual Reports, press releases, union wage agreements, 
industry directories, and material obtained from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. This material was used 
to target individual mines for phase five and to develop a 
database of historical information from which to draw 
production-related conclusions.
The final phase of research was conducted with the 
cooperation and assistance of thirty three mines, operating 
thirty seven incentive and bonus systems across North 
America. Table 1-3 presents categorical analysis of 
operations that were incorporated in this study. This phase 
comprised a collective analysis of the types of incentive 
and wage systems employed within these operations, the basic 
concepts and strategies of these systems, and their 
associated impact upon productivity and/or managerial goals.
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TABLE 1-3 Participating Operations
Geology Number of 
Operations
Daily Production (st) 











Furthermore, the information derived from this analysis 
provided a multitude of relationships that characterized the 
influence of operating parameters on the type of wage or 
incentive system. The introduction of these relationships 
are integral to the development of a equatable and 
productive system for specific operating conditions.
Thesis Organization
Chapter 1 develops the foundation of this analysis by 
emphasizing the impacts attributed to labor upon the 
economic viability of many underground operations and wide 
spread utilization of contract and incentive systems in the 
United States and Canada.
Chapter 2 presents the basic concepts and philosophies 
pertaining to incentives, wage systems, and employee 
compensation.
Chapter 3 introduces the principle classifications of 
Individual Contract Incentives for production stopes and 
work areas. Chapter 4 addresses Supplemental Contract 
Systems and their application in the industry. Gainsharing 
and Group Bonus Programs are examined in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 discusses the principle managerial 
considerations related to these systems and presents factors 
that contribute to the successful selection of a system for
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a given set of operating parameters.
In Chapter 7, a model is constructed that illustrates 
the process of integrating the physical characteristics and 
objectives of a operation into a productive wage incentive 
system. The model is based on data obtained from the 
Spanish Bar District of Colorado.
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of this thesis and 
recommendations for further research.
Thesis Limitations
Two notable problems arose during the course of this 
thesis, the acquisition of pertinent and meaningful data and 
establishing methods that enabled system comparisons between 
dissimilar operations.
Most mining operations viewed their contract and 
incentive programs as proprietary information and were 
reluctant to divulge any production-related data. In order 
to attain this information, each mine and mining company 
participating in this study was assured of complete 
anonymity and that material contained with in this thesis 
would not disclose or reveal the company from which it came.
Once this data was secured, problems appeared in 
establishing meaningful comparisons between different 
operations and analytically proving the impacts attributed
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to specific incentive systems. It would be highly desirable 
to numerically isolate the influence upon an operation by 
the implementation of a incentive program. Theoretically, 
this could be accomplished either by comparing similar 
operations utilizing different wage systems or by observing 
the changes that occur when an operation adopts a new 
incentive program. There are, however, significant problems 
with both these approaches. Each mine, because of the 
geologic nature of most deposits, particular operating 
conditions, and/or geographic location, is unique.
Therefore, ascertaining a comparison of the effects produced 
by the utilization of wage or incentive programs on 
different operations becomes extremely difficult.
Similarly, to quantitatively prove that the implementation 
of a new system is superior to another becomes a formidable 
task. To alleviate these obstacles, this thesis will empha­
size the factors and characteristics that are qualitatively 
representative of successful systems and will leave the 





Most corporate compensation programs incorporate a 
diverse spectrum of wages and benefits. Often it is 
advantageous for a single employer to utilize several 
different programs to optimize labor productivity throughout 
an entire operation (Milkovich, Newman, 1987). The 
structure of traditional compensation packages employed in 
the underground mining industry have been fairly simplistic, 
comprised primarily of wages derived from base pay and 
incentive contributions. With the influence attributed to 
today's complex social climate, many operations have been 
compelled to adopt enigmatic programs that contain numerous 
employee benefits and services. Figure 2-1 exemplifies the 
organizational relationship between the various forms of 
compensation common to underground production operations.
Compensation, as defined in the context of this thesis, 
refers to all forms of financial remunerations, including 
wages, benefits, and tangible services, received as part of 
employment. Earnings may be administered either through 
direct compensation, generally associated with cash payments 
like wages, or by indirect transactions that include such
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Figure 2-1 Compensation Schematic Common to Underground 
Production Personnel.
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things as employee benefits and services.
The structure of a compensation package utilized by a 
particular operation is influenced by a number of site 
characteristics, including: labor relations, union 
involvement, labor requirements, working conditions, 
corporate objectives, and historical wage practices 
(Milkovich, Newman, 1987). The magnitude and scope of these 
factors dictate the program configuation appropriate for an 
operation. Mines that possess dissimilar traits (e.g., 
union versus nonunion or mechanized versus labor intensive) 
would likely administer employee compensation systems which 
are different due to the unique requirements and pressures 
levied against each operation.
As Figure 2-1 illustrates, three distinct components 
comprise direct compensation, they include: Subjective 
Performance Programs, Objective Performance Programs, and 
Base Wage Systems. The most fundimental element of any 
compensation program is that of Base Wage Systems. These 
systems are the cornerstone of employee earnings and are 
defined relative to the provisions of a specific labor 
agreement. While the terms of employment may specify 
minimum or acceptable standards for employee performance, 
base wages are deemed independent of managerial valuation or 
scrutiny. As long as a employee-employer relationship
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exists, the employer is legally bound to compensate the 
employee irrespective of performance. Base Wage Systems can 
be structured relative to traditional wage scales based on a 
formalized criteria (e.g., senority), variable wage scales 
tied to fluctuating factors (e.g., metal prices), or a 
combination of both.
Objective Based Systems are intimately linked to 
performance standards derived from verifiable output, such 
as production and time. In these applications, a direct 
correlation between pay and performance can be determined 
through objective means associated with measuring output. 
These programs entail the financial entities associated with 
Individual and Group Incentive Programs.
Many activities performed in underground mines are not 
amenable to objective performance appraisals. Either job 
output is not quantifiable or the components that can be 
measured are not representative of employee effort and 
performance. Good examples include skip tenders, 
underground mechanics, nippers, and crews responsible for 
drift or stope repair/cleanup and shaft maintenance. In 
these situations, Subjective Performance Systems are often 
used. These programs require subjective judgments from 
supervisory personnel to deduce an employee1 s value measured 
in terms of performance and contribution made towards the
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operation. In these systems, there is not a concrete 
structure that relates pay to certain tasks or accomplish­
ments, the amounts associated with the distribution of 
monetary rewards are solely contingent upon managements 
perception of employee merit and/or their contribution 
toward company goals. Occasionally, programs administered 
under subjective performance criteria are utilized in 
applications were employee output can be quantified.
However, the amounts of the awards are generally formulated 
through a discretionary process and not tied to a structured 
incentive system. Their are four principle categories under 
Subjective Performance Systems: Reward Contributions, 




Base wages are the foundation of most conventional 
compensation programs and can be defined as the elementary 
wage level at which an employer pays an individual employee 
to perform work. These wage levels can be determined 
through structured or variable standards. Structured Base 
Wage Systems are indicative of traditional pay levels 
determined by employee skills, job classification, and/or
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experience. Variable Wage Systems are an innovative method 
of combining these conventional wage structures with 
variable pay scales based upon fluctuating levels such as 
metal prices, corporate profitability, or any other volatile 
component that intimately effects an operation.
Cost of Living Allowances
Cost of Living Allowances (COLA) are designed to 
automatically escalate employee wage structures in response 
to changes in the cost of living precipitated by inflation 
(Milkovich, Newman, 1987). These allowances originated 
through union arbitration to compensate labor rates during 
the duration of a wage agreement. Generally, COLA'S are 
tied to established economic indices delineating changes in 
the local, state, or national economy. Of the labor 
contracts reviewed during this study, most COLA provisions 
were linked to the federal consumer price index (CPI). The 
CPI measures the general rate of inflation by comparing the 
average change in prices for a fixed segment of market goods 
and services over time (Hrebar, 1986). Historically, unions 
pushed for COLAs during periods of high inflation like those 
experienced in the 1970's and deemphasized them during 
periods of low to moderate inflation (Per. Com., 1989). 
During the last decade, the application of COLAs in most
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operations, union and nonunion mines, has seen dramatic 
decline in their utilization. Prominent factors which have 
mitigated their application include: nominal inflation, 
shorter contract periods in labor agreements, and lower 
corporate revenues (Per. Com., 1989).
Objective Performance Systems 
Incentive Systems
Incentives were defined in Chapter 1 as a monetary 
inducement offered as part of a structured system to 
influence future employee actions as they impact established 
managerial objectives. These systems can be categorized 
into two types, Individual or Group Incentives. Individual 
Incentives are generally viewed as synonymous with Contract 
Mining Systems, while Group Incentives are representative of 
Bonus and Gainsharing Programs. The emphasis of this thesis 
will focus on these incentive systems and their current role 
in the operating strategies of underground metal mines.
Subjective Performance Systems
Reward Systems
Reward Programs credit employees for past 
accomplishments and for achieving strides in obtaining 
corporate goals and objectives. Although utilized in
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limited applications, these types of programs have been used 
effectively in promoting managerial objectives for numerous 
years (Milkovich, Newman, 1984). These programs differ from 
incentive systems in the way in which they are implemented. 
Incentives encourage future employee involvement, where as 
reward systems recognize past contributions or performances. 
In addition, Reward Programs are generally not structured in 
such a way to enable employees to ascertain a correlation 
between specific activities and earnings. Most incentive 
systems, however, must clearly establish this performance to 
pay relationship in order to be successful (Per.Com., 1989).
The most common form of reward compensation is that of 
Merit Pay (Kanter, 1987). It is a conservative approach 
where management awards individual employees for performance
and productivity. Rewards can be distributed in several
/
forms, including periodic cash bonuses or permanent raises 
in a worker's base wage. The ideology behind this type of 
program is that it motivates employees to be receptive to 
managerial instructions, encourages productivity, and 
promotes greater latitude for production supervisors (Per. 
Com., 1988). Another desirable attribute is that it 
coincides with the traditional work ethic, where an 
individual's ability to financially succeed is determined by 
his own desires.
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The criticisms of Merit Pay primarily revolve around two 
essential issues: how to equitably determine the recipients 
and the amount of these rewards (Kanter, 1987). In most 
mining applications, the determination of an employee's 
contribution to an operation is highly subjective and, 
thereby, places a great deal of pressure on lower level 
supervisors. Because these appraisals are instrumental in 
forming performance distinctions between employees, 
supervisors involved in the evaluation process are often 
exposed to employee resentment and harassment (Per. Com.,
1988). In addition, these programs possess an inherent 
potential for managerial abuses.
Two common obstacles routinely found in most Merit Pay 
Systems are that they encourage the advancement of personnel 
possessing similar beliefs and backgrounds and that often, 
rewards may be distributed based on personalities or 
friendships rather than merit. The problems generated by 
these situations can have serious repercussions for long­
term economic growth and if improperly implemented, can 
stimulate attrition among skilled and productive employees 
by inept supervisors or weak managerial policies (Per. Com.,
1989) .
Another prominent program incorporated under reward 
programs is that of Seasonal Bonuses. Simplistic in nature,
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these bonuses are annual or semiannual cash gratuities 
designed to express company appreciation to employees in 
recognition of performance or other outstanding 
contributions and are usually distributed in conjunction 
with the holidays and/or vacation (Per. Com., 1989). These 
types of bonuses are occasionally contained in union wage 
agreements and are given to groups of employees without 
regard to merit. The amount of the bonus comprises a fixed 
percentage of an employee's base wage (Per. Com., 1988). In 
these situations, seasonal bonuses are no longer subjective 
in their application and are more representative of 
conventional base wage systems.
Behavioral Programs
Behavioral Incentives are monetary rewards, made in 
addition to base wages, to individuals who make specific 
contributions towards improving the efficiency and safety of 
a operation (Kanter, 1987). For instance, participation in 
voluntary programs, like mine rescue, or exceptional 
performance in safety programs would be rewarded. These 
bonuses are similar to those included under most Reward 
Programs. However, the utilization of Behavioral Incentives 
are strictly implemented to encourage employees to 
contribute toward objectives deemed important by the
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company. Some companies have expanded the role of these 
incentives to reward mine employees for contributions made 
to surrounding communities (Per. Com., 1988). This type of 
support promotes an outstanding corporate image and nurtures 
employee loyalty.
Suggestion and Entrepreneurial Pay
With the challenges facing today's mining industry, some 
operating companies have devised innovative programs thati
attempt to utilize the ingenuity and experience of their 
employees. These systems differ from traditional 
compensation schemes, where production personnel are often 
solely evaluated with respect to their physical 
contributions. It is the intent of these programs to 
encourage employee participation in developing new and 
efficient operating practices that will contribute to a 
company's economic prosperity. Two principle categories 
that contain these philosophies include: Suggestion and 
Entrepreneurial Systems.
Suggestion Systems have gained wide acceptance in the 
mining industry during the last decade. In essence, these 
programs reward employees that contribute ideas that improve 
the efficiency or safety of an operation (Per. Com., 1988). 
The structure of most programs is quite simple. Employee's
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submit ideas that are individually evaluated by mine 
management. If the idea is deemed to possess merit and is 
implemented, the employee receives a fixed percentage of 
savings generated by the idea over a finite period of time 
(Strauss, Sayles, 19 67). For suggestions where savings to 
the operation is not quantifiable or when they do not 
possess direct relevance to economic considerations, like 
safety, monetary rewards are distributed based on their 
projected impact (Per. Com., 1988).
These systems encourage the active participation of 
production employees in how a mine operates and develops. 
Proponents of Suggestion Systems contend that employees are 
often more familiar with factors influencing daily 
production than supervisors and/or engineers (Strauss, 
Sayles, 1967). Therefore, these systems allow management 
the opportunity of making operating decisions based upon a 
larger block of knowledge, including the experiences and 
expertise contributed by labor in the form of ideas and 
suggestions (Per. Com., 1988).
Multi-industrial surveys indicate successful Suggestion 
Programs may solicit 25 - 50 ideas for every one hundred 
employees, of which 25 - 35 percent will be accepted by 
management for application (Strauss, Sayles, 1987). In 
industry's that are extremely dependent upon skilled labor,
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such as underground vein mining, the potential benefits 
attributed to these systems could have greater relevance 
than the national norm.
Another innovative program based on the same premise as 
Suggestion Systems is that of Entrepreneurial Pay. This 
program compensates employee's who make contributions that 
benefit the long-term economic or technical interests of the 
company (Kanter, 1987). Examples include: discovery of new 
potential mining properties and the invention of patents 
applicable to mining or milling. Financial compensation 
under this program can be administered in numerous ways, 
including stock options, cash payments based on projected 
revenues, or cash payments tied to increases in the company 
stock. (Per. Com., 1988).
Indirect Compensation Programs
Indirect Compensation is, in essence, a cumulative 
collect of programs that encompass a wide range of 
alternative payment schemes that employees receive in 
addition to cash earnings. Three loosely defined categories 
characterize most indirect compensation packages: Employee 
Benefits, Perquisites, and Services. Employee Benefits, in 
the context of this thesis, refers to the traditional 
programs customarily contained in union negotiated labor
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agreements for underground production personnel. Benefits 
include health care programs, life insurance policies, 
pension plans, disability/death benefits, vacations, and 
holidays. Employee Perquisites reflect programs provided by 
a company to improve its relationship with their employees 
beyond conventional employee benefit systems and include 
savings plans, employee education programs, laundry 
services, low interest loans, and free personal equipment.
In nonunion operations, these two categories can often 
appear to be analogous. The third component of Indirect 
Compensation is Employee Services. These programs are 
common to mines in remote geographic areas and include 
living facilities, meals, and transportation associated with 
vacations or leaves. The type of benefits, perquisites, and 
services utilized by an operation are often dependent upon 
factors associated with individual operations, regional 
customs, and/or geographic locations. Factors affiliated 
with regional concerns include: the number of operating 
mines, the quality and size of the work force, economic 
prosperity, the cost of living, and the historical 
utilization of benefits implemented by operations or 
negotiated in labor agreements (Per. Com., 1989). Factors 
relevant to individual operations include: labor intensity, 
the frequency of accidents, the type of mining method,
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working conditions, number of employees, economic position, 
projected operating life, and corporate policies.
The cost of Indirect Compensation, largely due to health 
care, has risen at rates exceeding overall inflation 
(Marlnaccio, 1985). Figure 2-2 illustrates the average 
annual percentage increase in medical costs with respect to 
the CPI. As such, indirect costs affiliated with these 
programs now embody a significant portion of the total 
employee compensation package, in some industrial 
applications exceeding 40 percent (Rosenbloom, 1984).
Table 2-1 illustrates the relationship associated with the 
cost of benefit and perquisite programs offered by seventeen 
underground metal mining operations, with respect to the 
percentage of wages they pay for production employees. This 
table does not include operating costs for employee services 
in remote areas. The escalating costs affiliated with these 
benefit programs should be of continuing concern to most 
companies, particularly labor intensive operations.
Incentive Systems
Philosophy
There are a multitude of different philosophies of how 
financial inducements function as a motivational tool and 
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Figure 2-2 Annual Percentage Change in Health Care Costs 
with respect to the CPI (1970 - 1989)
Source: U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1990
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TABLE 2-1 Total Cost of Benefits and Perquistes as a 
Percentage of Wages Paid for Seventeen U.S. 
Underground Metal Mines (1988)
Union
Number of Operations: 5
Range in Percentages: 32 - 35%
Average Percent: 33.9%
Source: After Mining Cost Service, 1988
Non-Union
12
21 - 46% 
31. 0%
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Most incentive programs utilize monetary bonuses to 
encourage and motivate employees to achieve higher than 
normal productivities. These systems are adopted on the 
premise that potential earnings possess an inherent 
motivational quality (Kaas, 1971). It also iterates the 
traditional belief that employee productivity is merely a 
reflection of effort and that monetary compensation is of 
such importance to employees, that it can dictate and 
influence their behavior. Most managers recognize that 
these relationships are not as simple as they appear 
(Lokiec, 1977). Although money is generally valued as 
important to most individuals, it's role as a motivator is 
largely dependent on the need or the desire of employees to 
increase their income (Chruden, Sherman, 1972). In many 
situations, income fulfills only a component of an 
employee's total psychological and physical needs. 
Recognition, self realization, and other forms of 
achievement often possess a motivational impact equivalent 
to any monetary incentive (Lupton, Tanner, 1984). It is, 
therefore, imperative that management understands the basic 
needs of its employees and tailors incentive practices that 
are responsive to them. In addition, operations should be 
cognizant of how financial incentives function as a 
motivator and how they relate to nonmonetary forms of
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motivation (Per. Com., 1989). These relationships, as with 
employee needs, change through time and occasionally, may 
not be analogous with corporate goals and objectives. 
Successfully implemented programs allow companies to make 
concessions for these factors and continually appraise the 
needs of their workers to insure they coincide with 
managerial objectives (Per. Com., 1989).
It was the consensus of nearly all operators surveyed 
within this thesis that incentive programs embodied more 
than just financial rewards designed to increase employee 
productivity. Rather, that these systems provide numerous 
avenues for an operation to optimize conditions deemed 
important by management. These systems have effectively 
been utilized to control specific operating parameters, 
influence employee attitudes, and encourage quality 
workmanship (Per. Com., 1988). Furthermore, incentive 
programs can be implemented to increase employee interest in 
activities that are often tedious, promote efficient and 
innovative methods of working in hostile environments, and 
enable supervisors to effectively evaluated individual 
employee's (Per. Com., 1989).
Another primary benefit of these systems are that they 
can mitigate the adversarial relationship that often 
develops between a company and its employees (Per. Com.,
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1989). If designed properly, these systems can integrate 
the interests associated with both the company and labor 
through a cooperative relationship. Employees can receive 
higher earnings, improved working conditions, and fulfill 
other psychological and physical needs, while the company 
gains higher productivity, lower unit operating costs, 
improved employee morale, and other objectives incorporated 
within the design of the program (Strauss, Sayles, 1967). 
These mutually beneficial systems that link organizational 
objectives with the individual needs of labor can only be 
established through an environment of trust and 
communication (Chruden, Sherman, 1972). As such, it 
requires assurances that both parties will be treated 
equitably and that they believe in the integrity of the 
system, as well as each other.
It should also be stressed that increases in labor 
productivity and other benefits derived from these systems 
do not necessarily result from employees being driven to 
work harder. Rather, it is believed that these improvements 
commonly arise because workers are more attentive, utilize 
more efficient means of working, and are dedicated to the 
activities that they perform (Per. Com., 1989).
Incentive programs, however, should not be construed as 
a panacea for all operational woes. Often mining companies
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implement these programs in hopes of solving production 
related problems derived by factors ranging from 
deteriorating employee relations to inexperienced 
supervisory personnel (Per. Com., 1989). Successful systems 
require skilled and knowledgeable management that fully 
understand the complexities associated with their incentive 
program, employees, operation, and objectives. These 
programs are designed to improve functioning operations and 
are not meant to act as a remedy for production problems.
The major dilemma of utilizing incentive systems in these 
situations is that they are more apt to compound the damage 
than to alleviate it (Per. Com., 1989).
Additionally, if incentive programs are improperly 
designed or implemented the ramifications can directly 
contribute towards the total deterioration of labor 
relations, increase costs, lower productivity, and generate 
a host of results that are contradictory to an operation's 
original objectives (Per. Com., 1989). While there are 
inherent difficulties with designing and instituting any 
system, diligent planning and the careful evaluation of the 
operation and its personnel should mitigate these obstacles 
(Per. Com., 1989). The specific advantages and disadvan­




Incentives can be viewed as merely a vehicle by which a 
company measures and distributes the benefits created by 
labor through improved productivity or as a direct result of 
their actions. This approach may be oversimplified compared 
to the formal introduction of incentives presented in 
Chapter 1, however, it accurately conveys the mechanism 
through which these systems work. Performance is gauged 
with respect to established standards to determine financial 
rewards (Lokiec, 1977). The level of aggregation 
incorporated within an incentive program, (e.g., 
individuals, groups, production levels, work classifica­
tions, or the entire operation), is an important issue in 
the determination of a efficient and equatable system (Per. 
Com., 1989). The characteristics unique to an operation 
should dictate the size of this labor component, with the 
intent of optimizing the relationship between employee 
performance and monetary rewards. Additionally, the ability 
to objectively evaluate the performance of individual 
employees plays a role in designing a program that is 
applicable for certain job classifications (Per. Com.,
1989). These considerations have produced two distinct 
categories of incentive programs utilized in underground 
mining, Individual and Group Bonus Systems. Each category
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has traits that make it amenable to certain operating 
personnel. In some situations, both types of systems can be 
utilized to fulfill the same needs. It then becomes the 
responsibility of management to choose and modify a system 
that will optimize their objectives. It is common for a 
operation to implement both systems simultaneously, each 
encompassing different classifications of employees (Per. 
Com., 1989).
Individual Incentive Plans
Individual Incentive Systems are perhaps the oldest form 
of compensation utilized in the mining industry. Since the 
discontinuation of tributing systems in the 1920's, 
Individual Incentive Programs that maintain a employer- 
employee relationship have become synonymous with Contract 
Mining Systems. Also referred to as Gypo Mining, these 
systems reflect a wide array of individually based 
performance programs.
These systems are designed to evaluate the contribution 
of employees with respect to established performance 
standards. Standards can be predicated upon production, 
volumetric measurements, advancement, rate of project 
completion, by activity, or any other objective form of 
measurement that is representative of employee performance.
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How these standards are formulated into a system and how 
these systems are implemented in an operation predicate 
their operational value in achieving initial design 
objectives.
Financial rewards are distributed to individual 
employees in conjunction with measurable contributions made 
towards the completion of predetermined tasks or projects 
(Strauss, Sayles, 1967). These systems are, in essence, an 
agreement between mine administrators and specific employees 
that directly correlate performance standards to monetary 
awards. In some union operations, performance standards are 
contractually negotiated and are contained within their 
labor agreement. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 19 38 
require that operations engaged in incentive systems, pay a 
guaranteed base pay level which the employee earns 
irrespective of performance. This "guaranteed11 rate can 
correspond to a government legislated minimum wage, to 
established company wage scales, or to a negotiated rate 
between the employee and the company (Per. Com., 1988).
Most individual incentive programs embody numerous 
contracts based upon different performance standards. This 
is the result of inconsistent characteristics associated 
with stopes and work areas, diverse mining procedures, 
utilization of different equipment, and various activities
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incorporated in mining (Per. Com., 1988). It is not 
uncommon for an operation to "run" more than 2 0 contracts 
simultaneously (Per. Com., 1988). There are five principle 
categories of individual contracts that will be addressed 
through the course of this thesis, they include:
Production and Stope Contracts
- Development and Drift Contracts 
Construction and Repair Contracts
- Exploration/Drilling Contracts 
Haulage and Hoisting Contracts
Unlike the title implies, Individual Incentive Systems 
can effectively be applied to groups of employees as well as 
individuals. In fact, most operations surveyed during the 
progression of this thesis utilized contract programs that 
were designed with respect to specific work areas, where 
minimal consideration was given to the number of people 
included under the contract. With the current trends of 
some companies towards the implementation of Time-Based 
Incentive Contracts, man power is becoming a increasingly 
important component in the design formula. A comprehensive 
examination of individual contract systems, including 
personnel requirements, will be addressed during the next 
chapter.
Individual Contract Programs are generally associated 
with less mechanized operations, where the physical
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contributions of employees possess a large impact upon 
production and operating parameters (Per. Com., 1988). The 
direct and indirect advantages attributed to incentive 
programs has been repeatedly iterated through this chapter. 
There are benefits, however, uniquely affiliated with 
implementing contract systems. They tend to promote 
competition among miners, heighten pressure on individuals 
to perform, and force employees to accept responsibility for 
their own actions (Per. Com., 1988). Although, these 
factors may not be advantageous in all situations, they are 
highly valued by most mine managers.
Their are several major dilemmas associated with the 
application of individual incentives in most operations.
The first is establishing performance standards that are 
representative of employee effort, where earnings are 
proportional to increases in productivity. Operators 
designing these types of systems must be cognizant of 
rewarding performance based on extra effort and not 
productivity. Although there is a general perception that 
the two directly correlate, this is not always the case. 
Employees may then be rewarded for complicating their job, 
performing unnecessary activities, or be penalized for 
developing shortcuts (Per. Com., 1989). The level of 
aggregation also influences how performance standards are
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determined and ultimately, evaluated (Per. Com., 1989).
Once performance standards have been determined, it 
becomes necessary to develop objective means of measuring 
employee performance. This is actually more difficult than 
it appears. Measuring the collective performance of larger 
groups, such as entire operations, is readily available in 
the form of overall production, profitability, or metal 
yield. However, unbiased performance measurements of 
smaller groups or individuals is a formable task, in that 
there are fewer concrete forms of output to measure. In 
addition, objectively evaluating the productivity and effort 
exerted by a specific employee in relationship to the 
collective performance of a group, is difficult at best 
(Per. Com., 1989). Economic considerations also play an 
important role in the devising methods of measuring employee 
performance. Man power requirements associated with 
measuring and calculating contracts translated to a real 
cost incurred by the company (Per. Com., 1989). This 
becomes particularly evident for operations utilizing 
shorter pay periods, such as a week. The benefits 
attributed to using these contracts must offset these costs 
for prudent utilization by a operation.
Another essential ingredient for a successful contract 
system is the acceptance of the program by labor as well as
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by immediate supervisory personnel (Cruden, Sherman, 1972). 
Employees must believe that they are being treated equitably 
by the system and in the integrity supervisors and contract 
engineers. Similarly, management must also have confidence 
that the program is "not giving anything away" and that 
employees are earning the financial awards they receive. 
These systems, in order to work, must have the complete 
support of shifters and production supervisors and should 
incorporate their input. Furthermore, the implementation of 
incentive contracts based on new standards or measuring 
techniques must be properly designed and installed on the 
first try, if they are to gain the support of the employees 
(Per. Com., ,1989). These and other related topics will be 
discussed in Chapter 6 on Managerial Considerations for 
incentive programs.
Group-Bonus Plans
In many respects, Group Bonus Programs reflect the same 
structural characteristics associated with Individual 
Incentive Systems. For example, the intent of these 
programs is to establish objective standards through which 
employee performance is gauged and monetary rewards 
distributed in recognition of achievement. Similarly, 
performance can be judged with respect to productivity or in
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terms of any other operational objective(s). These systems 
differ from conventional contract programs both in 
application and in reference to establishing performance 
standards.
Group Bonus Systems, often referred to as Group-Sharing 
Plans, are highly amenable to certain applications where 
objective means of determining individual performance are 
not possible. Examples include individual job assignments 
that are so interrelated that determining the contribution 
of a single employee is difficult, in job activities where 
performance can not be quantified, and in situations where 
performance is not representative of employee effort (Per. 
Com., 1989). These conditions are indicative of many 
activities performed underground, particularly in mechanized 
applications where productivity is generally more dependent 
upon equipment capacity and availability than manual labor.
The principle advantage affiliated with Group Incentives 
is that it encourages group cooperation towards achieving 
specific objectives (Chruden, Sherman, 1972). Since 
employee earnings are dependent upon the cumulative 
performance of a group, most workers realize that 
cooperation is imperative (Strauss, Sayles, 1967). This 
relationship eliminates some of the problems often found in 
Individual Contract Programs, such ass the hording of
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equipment and resources, the inflexibility associated with 
allocating personnel to different job assignments, and 
competition for specific stopes, work areas, or partners 
(Per. Com., 1989). In addition, many believe these systems 
force miners to become more productive and develop skills 
quicker because of pressure exerted by fellow employees to 
perform. There is also an incentive for experienced miners 
to teach inexperience employees skills and efficient 
operating techniques (Per. Com., 1989).
Another benefit of conventional Group Incentive Systems 
are that they have successfully been adopted in conjunction 
with programs associated with safety, absenteeism, and 
training (Strauss, Sayles, 1967). Furthermore, these 
systems are often utilized to compliment Individual 
Incentive Programs. In operations where employees are 
engaged in a contract program and are dependent upon the 
activities of personnel that are not, it is highly 
advantageous to incorporate these noncontract workers into a 
Group Bonus System. Dependence on one another promotes a 
relationship of mutual cooperation and possesses 
psychological attributes associated with participating as a 
"team" (Per. Com., 1989). In addition, it unifies the 
priorities of all employees and establishes common 
obj ectives.
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The negative aspects of group incentives are that they 
do not possess the motivational influence affiliated with 
individual incentives* In a large operation, an individual 
may feel his efforts have little effect on the overall 
performance of the group and therefore, will typically be 
less productive (Strauss, Sayles, 1967). In addition, it is 
much more difficult to design a group bonus system that is 
responsive to secondary managerial objectives that are 
associated with operating characteristics (i.e., dilution, 
equipment availability, etc.) or tailored to specific site 
requirements (Per. Com., 1987). Bonus incentives are also 
inflexible from the perspective of being able to meet the 
changing needs of management in different parts of an opera­
tion. Other problems commonly experienced include those 
derived by group pressure, like fighting and alienation, the 
inability to accurately assess individual talents and 
performance, and difficulties with establishing equitable 
performance standards (Per. Com., 1989).
Applications in Mining
From a managerial perspective, it would be highly 
desirable if employee performance could be optimized through 
the sole application of a standard wage scale, without the 
influence of incentive programs (Per. Com., 1988).
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Unfortunately for most operations, this is not the case.
The wide spread utilization of incentive systems throughout 
the underground mining industry iterates the value of this 
managerial tool in influencing operating parameters and 
promoting productivity. There are, however, specific 
operating, geologic, and environmental characteristics that 
appear to be prevalent in operations that utilize incentive 
programs. These factors include:
High dependence on skilled labor 
Repetitive, tedious, or strenuous activities 
High labor costs
Utilization of low-tech equipment or methods 
High potential for production bottlenecks 
- Hostile working environments 
Shortages of skilled miners
The quantity and severity of the factors dictate the 
appropriate incentive system for a particular operation.
For example: most of these characteristics are indicative of 
traditional vein mining methods, where labor productivity is 
a influential factor in a mine's ability to operate. In 
these situations, it is often advantageous for mine 
operators to implement incentive programs to obtain a 
greater latitude of control over labor related issues. The 
utilization of Individual Incentive Systems generally 
accompany these types of applications. Inversely, 
operations that mine deposits that are amenable to
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sophisticated mining systems or possess high degrees of 
mechanization, mitigate the influences attributed by labor. 
Production is, therefore, determined by the capability of 
the equipment and to a much lessor degree, the expertise of 
operators and general labor. These factors greatly reduce 
the need of incentives that encourage individual 
productivity and performance. However, many of these 
operations have found that incentives, in the form of Bonus 
Systems, can be adopted to influence equipment availability, 
improve safety and absenteeism, and a host of other 
operational factors (Per. Com., 1989).
The purpose of integrating incentive programs in labor 
intensive operations has repeatedly been addressed through 
this thesis. However, to fully comprehend the impact of 
labor upon the economic viability of these mines, it is 
helpful to analyze the individual components that enable 
these operations to achieve higher earnings. From an 
academic perspective, increases in profitability for most 
mines is contingent upon four functions:
Higher metal prices 
- Higher Ore Grades
Lower operating costs
Increase in production above cutoff grade
Assuming a company is continually trying to mine the
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highest ore grade available, a mine has only a semblance of 
control over two of these factors, lowering operating costs 
and increases in production. Both these factors have 
variable and fixed components that dictate the potential for 
managerial manipulation. Fixed variables include production 
constraints associated with mine facilities and infrastruc­
ture as well as operating costs that are not subject to 
variable reductions (e.g., costs incurred for compressor 
utilization and hoisting). Variable components of these 
factors comprise elements directly affiliated with 
increasing labor productivity.
To further illustrate this point, the Maximum Production 
Capacity (MPC) attributed to most operations is a function 
of the number of working stopes, individual stope 
configurations (i.e., width, length, dip), and mining rate. 
In most situations, the number of operating production 
stopes as well as their physical configuration, is dictated 
by the geologic characteristics of the deposit, economic 
considerations involving mine infrastructure and equipment, 
mining method, and the rate of development. Once these 
decisions have been made and the operation is in production, 
managerial influences on the MPC are largely limited to the 
rate of production. The sequencing of stopes with respect 
to development is also based upon this excavation rate.
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Therefore, the degree of influence attributed by labor upon 
the mining rate for any operation is of considerable 
importance. In labor intensive operations, the obvious 
impact of employee productivity on the mining rate is the 
basis for adopting incentive programs that encourage 
employee performance.
Other potential benefits of incentives that have not 
been previously discussed include overcoming environmental 
obstacles, mitigating production fluctuations, and retaining 
experienced personnel.
Incentive systems have been particularly effective in 
applications where production areas are subject to adverse 
environmental conditions, including temperature, humidity, 
dust, noise, and poor ventilation. The net effect of these 
factors can produce a climate hostile to an individual's 
ability to perform productive work (Per. Com., 1989). A 
correlation is believed to exists between these 
environmental barriers and the disparity in individual 
performance. The greater the severity of these conditions, 
the larger the range in productive variations that are 
possible. To illustrate this point, imagine a manufacturing 
company that produces units of a specific commodity. Each 
unit is produced entirely by a single operator who possesses 
the same degree of expertise as his fellow employees. The
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range of units being produced between the most productive 
and the least productive operators should be relatively 
small. But as environmental factors change, such as 
temperature, humidity, and lighting, the potential range in 
unit production will increase. As these factors become 
severe, the disparity in productivity should become more 
pronounced. This proportional relationship is a 
psychological phenomena that incorporates an individual1s 
ability to cope with changing conditions as well as effort 
and concentration. Incentive systems can be designed to 
reward those individual that display these characteristics 
and encourage efficient, innovative, and productive methods 
of working in these environments (Per. Com., 1989).
Another attribute of incentive programs is that they can 
mitigate production oscillations that are often associated 
with operations that are dependent on manual productivity 
(Per. Com., 1989). These production inconsistencies often 
conform to specific events of interest to a labor force, 
such as: the shifts proceeding and following days off, the 
time of the year (season), and social/political events. 
Similar relationships can often be seen with respect to the 
daily production, where employee productivity is not 
consistent throughout a shift or between different shifts 
(e.g., grave yard shift vs day shift). The source of these
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oscillations appears to be related to the psychological 
state of production employees. Incentive programs tend to 
stabilize these effects by motivating employees to 
concentrate of specific organization objectives (Per. Com., 
1989).
A common problem associated with the dramatic decline in 
the underground labor pool, is the acquisition and retention 
of quality, experience miners (Per. Com., 1989). The long­
term decay in the labor market, illustrated in Figure 1-2, 
has caused most unemployed miners to seek stable employment 
outside the mining industry and away from traditional mining 
areas (Per. Com., 1989). This is particularly evident in 
some districts that contain more than one operating mine, 
due to competition for employees that possess specific 
skills. Individual incentive programs enable supervisors to 
accurately assess the abilities of individual employee's and 
allow personnel decisions to be based on objective standards 
of comparison (Per. Com., 1989). In addition, these systems 
can reflect managerial desires for the long-term retention 





The evolution of labor organizations have had a 
significant effect on the structural development of 
underground wage incentives. Formulated to collectively 
represent the interest of miners, these unions date back to 
Nevada silver boom of the mid 1860's (Wallace, 1976). The 
need for such representation was precipitated by the 
unscrupulous managerial practices and horrendous safety 
problems common to that time (Lingenfelter, 1974).
Equitable compensation was the principle factor that led 
to the formal inception of these early unions (Lingenfelter, 
197 4) . Payment systems, at that time, were often 
discriminatory and abuses quite common. A classic 
illustration was employee compensation in the form of 
company tender that was only redeemable at company owned 
businesses (Lingenfelter, 1974). In addition, wage 
practices like tributing or pay-by-result systems were 
calculated and distributed at the discretion of the company, 
where miners possessed little recourse in wage disagreements 
(Lingenfelter, 1974).
Another primary goal of this labor movement was to 
mitigate the safety hazards that plagued the industry. The 
accident rate associated with these early operations was a
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order of magnitude higher than comparable mines in the 
eastern United States or Europe (Lingfelter, 1974)• "One 
out of every thirty western miners was disabled every year 
in an accident. One out of every eighty was killed" 
(Lingenfelter, 1974). These appalling statistics infer that 
in a 30 year career, a miner should expect to be seriously 
disabled and would possessed a 38 percent chance of being 
killed while working underground.
Much of this changed with the forced adoption of 
collective bargaining agreements, like those developed in 
Butte and Wallace in the 1880's. However, while these 
agreements specified the types of wages and working 
conditions that were acceptable to the miner's union, 
numerous grievances developed over the influx of migratory, 
nonunion labor and their effect on the established work 
force (Elliott, 1963). In some locations, like 
Coer d'Alene, Cripple Creek, and Butte, these problems 
escalated to bloody conflicts over wage disputes between 
different labor groups and the mining companies. The 
evolution of these conflicts and the labor history of these 
districts have influenced the type and structure of wages 
generally applied for a specific local, including the 
implementation of incentive systems (Per. Com., 1989).
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Incentive Systems
Assuming successful incentive plans are characterized by 
increasingly stable companies, higher employee earnings, and 
improved employee morale, one could expect that labor unions 
would be supportive of operations implementing these 
programs. This is generally not the case. Incentive 
programs present obstacles to many of the philosophies 
embodied by most union organizations, this is particularly 
true for Individual Contract Systems (Lokiec, 1977). These 
programs encourage intergroup competition, differential 
earnings for employees, and rewards individual 
achievement (Lokiec, 1977). In addition, the acceptance of 
Individual Incentive Systems presents a philosophical 
problem for most unions. These systems are inherently 
designed to compensate productive employees with higher 
earnings than less productive workers. Therefore when 
negotiating for wage agreements, the union is faced with the 
dilemma on deciding whether to concentrate on trying to set 
standards that will unify the wage disparity of these 
workers, defend those employees making higher wages through 
incentives, or represent the interests of the less 
productive laborers (Per. Com., 1988). In most situations, 
it appears that union officials try to do all three, often 
at the expense of contract miners who earn the highest wages
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(Per. Com., 1988). In the mines surveyed for this study, 
nonunion contract miners earned typically 4 - 8  percent more 
than their union counterparts.
Unions are usually less apprehensive concerning Group 
Incentive Programs (Per. Com., 1988). These systems foster 
a cohesive working relationship between workers and 
distributes financial rewards evenly across the group. In 
addition, arbitration for employee interests are generally 
more closely unified for a given cross-section of employees 
(Per. Com., 1988).




This chapter will focus on the different types of 
contract incentives affiliated with production/ as witnessed 
during progression of this study. Some difficulties arose 
while trying to definitively organize specific contract 
systems into distinct classifications. This was principally 
attributed to the intricacies associated with numerous 
program variations existing in the industry. Nearly every 
contract system reviewed embodied characteristics unique to 
its own particular operating and managerial parameters. 
Therefore to aid in the analysis of these systems, this 
chapter will only present the basic generalities of contract 
structure and operation. Other secondary considerations 
related to specific operating characteristics and 
constraints will be addressed in Chapter 6.
Given these assumptions, it is possible to categorize 
stope and production contracts into four primary systems: 
Piece-Rate, Time-Based, Volumetric, and Linear Advance. 
Although these systems possess many common elements, each 
category represents a unique approach toward quantifying the 
relationship between employee performance and monetary 
retribution. During the course of this chapter, each 
program classification will be individually examined
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in-terms of structure, operation, and application.
As was discussed earlier, the preponderance of this data 
was acquired from sources that requested to remain 
anonymous. Therefore, unless otherwise cited, all reference 
material contained within this chapter is derived from 




Piece-Rate Contract Systems, in various forms, have been 
utilized in the underground hardrock industry for nearly 
seventy years. Although its popularity in the United States 
has steadily declined, it still remains a viable contract 
system in many Canadian and South American operations. In 
addition, elements endemic to these systems have been 
adopted into the structural formation of numerous other 
types of contract and bonus programs.
The intent of Piece-Rate Systems is to compensate each 
employee for every productive activity that he/she 
accomplishes, where the sum of these activities directly 
determine that employee*s incentive earnings. Based upon 
identifying the individual components or activities that 
comprise the mining cycle, these systems establish a
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specific value associated with each task performed. The 
value allotted to each activity is based on it*s duration 
and physical requirements, as well as the operating 
conditions and the type of equipment employed. Because 
these systems are founded on the premise of establishing 
standards with respect to different mining activities rather 
than specific production areas (Time-Base and Linear 
Systems), they are highly amenable to labor intensive 
operations that mine unpredictable geologic targets, possess 
a transient labor force, and/or utilize mining systems that 
necessitate the specialization of unit activities. There 
are two principle types of Piece-Rate Systems that will be 




The most elementary form of the traditional Piece-Rate 
Contract Programs is that of the Task Bonus systems. 
Conceptually these systems are quite simple, each activity 
corresponds to a specific monetary value attributed to the 
labor cost incurred while completing that activity. The 
installation of one 4 foot Split Set Bolt, for example, 
might equal $ 1.75. The sum of all values associated with
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the activities performed during a contract period is the 
basis through which monetary incentives are distributed.
The total dollar amount '•banked11 during the course of a 
contract is referred to as the miner's "Total Activity" for 
the period. The contract incentive is determined by 
subtracting an employee's accumulated Total Activity by the 
amount of wages earned through day's pay. This process is 
illustrated below:
Assume: Day's Pay (1 Shift) = $ 96.00/Shift
Day's Pay (5 Shifts) = $ 480.00/Wk
Total Activity (5 Shifts) = $ 816.00
Contract Incentive (5 Shifts):
$ 816.00 - $ 480.00 = $ 336.00
Contract Incentive (1 Shift):
$ 336.00/(5 Shifts) = $ 67.20
Total Employee Earnings/Shift:
$ 67.20 + $ 96.00 = $ 163.20
As with all contract systems, employees can not earn less
than the day's pay rate. Therefore, in this example, if the
contract incentive is zero or a negative number, the 
employee would earn a rate of $ 96.00 per shift.
Performance standards, in terms of assigning value to 
each activity, are determined through an iterative process
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of analyzing how each task is performed and how it relates 
to the sequencing of other activities. Although standards 
appear to be analytically ascertained, the process is 
heavily dependent upon the subjective appraisal by 
experienced mine administrators. As such, the practice of 
designating a value to an activity is highly contingent upon 
the individual operation. To demonstrate how the value of a 
task is delineated, an example will be presented that 
formulates the standard affiliated with installing a 4 foot 
Split Set Bolt. The first step is to calculate the number 
of actual working minutes that an average employee, at a 
day's pay rate, would be productive:
Total Shift Minutes = (8 hrs/shift x 60 min/hr) = 480 min
Less: Average Travel Time (Measured)
Beginning of Shift: 22 min
End of Shift: 20 min
Lunch (Company Policy): 3 0 min
Personnel Time (Company Policy): 30 min
Stope Startup/Teardown (Measured): 32 min
- 134 min
Total Working Time = 346 Min
Personnel time refers to breaks and rest periods that an 
employee takes during the course of a shift. Similarly, 
stope startup-teardown is the time at the beginning of a
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shift where the miner's orient themselves to the stope, find 
any necessary equipment, and make the work area safe. It 
also includes time at the conclusion of the shift to stow 
equipment away, dispose of refuse, etc.. The time 
affiliated with each category is derived through time 
studies of production areas, from company policy, or a 
combination of both.
The next step is to divide the Total Working Time by the 
labor rate associated with day's pay, producing a solution 
in units of dollars per working minute, called a Labor 
Multiplier. By multiplying this factor with the average 
time it takes to perform the activity (i.e., install the 
bolt), a labor cost or standard is determined. Assuming the 
average time associated with installing a 4 foot bolt is 7.2 
minutes, then:
Labor Multiplier = (Day's Pay)/(Total Working Time)
= ($ 96.00/Shift)/(346 Min./Shift)
= $ 0.277/Working Minute
Estimated Bolting Value = ($ 0.277/Min) X (7.2 Min)
= $ 1.99/bolt
The most arduous task in determining a equitable 
standard involves assigning each activity a representative 
average completion time. This requires an elaborate time 
study, which targets each activity in a multitude of 
different operating scenarios and environmental conditions.
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Furthermore, program considerations regarding different 
equipment types, support systems (e.g., nippers and/or skip 
tenders), and mine infrastructure must be incorporated 
within the study. Most operations employing these systems 
have used time standards that reflect the average conditions 
found throughout their operation. This minimizes the need 
to continually adjust standards for factors that adversely 
effect employee productivity.
Contract standards, however, can be adjusted to 
compensate for variable operating conditions through several 
different procedures. The most common method is to multiply 
the total accrued value earned by an employee by a weighting 
factor, derived either through a structured policy or by the 
expertise of an experienced mine administrator. Table 3-1 
illustrates an example of a subjective format used to 
determine a weighting factor that adjusts for changes in 
temperature and humidity, rock conditions, stope length, 
service factors, equipment, and any other factor(s) that the 
contract engineer deems applicable. Service factors 
includes items such as: raise height, distance to supplies 
and/or the level station, number of mine helpers or nippers, 
frequency of interference, etc.. The maximum adjusted value 
(the worst case scenario) in this example equals 5.0 times 
the estimated total incentive. For example,
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TABLE 3-1 Contract Adjustments For Operating Factors
STOPE: __________________________ DATE: _________
Temperature and Humidity Classification
(Normal) 1 2  3 4 5 (Extreme)
Rock Conditions
(Good) 1 2  3 4 5 (Poor)
Total Stope Length 
(In Units of Feet)
(< - 150) (151-200) (201-250) (251-300) (301 - >)
1 2 3 4 5
Service Classification
(Good) 1 2  3 4 5 (Poor)
Equipment Classification
1 2 3 4 5
Miscellaneous
1 2 3 4 5
Explain:
SUMMARY:
Temperature and Humidity Classification:___ _____
Rock Conditions:________________________________ _____






Weight Factor = [(Summary Pt. Total)/(6)]
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Assume: Total Activity (5 Shifts) = $ 532.00
Day's Pay (5 Shifts) = $ 480.00
Weighting Factor = 5.00
Contract Incentive (5 Shifts):
[($ 532.00 - $ 480.00) X 5.00] = $ 260.00
In terms of productivity, this means that the conditions 
outlined in Table 3-1 have accounted for a reduction in
employee performance by 80 percent. The denominator used to
calculate the weighting factor (e.g., 6 in this example) can 
be adjusted, prior to program implementation to correlate 
operating conditions with a desired wage level. This type 
of program relies extensively on the expertise of mine 
administrators to formulate relationships between 
detrimental factors and productivity.
The other major method of reconciling adverse conditions 
is to directly influence the individual standard associated 
with specific activities. Operations that utilizes this 
type of program are generally dependent upon miners 
performing specialized tasks, that often require them to 
move from one production area to another. In these 
situations, a combination of shifter discretion and 
production data gathered from time studies are used to 
formulate an appropriate standard.
Once a estimated activity value has been established for
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every component of the mining cycle and an appropriate 
procedure for adjusting standards has been adopted, final 
modifications in task standards can be studied. In most of 
the programs reviewed, activity standards were evaluated 
from a holistic perspective prior to their implementation. 
That is, the relational characteristics between task value 
and the realities of mining are examined in an attempt to 
alleviate potential complications. For example, operations 
that employ mining systems that rely on specialized 
personnel to perform specific unit activities, must gauge 
the potential wage disparity between groups of employees.
In addition, initial estimates of standards, like those 
derived from Table 3-1, assume that a correlation exists 
between the length of time it takes to perform an activity 
and how strenuous it is on the miner. This, however, is 
rarely the case. Therefore, there is a tendency for 
employees to avoid tasks that are physically more demanding 
and perform unnecessary work.
Card-Rating Systems
The other principle type of Piece-Rate Contract utilized 
in the industry are the Card-Rating Programs. These systems 
are, in essence, a hybrid of the Task Bonus Contracts 
discussed above and are based upon a numerical scale where
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points are assigned to each task an employee performs during 
the course of mining. The installation of a 4 foot Split 
Set Bolt, in this example, might equal two (2) points.
Point standards are determined by estimating the length of 
time a specific activity should take an average miner 
working on a day's pay rate, given specific operating and 
environmental conditions. At the conclusion of the contract 
period (e.g., a single shift, weekly, bimonthly, or 
monthly), the points are compiled, compared to a standard, 
where the points that exceed the standard are multiplied by 
a bonus rate to determine the contract incentive for the 
period. For example,
Assume: Day's Pay Rate = $ 9 6.0 0/shift
Bonus Rate = $ 5.2 5/point
Point Standard = 80 Points/shift
Therefore, if an employee earned 464 points during a 5 shift 
contract period, then:
Point Standard (5 Shifts) = 80 Pts X 5 Shifts = 400 Pts
Contract Incentive (5 Shifts) = (464 - 400) X $ 5.25/Pt
= $ 336.00
Contract Incentive/Shift = $ 336.00/5 Shifts = $ 67.20
Total Employee Earnings/Shift = $ 67.20 + $ 96.00
= $ 163.20
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This particular employee has earned a contract incentive of 
$ 67.20/shift over the entire contract period. As 
previously stated, employees can not earn less than day's 
pay, even if they earn less than the established point 
standard.
The bonus standard represents only a percentage of an 
average miner's accomplishments at day's pay rate, less any 
deductions to account for adverse operating conditions, 
equipment variations, and other factors that effect 
productivity. The standard is derived through extensive 
time studies of each activity in a range of operating 
scenarios and environmental conditions. Most operations 
establish point standards that enable the average miner to 
earn a percentage above day's pay rate. This is 
accomplished by multiplying the Adjusted Average Point 
Standard for a day's pay employee by a discount factor, 
usually in the range of .7 - .9 times the expected point 
total. To illustrate this procedure,
Assume: Average Expected Point Total = 12 0 Pts
Stope Adjustment = 2 0 Pts
Discount Percentage = .80
Established Pt. Standard = (120 Pts - 20 Pts) X .80 = 80 Pts
The stope adjustment compensates for detrimental factors 
that influence employee productivity beyond the tolerances
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constructed within the adopted activity standards. Programs 
that modify these standards to offset variable operating 
conditions are similar to the procedures derived from Task 
Bonus Systems. However, instead of formulating a weighting 
factor which is used to multiply the total contract 
incentive, these systems generally use Point Adjustment 
Factors, which are then subtracted from the Expected Point 
Total. While most systems in this study contain provisions 
for lowering the standard, none of the systems that were 
examined had a means of raising the standards in situations
where the conditions were more favorable than anticipated.
Determining the individual value affiliated with each 
activity is merely a continuation of the process outline in 
the Task Systems. Once a initial value has been determined, 
it is divided by the day's pay standard to achieve a percent 
value of the rate. The quantity is then multiplied by the 
desired Average Expected Point Total to equal a point value. 
To demonstrate this process, the standard value calculated 
for the installation of a 4 foot Split Set Bolt will be 
used. Therefore,
Assume: Estimated Bolting Value = $ 1.99/Bolt
Average Expected Point Total = 12 0 Points
Day's Pay Rate = $ 96.00/Shift
Point Standard/Bolt = (1.99/96.00) X 120 = 2.5 Points
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Adjustments to these standards are analogous with the 
process and philosophy discussed in Task Systems. In 
addition, the Average Expected Point Total can be 
manipulated up or down, causing changes in the magnitude of 
point values associated with individual activities. This is 
important from the perspective of assigning point standards 
to activities that lend themselves to convenient 
calculation. Contracts with low point totals are indicative 
of programs that possess task standards with fractional 
values and where the distribution of certain standards do 
not pictorially reflect the physical disparity between the 
activities. Furthermore, mining systems that employ 
numerous activities might bear standards less than a single 
point. These conditions are normally viewed as unfavorable 
from an operational posture and can be easily elevated by 
raising the desired point total.
If an activity is of such stature that it can not be 
accomplished prior to the relocation of the participating 
employees (e.g., the installation of a chute set), each 
component of the Total Activity must possess a standard that 
is proportional to the value of the entire task. Therefore, 
any fraction of the activity that is completed corresponds 
to an associated value earned by the employee.
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Characteristics of Piece-Rate Systems
A key benefit of most Piece-Rate Programs is that the 
mining cycle is broken into elementary tasks which enables 
contract administrators to quickly assess the incentive 
earned by a specific individual at any given time. The one 
possible exception is the financial contribution that 
originates from mucking. Developing the incentive allotment 
for this activity is nearly identical to the procedure that 
will be outlined in Time-Based and Volumetric Contract 
Systems, including stope measurements, holdback, and 
payouts. In the context of traditional Piece-Rate, each 
cubic foot of rock mucked translates to a specific activity 
value, such as 3 points or 24 cents per cubic foot. 
Determining the volume an employee mucks at any given time, 
particularly in larger rounds, becomes a real predicament. 
Therefore, volumetric measurements are generally used to 
determine the amount of in-place rock which was removed 
(mucked) during a specific cut or round. Determining an 
employees incentive contribution for mucking is then simply 
a function of calculating the percentage of time contributed 
by a miner based on a weighted average. For example,
Assume: Total Volume Mucked = 2 42 0 Cubic Feet
Incentive Rate = l Point/Cubic Ft
Mucking Time (Employee A) = 15 Man-Hours
Mucking Time (Employee B) = 6 Man-Hours
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Then, the employee incentive equals:
Employee Incentive = (EH/TMH) X (TV) X (IR)
where: EH = Employee Hours
TMH = Total Mucking Hours 
TV = Total Volume Mucked 
IR = Incentive Rate
Incentive (Employee A) = (15/15+6) X (2420 eft) X (l Pt/cft)
= 1728.6 Pts
Incentive (Employee B) = ( 6/15+6) X (2420 eft) X (1 Pt/cft)
= 691.4 Pts
In situations where the cut can not be mucked out in a 
single pay period, a procedure for estimating the volume of 
rock removed in a given period must be adopted. The most 
popular estimating procedure involves direct stope 
measurement with utilization holdbacks and pay advances.
This process will examined in Time-Based Contract Systems.
Piece-Rate Contract Programs are highly amenable to 
employee specialization with respect to unit operations, 
including drilling, timbering, mucking, blasting, and 
sandfill. These classifications are often structured to 
reflect seniority and wage promotions. For example, the 
standard base wage affiliated with a driller might be 
$ 12.50 per hour, while the wage standards associated with 
the other classes of miners could decline to the low of 
$ 9.7 5 per hour for general underground laborers. In
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addition, the structure of Piece-Rate Programs invariably 
make some activities "easier" than others, in terms of 
manual labor versus financial benefits. Many operations use 
these disparities to give preferential treatment to 
employees that possess seniority.
Most Piece-Rate systems utilize some form of contract 
cards, which are often pictorial, that enables each 
participating employee to record the type and amount of work 
performed during the shift. Figure 3-1 is an example of a 
contract card utilized in a Task Bonus Program, where 
activity standards are measured relative to drifting. In 
addition, contract cards are generally made with respect to 
the different types of stopes within a operation and the 
activities associated with each stoping method. They 
include such things as: the number of feet drilled, the 
number of bolts installed, number of stulls constructed, 
etc.. At the conclusion of the shift, the shifter or 
foreman collects the cards from his crew and compares the 
performance of each individual against his own observations 
made during shift. Because verifying every activity a group 
of individuals has performed during a shift is a rather 
formable task, shifters in successful Piece-Rate Systems 
supervise relatively small groups of employee*s (e.g., 8 - 
12 men). Even in optimal situations, shifters are forced to
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Figure 3-1 Contract Cards - Task Bonus Systems
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rely heavily upon the honesty of the miners. Therefore, 
most systems, clearly establish rules that govern if an 
employee is caught cheating while on contract.
These systems are intimately dependent upon the 
experience and integrity of the production supervisors. In 
most applications, they are the principle administrator 
dictating activities to be performed, employee assignments, 
completion specifications, and activity inspections. These 
types of requirements necessitate the utilization of 
experienced and seasoned professionals who are familiar with 
the unique operating characteristics of a particular 
operation. To meet these prerequisites, an operation 
generally finds itself hiring miners as shifters.
Operations that rely heavily upon the discretion of shifters 
for employee wage decisions possess the potential for 
numerous problems. Extraordinary pressure for leniency is 
placed on these individuals by miners with whom they have 
worked or socialized. Furthermore, most operations are too 
large to allow contract engineers or mine superintendents to 
constantly monitor the shifter's decisions or verify the 
activities they credit individual employees. Therefore, 
problems related to favoritism, employee alienation, 
interpersonal conflicts between miners, and a host of other 
abuses often emanate from the application of these systems.
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A classic example of a shifter undermining the objectives of 
this contract program is illustrated by the common practice 
of "carrying activities". This practice credits employee's 
for worked performed on a normalized basis without regard to 
what was actually accomplished. For example, if a backstope 
round is designed for 120 holes but the miners pull the 
round with only 90 holes, the shifter would be guilty of 
"carrying the round" if he credited the miners for drilling 
and blasting the designed number of holes (i.e., 120 holes). 
This practice translates to a 25 percent reduction in worker 
productivity to achieve the same standard. In addition, 
while the miner's affiliated with drilling and blasting 
maximize their bonus payment by using fewer holes and a 
larger spacing, the larger rock fragment size precipitated 
by blasting this way will cause problems for miners on 
mucking and haulage contracts. similar problems include the 
inflation of activity standards, declining work quality, 
crew interference (particularly if they do not possess the 
same objectives), and the hording of equipment. These prob­
lems are further magnified if the shifters receive a bonus 
based upon the recorded productivity of their crews.
In an attempt to alleviate these obstacles, most 
operators routinely rotate crews with respect to shifters 
and stopes. Productivity losses associated with this
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procedure are generally justified by companies in terms of 
gains in reporting accuracy. In these situations, shifters 
do not spend any length of time in a particular stope or 
with a specific crew. This increases the ability of 
shifters to police themselves by verifying the relationship 
between recorded tasks and subsequent activities.
Contract Example
To illustrate the process of calculating incentive 
allotments for a Piece-Rate Systems, an example problem of a 
Task Bonus Program will be examined. Assuming task 
standards and weighting factors have been derived, 
determining the allocation of employee bonuses largely 
becomes an exercise in bookkeeping, where production 
records, shifter reports, and contract cards are compared 
and the results verified through visual inspections and 
measurements performed by the contract administrator.
STEP #1: STOPE MEASUREMENT
At the conclusion of the contract period, the contract 
engineer, generally accompanied by the mine superintendent 
and shifters, will examine each stope including all timber 
work, bolting/stulls, and other recorded activities to 
insure that they have been completed and comply to mine
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specifications. In addition, each stope is surveyed to 
determine the volume of rock that has been excavated during 
the period. The process of stope verification is done to 
check the performance of individual employee's and place 
some form of accountability on the shifters for task 
reporting. However, because blasting often makes it 
impossible to accurately assess the amount of work that has 
been performed within a stope (e.g., the number of drill 
holes or bolts), the shifters still possess enormous impact 
on how incentives are distributed.
STEP #2: TASK ACCOUNTING
Once stope measurements have been completed, the next 
step is to examine the daily production reports prepared by 
the shifters. Table 3-2 is an example of one such a report. 
These reports are completed for every shift and incorporate 
the stopes under a particular shifters supervision. As was 
stated earlier, the difficulties attributed to monitoring 
the performance of employees under a Piece-Rate System 
necessitate that shifters supervise relatively small groups 
of employees, typically encompassing 2 - 3  production stopes 
and 1 - 2  development/construction projects. Therefore in 
large operations, it is not uncommon to have 10 or more 
shifters during a single shift. Each production report
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TABLE 3-2 Shifter*s Daily Production Report
SHIFTER:
DATE: SHIFT:
-CTCFE:   WEIEHTINB FACTOR:
B o l t s  Tim ber  H o l e s  D r i l l e d  Holes  S h o t  U t i l i t i e s  H u c i in o  R e o a i r s
■ l in e r No* Tvpe ! U n i t s Type Hub Type !Ny»! Tvce FT T yp? V o l u B e l E a o i p i H r s Tyce Mrs
: : :
: ! : ! ;
: ! ! ‘ :
WORK AREA: __________________________  WEIGHTING FACTOR:   TYPE OF REPAIR:
B o l t s  T j i b e r  H o l e s  . D r i l l e d  Holes  S ho t U t i l i t i e s  ft uck ino  H i s c e l l a n e o u s





includes the work areas for which the shifter is 
responsible, the employees that participated in each work 
area, the number of hours they worked there, and what they 
accomplished. Furthermore, a weighting factor is assigned 
to each stope which is used to compensate for adverse 
operating conditions that detrimentally effect employee 
productivity. In situations where an employee moves from 
one work area to another within a shift and each is 
supervised by a different shifter, each supervisor records 
the amount of time that the employee spent working at his 
respective area and the activities that were subsequently 
performed.
In most operations, shifter reports are synthesized each 
day to isolate the activities performed by individual 
employee's and to itemized these accomplishments in 
relationship to production areas and work hours (Table 3-2). 
These tally sheets are then compared to the Contract Cards 
submitted by each miner at the conclusion of every shift.
If discrepancies exist, it is generally the responsibility 
of the chief contract administrator and the mine 
superintendent to determine the appropriate settlement.
This evaluation process ideally occurs as soon as possible 
to mitigate the severity of potential disagreements and to 
resolve conflicts before physical evidence is destroyed
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(e.g., drill holes). As Table 3-3 illustrates, each 
activity translates to a monetary value which has been 
adjusted, through stope weighting factors, to compensate for 
adverse conditions. These values are "banked" on a daily 
basis through the course of the contract period.
The calculation of mucking incentives, however, are 
contingent on the frequency of stope surveys. In most 
Piece-Rate Systems, stope measurements were performed every 
week, regardless of the duration of the contract period. 
Individual incentive allotments are calculated by 
multiplying the stope volume excavated during the period by 
a muck rate ($/cubic foot). This product is then multiplied 
by a weighted average dependent upon the proportion of time 
each employee participated in mucking out that particular 
stope, as recorded by the shifter. This procedure is 
illustrated below,
Assume:
Contract Duration = 1 week
Total Volume Mucked = 480 Cubic Feet
Mucking Rate = $ 1.00/Cubic Ft
Total Mucking Hours (Stope 1000-154) = 32 Man-Hours
Employee Mucking Hours = 16 Man-Hours
Mucking Incentive = [(480 CFT) X ($ 1.00/CFT) X (16/32)]
= $ 240.00
If muck remains in the stope at the conclusion of a pay
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TABLE 3-3 Piece-Rate Activity Calculations 
DAILY PERFORMANCE LOG
PERIOD BEGINNING: _______________  PERIOD ENDING: ___________
EMPLOYEE: ______________________________________________
BOLTING:
Day Stope WF Num Type Rate Total
Bolting Subtotal:
TIMBERING:
Day Stope WF Unit Type Rate Total
Timbering Subtotal:
UTILITIES:
Day Stope WF FT Type Rate Total
Utilities Subtotal:
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TABLE 3-3 Piece-Rate Activity Calculations [Continued]
DAILY PERFORMANCE LOG 
(Continued)
HOLES DRILLED:
Day Stope WF Num Type Rate Total
Holes Drilled Subtotal:
HOLES SHOT:
Day Stope WF Num Type Rate Total
Holes Shot Subtotal:
MUCKING:
Day Stope WF Volume Equip Hours Rate Total
Mucking Subtotal:
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TABLE 3-3 Piece-Rate Activity Calculations [Continued]
DAILY PERFORMANCE LOG 
(Continued)
REPAIRS:
Day Stope WF Hrs Type Rate Total
Repair Subtotal:
MISCELLANEOUS:











Total Activity for Period:
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period, then the process outlined in Time-Based Systems for 
estimating pay advances will be used, including the 
utilization of a holdback.
STEP #3: CONTRACT SETTLEMENT
At the conclusion of the period, the daily itemized 
employee activity reports are compiled and dollar values 
totaled, including contributions attributed to mucking. 
Income earned in the form of day's pay is then subtracted 
from the Total Activity to equal the Total Employee 
Incentive for the period. Employee man-hours must also be 
accounted for, including overtime, to insure that the 
incentive is greater than the day's pay standard. For 
example,
Assume: Contract Duration = 1 week
Total Activity = $ 870.15 
Day's Pay Rate = $ 96.00/Shift 
Over Time Rate = $ 154.00/Shift 
Employee Hours (Contract) = 40 Hours (5 Shifts)
(OverTime) = 8 Hours (1 Shift)
Base Wage = (5 Sh) X ($ 96.00) + (1 Sh) X (1.5 X $ 96.00) 
= $ 480.00 + $ 144.00 = $ 624.00
Contract Incentive/Period = $ 870.15 - $ 624.00 = $ 246.15 
Contract Incentive/Shift = ($ 246.15/6 shifts) = $ 41.03 
Employee Earnings/Shift = $ 41.03 + $ 96.00 = $ 137.03
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It is apparent that the present structure of this program 
does not encourage overtime work from an employee's 
perspective since the more hours worked on overtime, the 
lower the incremental rate becomes. It does, however, 
enable a company to distribute the labor cost incurred by 
overtime over the entire work week. This is a vivid example 
of how the structure of these systems can be formulated to 
complement the specific objectives of an operation.
Time-Based Systems
Time-Based Systems are perhaps the newest and fastest 
growing form of contract incentives utilized in the mining 
industry today. These systems are based upon established 
performance standards that represent the productivity of the 
average miner in a specific stope or work area. In turn, 
bonuses are paid for employee productivity that exceeds the 
performance standard. These programs are highly amenable to 
labor intensive operations that mine uniform and/or 
measurable deposits with mining methods that incorporate 
cyclical activities performed in sequential horizontal cuts, 
such as conventional Cut and Fill Mining. Time-Based 
Programs significantly differ from traditional contract 
programs in how employee performance is gauged and 
evaluated. Miners incorporated under these systems perform
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all of the necessary tasks required in mining a specific 
area, including sand preparation and fill.
Program Design
Performance standards are individually determined by 
evaluating each stope and work area to assess the amount of 
labor required to completely mine one or more designated 
stope cuts or cycles. These standards are based upon 
management's perception of what an average miner on day's 
pay should accomplish. Performance standards represent 
labor productivity, measured in units of ton/man-shift or in 
the quantity of time necessary to complete a specific 
activity. If employee performance exceeds the established 
standard, a monetary reward is paid to those individuals 
participating in the contract. As with Piece-Rate Systems, 
most Time-Based Contracts were designed with standards that 
would enable a miner with average skills and abilities to 
earn a certain percentage above the day's pay rate for a 
stope miner, typically in the order of 1.3 - 1.6 times the 
standard rate. These systems, therefore, presents the 
opportunity for efficient and hardworking production 
employees to earn considerably more than a structured wage 
scale•
Once a productivity standard has been established for a
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particular stope, a bonus rate can be determined on a per 
ton basis. Referred to as the "price per ton", this rate is 
calculated by dividing the average base wage per day (day's 
pay) by the performance standard for the stope. For 
example:
Stope Miner's Base Wage = $12.00/hour
Day's Pay = ($12.00/hour) x (8 hours/shift) = $96.00/shift
Stope: 1000-800
Performance Standard = 8 tons/man-shift
Bonus Rate = ($96.00/man-shift)/(8 tons/man-shift)
= $ 12.00/ton
Stope: 3000-500
Performance Standard = 14 tons/man-shift 
Bonus Rate = ($96.00/man-shift)/(14 tons/man-shift) 
= $ 6.86/ton
This illustrates that both performance standards and bonus 
rate (price) are a numerical representation attributed to 
how difficult a specific stope is to mine. These factors 
are dependent upon the tonnage excavated during the contract 
and the time required to mine it. These two ingredients 
comprise the essence of Time-Based Incentive Programs in 
stope production contracts. In addition, because 
performance standards are established with respect to 
specific areas, the number of employees included under a 
single contract can vary. The total time contributed by
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employees participating in the stope, however, must 
carefully be measured to determine productivity.
The length of a contract in a particular stope is 
largely dependent on it's physical parameters, the 
complexities associated with mining, and managerial 
considerations, like the duration between employee pay 
periods. Time, in vein mining applications, is inevitably 
measured with respect to cycles or cuts. In this thesis, a 
cycle refers to the mining of one horizontal slice of the 
stope (1 cut). The number of cycles or cuts implemented in 
a contract is based upon several factors including time, the 
geologic variability in the deposit, and managements ability 
to accurately estimate stope characteristics and time 
projections. Optimally, the time associated with mining one 
cycle would be equivalent to a single employee pay period.
In these situations, the bonus payment would exactly 
represent what the employee earned during that period. 
Unfortunately this is very rarely the case. Every stope 
contract reviewed in this study exceeded more than one 
scheduled pay period. In these situations, contract 
administrators issue "pay advances" based on estimating what 
percentage of the contract has been completed during that 
pay period. Pay advances usually represent only a portion 
of the total value earned by miners during that period,
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typically in the range of 70 - 90 percent. The reason for 
not paying the full amount, often called a holdback, is to 
insure that the company does not over pay employees in 
situations were contracts possess erroneous estimations.
Once the contract is completed, a final adjustment is made, 
where total tonnage measurements are calculated with 
employee man-shifts to determine the actual earnings for the 
contract. Pay advances are then subtracted from total 
contract price and the residual amount is paid to the 
employees, often called a payout. The longer the duration 
of the contract, the greater the chance of errors associated 
with inaccurate tonnages, unexpected conditions, and 
employee payments. Most companies prefer to run shorter 
contract periods to mitigate these problems. The most 
common contract duration witnessed in this study was a 
equivalent to a single cut.
Performance Standards
Work standards are determined by individually examining 
each production area to assess all of the necessary 
activities and tasks that must be accomplish to mine that 
particular stope. This analysis includes the examination of 
stope configuration (width, length, dip), ground conditions, 
equipment utilization, mining method, work and safety
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regulations, environmental conditions, and a host of other 
factors that will effect the efficiency of employee 
performance. As was stated earlier, these standards 
numerically represent the difficulty attributed with mining 
a specific stope. For example, a difficult stope might 
possess a work standard of 5 ton/man-shift and include 
characteristics like: poor rock conditions, high temperature 
and humidity, and a shallow dip, where a stope much easier 
to mine with good rock conditions, moderate temperature, and 
a steep dip might be indicative of a standard of 14 
tons/man-shift. It is evident that productivity standards 
reflect managements evaluation of potential difficulties 
affiliated with mining a particular work area.
Delays and downtime attributed to materials handling, 
equipment maintenance, mechanical inavailability, equipment 
moves, safety considerations, etc., must be incorporated 
within a stope1s performance standard. The influence of 
these components can be determined through a combination of 
sources including historical data, equipment 
specifications, and time studies. There are, however, 
unforeseen circumstances that can occur which will have a 
detrimental effect on productivity, such as cave-ins, rock 
bursts, vein offsets, or timber conversions. Most systems 
contain clauses that take these conditions into account.
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For example, one proven method is to measure the influence 
attributed by these conditions on productivity. If they 
reduce the production standard by more than a specified 
percentage (e.g., 10%), work associate with rectifying the 
condition will be paid separate to the initial stope 
contract.
Similarly, if circumstances such as no air or water, 
excessive smoke, or being muck bound prevent employees from 
performing productive work within the stope, most systems 
required the immediate supervisor to bring the miners out of 
the stope and take them off contract until the problem can 
be resolved. This, however, should not include breakdowns 
associated with most types of production related equipment 
used within the stope, like jacklegs and slushers. By 
including the mechanical availability and maintenance of 
these pieces of equipment in the production standard, it 
gives the miners incentive not to abuse equipment and keep 
it properly maintained.
The determination of an equitable standard for a 
specific work area is generally accomplished through two 
processes: the evaluation of historical production related 
data and the utilization of conventional time studies. 
Contract incentives should only be implemented in operations 
that have normalized production and have established a
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historical basis from which accurate performance standards 
can be determined. Optimally, it is advantageous to possess 
production records collected from a diverse and extensive 
number of stopes within the operation or adjacent 
operations. Relationships between productivity and specific 
geologic/operating conditions can then be constructed.
Time studies further aid in the evaluation of 
performance standards by supplementing information on 
specific activities or new mining innovations. It often 
becomes necessary to assess the time associated with each 
individual component that comprises the mining cycle. This 
can be a rather tedious process and requires the 
participation of highly experienced managerial personnel. 
Table 3-4 illustrates some of the operational elements 
required in a small Cut and Fill Stope. The cumulative time 
of these unit activities can be used to verify and augment 
information acquired through historical performance. In 
addition, these studies enable periodic adjustments in 
performance standards to account for the introduction of new 
or different equipment and methods of mining. Furthermore, 
shifters and supervisors can often contribute a wealth of 
information that can assist in establishing and modifying 
standards through observations of specific activities under 





TABLE 3-4 Unit Activities Affiliated With A 
Cut and Fill Production Stope
This is a partial list of the activities that must 
be analyzed to establish a performance standard for 
a small Cut and Fill Production Stope.
Drilling time/hole MUCKING:
Drill Queuing and Moves 












Securing Equipment/Protecting Raise 
Checking Round after Blast
Setting Slusher Pins/Extend Pulley Bar 
Grizzley Placement 
Slusher Placement
Slushing Time per CFT of Stope Volume


















- Interruptions (e.g.. Shifters, Surveyers, Geologists)
- Extending Utilities
- Personnel Time (Livich, Breaks, etc.)
- Travel Time To and From the Stope
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application of time studies will be addressed in Chapter 6.
It usually becomes advantageous for a company to 
incorporate the relationships derived from these sources 
into a structured format that allows miners to fully 
understand how a performance standard for a particular stope 
was determined. Through a combination of historical data,
c
time studies, and performance appraisals, basic standards 
are developed for specific stoping methods with a given set 
of constraints. Similarly, factors that influence the 
productivity between work areas must be identified and their 
effects quantified. Because these constraints, called 
Critical Variables, often change with the application of 
different operating techniques and stope characteristics, 
their effects on productivity must be reflected in the 
standards.
Table 3-5 represents an example of an evaluation process 
that establishes a standard for a given set of stope and 
operating conditions. In this example, the Critical 
Variables that differentiate labor productivity between work 
areas are stoping method, shift differential, stope width, 
rock support, and the dip of the vein. Base standards have 
been determined with respect to stoping method (i.e., 
Backstoping or Breast Down Cuts) for a specified set of 
operating constraints. The difference in base productivity
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TABLE 3-5 Evaluation of stope Performance Standards
BASE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS:
Note: Includes all activities associate with piping,
raising, mining, clean out, raise timber, all sand 
prep, and safety.
BACKSTOPE CUT 9 tons/man-shift
- 6 foot Cut Height
- 2 Chute Sets
- Double Breasted Stope
- Equipment: Stopers/Jacklegs and Slushers
- Rock Support as needed
BREASTDOWN CUT
- 6 foot Rounds
- 6 foot Cut Height
- 2 Chute Sets
- Double Breasted Stope
- Equipment: Jacklegs and Slushers








- Up to 5.0 feet
- 5.0 to 7.0 feet
- 7.0 to 10.0 feet
- 10.0 to 14.0 feet
Over 14.0 feet




- 1/2 ton/man-shift 
0 ton/man-shift 
+ 1/2 ton/man-shift 
+ 1 ton/man-shift
Ground Conditions:
- Base Standards incorporate average ground conditions 
through the mine. In situations were a high degree of 
timbering or rock support is necessary, an adjustment 
up to -2 tons/man-shift can be made at the discretion 
of the Mine Superintendent or Contract Administrator.
Average Vein Dip: (used for vein widths 10 feet or less)
- Up to 50 degrees - l ton/man-shift
- 50 to 70 degrees - 1/2 ton/man-shift
7 0 to 9 0 degrees 0 ton/man-shift
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between these two methods is, therefore, the result of unit 
activities characteristic of each method. In this example, 
Backstoping possesses a base productivity standard of 9 
tons/man-shift for the following variables: double shifting, 
stope width of 7 - 10 feet, good ground conditions, and a 
vein dip steeper than 7 0 degrees. Any deviation or 
variability in these conditions, such as a narrower stope, 
will impact the standard. Furthermore, "add-ons" or 
additions associated with special conditions (i.e., the 
extension of an I-Drift) that are not included in the base 
performance standard, can either be added to the contract by 
adjusting the base standard or by issuing a new supplemental 
contract.
Contract Example
To illustrate how this method is employed, an example 
stope (Stope #2000-464) will be used to simulate the 
progression of a sample Time-Based Contract. It is assumed 
that this stope is indicative of those included in Table 3-5 
and possesses the following characteristics:
- Contract Duration Equals (1) One Cut
- 6 foot Backstope Cut
- Double Breasted Stope (1 Miner/Side)
- Single Shifted
- 6 foot Stope Width
Good Ground Conditions
65 degree Average Vein Dip
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STEP #1: DETERMINATION OF STOPE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
The utilization of performance standards in Table 3-5 
assumes that the operation has previously compiled a 
structured data base and/or system for establishing 
productivity relationships with respect to specific 
operating parameters. Given this format, standards can be 
determined for any particular work area or stope. Table 3-6 
illustrates this process for the sample Stope #2000-464.
The productivity standard in this example is 8.5 tons/man­
shift.
Prior to initiating the contract calculations outlined 
in Table 3-6, it is imperative that the company official 
responsible for administrating the contract visit and 
measure the stope. This is done as a precautionary measure 
to verify specific parameters and assumptions incorporated 
within the contract. In addition, accurate notes kept in a 
contract or field notebook frequently alleviates future 
problems, particular with disgruntle employees.
STEP #2: STOPE CUT PROJECTION
Once the productivity standard has been established for 
the stope, the contract administrator must estimate the 
tonnage that will be excavated during the cut. The accuracy 
of this estimate is important because it is used to
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TABLE 3-6 Evaluation of Stope Performance Standard
STOPE: 2000-464 DATE: Sept. 4, 19XX
CUT NUMBER: 3
STOPE CHARACTERISTICS:
Standard Backstope Cut 
Single Shifted 
6 foot stope Width 
- Good Ground conditions
65 degree Average Vein Dip
BASE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS:
Includes: all activities associate with piping, raising,
mining, clean out, raise timber, all sand prep, 
and safety.
BACKSTOPE CUT 9 tons/man-shift
- 6 foot Cut Height
- 2 Chute Sets
- Double Breasted Stope
- Equipment: Stopers/Jacklegs and Slushers





- 5.0 to 7.0 feet
Ground Conditions:
Average Vein Dip:







COMPLETE BY: APPROVED BY:
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determine the contract bonus rate (price per ton) and pay 
advances. If these estimates are significantly different 
from the actual tonnage (i.e., the number of tons measured 
at the conclusion of the cut), the potential for overpaying 
or underpaying employees during pay advances becomes a real 
concern. Most contracts stipulate that if the variance 
between the estimated tonnage and the actual tonnage exceeds 
a specified percentage, such as 5%, the actual tonnage will 
be used to determine the final cut price. If the actual 
tonnage is within the variance, the final cut price will 
remain based upon the initial tonnage estimate. The 
following examples will illustrate this point:
Example A: Estimated Tons = 1450 tons
Final Measured Tons = 1277 tons
Allowed Tonnage Variance = 5 percent
Variance from Estimate = [(1450 - 1277)/(1450)] x 100
= 12 percent
Because the difference between the estimated and actual 
tonnage varied by more than the allowed variance (5%),
1277 tons will be used to calculate final cut price.
Example B: Estimate Tons = 1450 tons
Final Measured Tons = 1394 tons
Allowed Tonnage Variance = 5 percent
Variance from Estimate = [(1450 - 1394)/(1450)] x 100
= 3.9 percent
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In this situation, the variance is less than the allowed 
percentage, therefore, the final cut price will remain 
contingent upon the estimated value (i.e., 1450 tons).
Estimating the tonnage associated with a specific cut 
requires a combination of historical information collected 
from proceeding cuts in the stope, geometric measurements, 
and observations from supervisory personnel. Along with 
ore, tonnage estimates must also include any dilution that 
must be excavated. This is particularly relevant for narrow 
veins or in applications where resuing is used.
Unauthorized dilution, waste rock not incorporate in the 
tonnage estimate, can have a significant effect on stope 
measurements and ultimately, the final cut price.
Therefore, most contracts will stipulate that dilution that 
has not been approved by the mine superintendent or the 
contract administrator will not be included in productivity 
measurements. Furthermore, if dilution is less than 
prescribed in the estimate, the final tonnage measurements 
will be inflated to include the entire allowable dilution. 
This encourages miners to minimize overbreak and maintain 
instructed stope widths.
The stope cut projection is similar to a contract, in 
that it establishes a time-work-pay relationship. Table 3-7 
illustrates a cut projection for the characteristics
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TABLE 3-7 Stope Cut Projection
STOPE: 2000-464 Design Date: Sept. 4, 19XX
CUT NUMBER: 3 Starting Date: Sept.15, 19XX
PERFORMANCE STANDARD: 8.5 tons/man-shift
BONUS RATE: $ 11.2 9/ton
ESTIMATED TONS: 610 tons
TOTAL ESTIMATED INCENTIVE: $ 688 6.9 0
STOPE CHARACTERISTICS:
Includes: all activities associate with piping, raising, 
mining, stope clean out, raise timber, all sand 
prep, and safety.
STANDARD BACKSTOPE CUT
- 6 foot Cut Height
- 2 Chute Sets
- Double Breasted Stope
- Equipment: Stopers/Jacklegs and Slushers
- Single Slushing
- Rock Support as Needed
STOPE SPECIFICATIONS
- Length: North Side = 108 feet
South Side = 95 feet
- 6 foot Stope Width
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contained in the example. The performance standard was 
derived in Step #1, Table 3-6, and equals 8.5 tons/man­
shift. The bonus rate (price per ton) is calculated by 
dividing a miner*s days pay rate by the stope standard. In 
this case:
Stope Miner's Base Wage = $12.00/hour
Day's Pay = ($12.00/hour) x (8 hours/shift)
= $ 96.00/shift
Stope: 2000-464
Performance Standard = 8.5 tons/man-shift
Bonus Rate = ($96.00/man-shift)/(8.5 tons/man-shift) 
= $ 11.29/ton
The estimated number of total tons, including both waste 
and ore, for the contract is then multiplied by the bonus 
rate to determine the total incentive for the cut. Assuming 
the following:
Tons of Ore = 516 tons
Tons of Waste = 94 tons
Total Estimated Tonnage = 610 tons
Total Estimate Incentive Payment = ($11.29/ton) x (610 tons)
= $ 6886.90
Cut specifications are reiterated on the cut projection 
form (Table 3-7) to insure that contract additions, as well 
as cut standards are understood and properly conveyed to the 
miners.
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The last category on this form establishes wage 
projections based on project completion times. The percent 
of standard refers to the percentage of the average wage 
earned per shift (day's pay) by a miner involved in the 
contract. In this example, 100% of standard translates to 
the productivity of an average miner and is equivalent to 
day's pay, $96.00/shift. Most systems are designed to 
enable a miner to earn a certain percentage above the day's
pay rate, typically in the order of 1.3 - 1.6 times the
standard rate. For this example, the system has been 
designed to enable a miner to earn 150% of the standard or
1.5 times day's pay. If performance within a stope is 
consistently below this rate, both the miners and the 
contract should be reevaluated.
Total man-shifts is determined by dividing the total 
number of estimated tons by the performance standard, then 
dividing the entire quantity by the percent of standard 
divided by 100.
Total Man-Shifts = [T/PS/S/100]
where: T = Total Estimated Tonnage
PS = Stope Performance Standard
S = Percent of Standard
To calculate the number of working shifts required to 
complete the project is simply a matter of dividing total
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man-shifts by the number of personnel participating in the 
contract. In this example, it is assumed that:
Single Shift = 2 Miners
Double Shift = 4 Miners
Triple Shift = 6 Miners
where:
Total Working Shifts = (Tot. Man-Shifts)/ (Number of Miners)
Some companies may require employees to sign this form 
to insure that they fully understand the specifications of 
the cut and the relationship between performance and 
earnings. For this very reason, regardless of the signing 
policy, it is important that a employee receives the 
information presented in Tables 3-5, 3-6, and 3-7.
STEP #3: CONTRACT IMPLEMENTATION
This particular contract was designed to encompass 
approximately 23.9 shifts, if single shifted (Table 3-7). 
Assuming a bimonthly payroll, the contract should comprise 
three pay periods including two pay advances and a final 
contract settlement. At the conclusion of each pay period 
prior to contract completion, the contract administrator 
will measure Stope 2000-464 and determine the percentage of 
the cut which has been completed (Table 3-8). Each side of 
the stope is measured separately. In this example, the
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TABLE 3-8 Project Completion Estimate 
BACKSTOPE CUT
STOPE: 2000-464 Starting Date: Sept.15, 19XX
CUT NUMBER: 3
ENDING PAY PERIOD
Totals 9/28 10/12 10/28
North End
Stope Length Drilled 108 ft 108 ft 108 ft
Stope Units Mucked 3890 890 3890
South End
Stope Length Drilled 95 ft 95 ft 95 ft
Stope Units Mucked 3420 380 3420
Total
Stope Length Drilled 203 ft 203 ft 203 ft
Percent Complete 
Weighting Factor 1.00
100 % 100 %
Stope Units Mucked 7310 1270 7310
Percent Complete 
Weighting Factor 1.25
17 . 4% 100%
Percent of Total 64 % 34 . 4% 64% 64%
Miscellaneous (Shifts)
Move In 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Blasting 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Timber 1.5 .25 1.5 1. 5
Clean Out 4.9 0 2.7 4 . 9
Sand Prep/Fill 3.8 0 1.5 3 . 8
Total Man-Shifts 25.8 5.9 16.8 25 . 8
Total Workdays 12 . 9 2.95 8.4 12 . 9
Percent Complete -- 22 .9% 65. 1% 100%
Percent of Total 36 % 8.2% 23 . 4% 36%
ESTIMATED TOTALS
Percent for Period 42.6% 44.8% 12 . 6%
Cumm. % of Total mam 87 .4% 100%
TOTAL ESTIMATED TONNAGE/CUT: 610 tons 
TOTAL ESTIMATED INCENTIVE: $ 6886.90
CUT COMPLETION DATE: Oct. 17, 19XX
TOTAL PROJECT MAN-HOURS: 372 Man-Hours
MEASURED BY: CALCULATED BY:
A R T H U R  LAKES LIBRARY COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES GOLDEN. CO 80401
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stope is divided into two components, the North and South 
End. The results from each side are combined to determine 
the earnings for both miners in the stope. It is believed 
this creates additional motivation because each miner in a 
stope is financially dependent upon each other.
The process of estimating the partial completion of a 
stope can be accomplished in a variety of ways and is 
largely dependent upon the mining application. In some 
situations, estimates of these stopes may be difficult to 
ascertain, due to problems with accessing parts of a stope 
or the configuration associated with a particular mining 
method. Back Stoping, utilized in this example, is one 
method that can be rather difficult to estimate. The long 
duration associated with specific unit activities, stope 
access, and the upward progression of the cut are inhibiting 
factors for an accurate stope assessment. As such, these 
estimates are often based upon subjective appraisals by the 
contract engineer and shifters.
Table 3-8 utilizes a method of estimating stope 
completion by differentiating the influence attributed to 
the activities that must be performed to mine the cut. 
Utilizing the information derived while establishing 
performance standards, these activities are arranged into 
broad categories where the time necessary to complete each
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category represents a percentage of the total contract. In 
this example, the activities associated with drilling and 
mucking comprise 64 percent of the total contract period. 
This also includes activities ranging from bolting to 
equipment maintenance. Assuming that drilling is performed 
in a single lift, the linear feet of stope length drilled 
(from the raise to the last row of drill holes) for both 
breasts of the stope divided by the total length of the cut 
equals the percentage of the stope that has been drilled 
out. Similar calculations are used to gauge the progress of 
mucking out a stope at any given time. These calculations, 
however, are based upon Stope Units (cubic feet of ore) 
mucked from a stope with respect to the total volume in the 
cut. These relationships are presented below:
Percent of Drilling Completion (PDC) = (SLD)/(TSL) 
Percent of Mucking Completion (PMC) = (SUM)/(TMU)
where SLD = Stope Length Drilled 
TSL = Total Stope Length
SUM = Stope Units Mucked
TMU = Total Muck Units
Because the time associated with drilling out a cut may not 
be equivalent to the time it takes to muck it out, weighting 
factors are adopted to compensate for variable time 
requirements that will influence the estimating procedure.
For example, if mucking takes 2 5 percent more time than
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drilling, then the following relationship characterizes the 
collective completion percentage of drilling and mucking:
PDMC = [((PDC) X (WF1)) + ((PMC) X (WF2))]
= [((PDC) X (1.00/2.25)) + ((PMC) X (1.25/2.25))]
= [(PDC) X (.44)] + [(PMC) X (.56)]
where; PDMC = Percent Drilling/Mucking Completion 
PDC = Percent Drilling Completion 
PMC = Percent Mucking Completion 
WF1 = Weight Factor (1)
WF2 = Weight Factor (2)
This quantity (PDMC) can then be multiplied by the percent 
of time these activities (drilling/mucking) take with 
respect to the total contract period. The resulting 
quantity is representative of the contribution of 
drilling/mucking activities towards determining how much of 
the total project has been completed.
To illustrate this procedure, Step #3 has been 
outlined for the example problem utilized in this section 
(Table 3-8) . At the conclusion of the first two week pay 
period (week ending 9/28), both the North and South Ends of
the stope have been totally drilled out and a total of 127 0
cubic feet of ore has been mucked. Assuming that mucking 
takes 25 percent more time than drilling and that 
drilling/mucking comprise 64 percent of the total time it 
takes to mine the cut, then:
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PDC = ((108 + 95)/(108 + 95) X 100 = 100.0 %
PMC = ((890 + 380)/(3890 + 3420)) X 100 = 17.4 %
PDMC = ((100) X (.44)) + ((17.4) X (.56)) = 53.7 %
Therefore:
Percent of Total = (53.7) x (.64) = 34.4 percent
In this example, 53.7 percent of the drilling and 
mucking have been completed, in turn, this translates to 
34.4 percent of the total project.
The remaining activities necessary to complete the cut 
have been grouped into five miscellaneous categories, move- 
in, blasting, timber work, clean out, and sand prep/fill. 
Each category is assigned the number of man-shifts it would 
take a miner with average skills and abilities working at a 
day's pay rate to accomplish the tasks incorporated under 
each category. Because the stope in this example is single 
shifted, the miscellaneous categories in Table 3-8 are 
represented in workdays:
where: Workdays = (Man-Shifts)/(2 men/stope/day)
It must be remembered that this exercise is solely a 
means of estimating the status of a project in terms of how 
much has been accomplished within a specific time interval. 
Therefore, once a category or task has been completed, the 
designated number of workdays associated with that task will
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be recorded in the estimate on Table 3-8, irrespective of 
how long it takes. For example, if the activities 
associated with blasting during the cut should take 1.2 
workdays for two miners working at an average pace and they 
actually complete it in .75 workdays, the estimate will 
acknowledge that blasting has been completed and strictly 
for the purposes of estimating will assign a value of 1.2 
workdays to that activity in Table 3-8. Therefore, by 
dividing the assigned value of the activity by the standard 
will equal the percentage of that category completed. If 
the activity affiliated with blasting are 50 percent 
completed, then .6 workdays will be recorded on the estimate 
sheet.
By summing the number of workdays associated with each 
miscellaneous category and dividing it by the sum of the 
standards, a percent of completion for these activities can 
be calculated. For example, at the conclusion of the first 
pay period (Table 3-8), the sum of work completed equals 
2.95 workdays and the total sum of the standards is 12.9 
workdays. Therefore, the percent of these activities 
completed is:
PAC = [(2.95 workdays)/(12.9 workdays)] x 100 = 22.9% 
where; PAC = Percent of Misc. Activities Completed
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This quantity (PAC) can then be multiplied by the percent of 
time it takes to accomplish these activities with respect to 
the total contract period to determine how much of the total 
project has been completed. In this example, these 
activities comprise 36 percent of the total period. 
Therefore,
Percent of Total = (.36) x (PAC) = (.36) x (22.9%) = 8.2%
By summing the percent totals from drilling/mucking and 
these miscellaneous activities, it becomes possible to 
estimate the total project completion during a given period. 
In reference to the example, the following percent totals 
were determined for the pay period ending 9/28:
This infers that at the conclusion of this pay period, 42.6 
percent of the total contract or cut has been completed.
In most applications, Breastdown Stoping Methods are 
easier to estimate because the progression of a cut can be 
measured in relationship to the stope length. In addition, 
the cyclical nature of this stoping technique enables a 
larger percentage of activities that would generally be
Percent of Total (Drilling/Mucking) 
Percent of Total (Miscellaneous)
34 . 4% 
8 .2%
Therefore 34.4% + 8.2% = 42.6%
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classified as miscellaneous to be incorporated and measured 
with respect to the mining rate. For example, assume mining 
directly corresponds to 86 percent of the total time 
associated with completing the cut and the total projected 
cut length is 187 feet. If the present stope length is 
measured at 54 feet and 3 percent of the work not affiliated 
with the direct excavation of ore has been completed (e.g., 
sand prep., timber work, etc.), then the percent of the 
total project completion can be calculated by:
Percent Completion = [(ML/CL) x (MP)] + (WP)
where: ML = Measured Stope Length
CL = Projected Cut Length
MP = Percent of Mining with Respect to Total Project 
WP = Percent of Work Completed, Excluding Mining
In this example:
Percent Completion = [((54)/(187)) x (86%)] + (3%)
= 27.8%
This indicates that 27.8 percent of the contract would have 
been completed.
STEP #4: PAY ADVANCES
Once progress estimates have been established for a 
specific time period (Table 3-8), the responsibility of the 
contract administrator then shifts to calculating equatable
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employee pay advances and final contract payouts. The first 
step in this process is determining the number of man-hours 
each employee contributed to the contract during that pay 
period. This can be accomplished through a variety of 
processes, including shifter/production reports and 
payroll/contract cards.
Most mines utilize some form of shifter or supervisor 
reports that review the activities performed by specific 
individuals in each stope or heading during a shift. Table 
3-9 is an example of a daily shifter stope report for a mine 
operating 8 production areas. On this form, the immediate 
supervisor records the amount of time each employee spends 
at a particular work area and what was accomplished. This 
allows the contract administrator to differentiate employee 
hours in regards to specific contracts and base pay.
While Table 3-9 only incorporates production stopes, 
shifter reports are also compiled for developmental headings 
and activities associated with haulage, repair/construction, 
and production support (e.g., nippers and skip tenders). In 
smaller operations, these reports are often combined into 
one comprehensive form. In addition, many times these forms 
also include shifter safety inspections for each work area 
and serves as the required documentation in accordance with 
MSHA regulations.
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TABLE 3-9 Daily Shifter's Report 
STOPE REPORT
DATE: Sept. 25, 19XX 
SHIFT: 2
SUPERVISOR: Mike Smith 




STOPE MINERS ACTIVITIES Cont Base
1000-256 Tim Jones Cycled 6 ft Breast Rd. 8 0
Bill Smith (North Side) 8 0
1000-842 Rick Johnson Slushed (North/South) 4 4
Mark Brown Repaired Chute 1090 4 4
2000-164 Jay Anderson Sand Prep/Timber 8 0
Dave Harris 
Ed Meyers




2000-464 Fred Walker Slushing/Bolting 8 0
Mike Taylor (North/South) 8 0
2000-878 Glen Larson Drilled Backstope 8 0
Harry Olson (North Side) 8 0
3000-170 Tim Jackson Slushed (Norht Side) 2 6
Brett Cook Until Muck Bound, Sand 
Spill Cleanup 4000-325
2 6
3000-364 John Wilson Cycled 2-6 ft Breast 8 0
Pete Dawkins Rounds (North/South) 8 0
4000-164 Brian Allen Sand Pour (North Side) 5 3





Another accounting method routinely used by mining 
companies to record productivity information is derived from 
employee payroll/contract cards (Table 3-10). In these 
applications, each employee fills out a card that details 
work locations and accomplishments during the shift. Hours 
are divided between time spent doing work on and off 
contract, in a fashion similar to a shifter's report. A 
category for supplies used is often included because it not 
only enables mine administrators to account for the 
consumption of materials but also permits evaluations of how 
busy nippers and other support people are. If discrepancies 
between these cards and shifters reports occur, it is 
generally the superintendents responsibility to resolve the 
situation.
Once employee hours have been tabulated, the second step 
in the process of contract wage calculations is determining 
employee pay advances. As with other systems, wage advances 
are a partial payment made to the employee for work that has 
been completed on a specific contract. With Time-Based 
Incentives, three components dictates the amount of earnings 
paid to employees in the form of advances: the percentage of 
the contract that has been completed during the pay period 
(discussed in Step #3), the time individual employees 
contributed towards the contract, and the amount of
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TABLE 3-10 Employee Payroll/Contract Card
EMPLOYEE PAYROLL/CONTRACT CARD
NAME: Mike Taylor
DATE: Sept. 25, 19XX
SHIFT: 2
HOURS













holdback. Presented in Table 3-11 are the calculations for 
both pay advances issued during the progression of the stope 
contract.
At the conclusion of the first pay period (9/28/19XX) in 
Table 3-11, the contract administrator has used the estimate 
of contract completion derived in Step #3 (42.6 percent) and 
the number of man-hours that have been spent working in the 
stope (142 man-hours) to determine the Total Estimated 
Earnings for the period.
Total Estimated Earnings = (TEI) X (TPCC)
where: TEI = Total Estimated Incentive Payment
TPCC = Total Percent of Contract Completion
Total Estimated Earnings = ($ 6886.90) X (.426)
= $ 2933.82
Assuming a holdback policy of 15 percent:
Total Holdback = (Total Estimated Earnings) X (% Holdback)
= ($ 2933.82) X (.15) = $ 440.07
Therefore, Total Earnings Advanced equals:
Total Advance = (Total Estimated Earnings)- (Total Holdback)
= ($ 2933.82) - ($ 440.07) = $ 2493.75
The percent of holdback, as previously discussed, can 
vary between stopes and/or pay periods and is largely 
dependent upon management's confidence in its ability to
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TABLE 3-11 Contract Pay Advances
STOPE: 2000-464 STARTING DATE: Sept. 15, 19XX
CUT: 3
PEFORMANCE STANDARD: 8.5 tons/man-shift
BONUS RATE: $ 11.29/ton
ESTIMATED TONS/CUT: 610 tons
CONTRACT ADDITIONS: $ 0.00




Percent of Contract Complete 42.6 % 44.8 %
Cumm. % of Completion ---- 87 . 4 %
Percent of Holdback 15.0 % 15. 0 %
Total Contract Man-Hours 142 . 0 154 . 0
Cumm. Contract Man-Hours ---- 296.0
Total Estimated Earnings $ 2933.82 $ 3085.33
Cumm. Estimated Earnings ---- $ 6019.15
Total Holdback $ 440.07 $ 462.80
Cumm. Holdback ---- $ 902.87
Total Advance $ 2493 .75 $ 2622.53
Cumm. Advance ---- $ 5116.28
Employee Hrs Advances Hrs Advances
3727 Mike Taylor 71 1246.88 68 1158.00
6312 Fred Walker 55 965.89 75 1277 .21
7112 Brett Cook 16 280.99 2 34.06
5012 Brian Allen 9 153 .26
Totals 142 2493.76 154 2622 .53
STANDARD BASE PAY RATE $ 96.00 $ 96.00
ESTIMATED CONTRACT RATE $ 165.2 9 $ 160.28
PERCENT DIFFERENCE 172 % 167 %
CALCULATED BY APPROVED BY
T-3894 138
accurately estimate a stope1s tonnage and performance 
standard. Most operators prefer to maintain a conservative 
holdback percentage that remains fairly constant throughout 
the operation to alleviate any potential for employee 
overpayment and to further simplify contract calculations.
Once the Total Advance for the period has been 
calculated, individual bonus allotments can be assessed.
This is accomplished through a process of weighting the 
amount of time each employee works in the stope. That is, 
by dividing the Total Advance Payment by the collective sum 
of all the man-hours spent on the contract, then multiplying 
this quantity by the number of hours each employee worked in 
the stope will yield the bonus advanced to each miner. For 
example, the pay advance issued to Mike Taylor on Table 3-11 
was calculated by:
Employee Pay Advance = (Total Advance/Total Man-Hours) X IHW 
where: IHW = Individual Man-Hours Worked
Employee Pay Advance = ($ 2493.75/142 Man-Hrs) X (71 Man-Hr)
= $ 1246.88
The sum of all the individual advances should equate to 
within a few cents (rounding error) of the Total Advance 
Payment.
After bonus advances have been allocated, it has become
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an established practice to insure miner's have not earned 
bonuses that pay below base pay standards. In this example, 
the Total Estimated Earnings, without the deduction for 
holdback, is divided by the total contract hours accumulated 
during the period to produce the estimated incentive based 
on a hourly rate. By multiplying this rate by the shift 
duration (generally 8 hours), a daily contract rate can be 
determined:
Estimated Contract Rate equals:
= (Total Estimated Earnings/Total Man-hrs) X Hrs/Shift 
= ($ 2933.82/142 man-hours) X (8 hours/shift)
= $ 165.29/shift
Assuming a base wage standard (day's pay) of $ 96.00/shift, 
it is obvious that the estimated contract rate is greater 
than the base standard. By dividing day's pay by this 
contract rate, it enables contract engineers to monitor the 
progress of the miners with respect to a designed standard, 
in this case 1.5 times the standard base rate. In this 
example:
Percent above Standard = $ 165.29/$ 96.00 = 1.72
That is, 1.72 times the day's pay rate.
It is generally more productive to keep the same miners 
working continuously at particular stope until the
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completion of the contract. However, due to the operating 
realities imposed by labor constraints, many operations 
often find it necessary to disrupt continuing contracts by 
utilizing stope miners to perform activities that require 
immediate attention or possess a higher priority. Coupled 
with absenteeism, these situations can result in the 
rotation of employees through a stope. Potential problems 
among miners are sometimes created by this practice, 
stemming from employee dissatisfaction in the distribution 
of incentive bonuses. A common problem involves substitute 
employees that are "filling in" for stope miners and lack 
the proficiency and skill of the other miners on contract or 
are there strictly for safety related reasons. Are these 
miners financially entitled to participate in the bonuses 
derived from the contract? Furthermore, tasks performed 
during the course of a project are sometimes not physically 
equivalent in-terms of the employee effort required. Is it 
fair to pay one employee who drills for 8 hours the same as 
the employee who sandfills a stope for 8 hours? These types 
of questions must be resolved by mine administrators prior 
to the implementation of any stope contract. In the example 
presented within this section, it will be assumed that all 
employees participating in the contract are stope miners and 
no task differentiation is used to allocate bonus shares.
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Contract pay advances can be either paid in conjunction 
with established pay periods for standardized base wages or 
during regularly scheduled pay period exclusively for 
bonuses, called Contract or Gypo Paydays. Regardless of how 
the payment is made, the intent is to segregate the monies 
generated through incentives from base earnings to 
conceptually enhance employee's perception of the benefits 
derived from increased productivity while working on 
contract.
STEP #5: FINAL CONTRACT PAYOUT
Once the terms contained within the contract have been 
completed (i.e., the excavation of a cut), the final bonus 
settlement can be calculated. In essence, this procedure is 
quite simple. The contract administrator, often with the 
aid of the mine superintendent, will visit the stope to 
insure that the miners have complied with the specifications 
contained within the contract. Volumetric measurements will 
then be made to determine the total tonnage excavated 
during the contract. Often production reports are used to 
verify these tonnage calculation (discussed in Chapter 6). 
Once the total tonnage for the contract has been measured 
and calculated, it is compared with initial estimated to 
determine if it exceeds the allowed tonnage variance
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(STEP #2). If the actual allowable tonnage excavated is 
greater than the estimate in excess of the established 
variance, an adjustment of the total contract incentive must 
be made. After an appropriate tonnage value has been 
selected and the total incentive has been calculated, 
employee man-hours are compiled. Each employee 
participating in the contract is rewarded a prorated share 
of the total incentive based upon the number of hours each 
had worked in the stope, less the monies paid during 
periodic advances. The bonus is then compared to wages that 
would have been earned at a day's pay rate to insure that 
they are equivalent or greater. The process of determining 
this final settlement has been replicated for the example 
problem contained within this section and is presented 
below.
Table 3-12 illustrates a Contract Payout Form that is 
used to calculate the final stope settlement. For this 
problem, completion of the cut occurred on Oct. 17, 19XX 
and, at that time, the cut specifications were checked and 
the stope measured. The final survey determined that the 
actual (allowable) tons mined during the contract was 7 02 
tons. Comparing this value with the initial tonnage 
estimate, a percent variance can be calculated:
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Actual (Measured) Tonnage: 702 tons
Estimated Tonnage: 610 tons
Difference: 92 tons
Percent Variance: 15 X
Starting Date: Sept. 15, 19XX 
Completion Date: Oct. 17, 19XX
8.5 tons/man-shift 
$ 11.29/ton
Initial Estimated Incentive: $ 6886.90
Tonnage Variation Adjustment: + S 1038.68
Contract Additions: $ 0.00
TOTAL CONTRACT INCENTIVE: $ 7925.58
Pay Periods
9/14/90 9/29/90 10/13/90 Contract
9/28/90 10/12/90 10/27/90 Totala
Percent of Coiplete 42.6 X 44.8 X 12.6 X 100 X
Percent of Holdback 15.0 X 15.0 X 15.0 X 15 X
Contract Han-Boura 142.0 154.0 64.0 372 Han-Bra
Istiiated larningn X 2933.82 X 3085.33 — X 6019.15
Total Holdback 6 440.07 I 462.80 — X 902.87Total Advance X 2493.75 I 2622.53 — X 5116.28
Total 1Total Bonus ! Total Eesidnal
liployee Hrn Adrance Hrn! Advance Hrn! Advance Honrs (pro-rated) ! Advanced
1
Owed








X 3643.21 i x 2404.88 X 1238.33
6312 Pred Halier 55 965.89 75! 1277.21 30} — 160 X 3408.65 ! X 2243.10 X 1165.75
7112 Brett Cook 16 280.99 2! 34.06 14! — 32 X 681.77 ! X 315.05 X 366.72












Totals 142 2493.76 154! 2622.53 76! — 372 X 7925.58 ! X 5116.29
I
X 2809.29
BAS1 PAT SATX 6 96.00 X 96.00 — X 96.00/(8 Hour Skift)1ST. COITHACT EAT! 6 165.29 I 160.28 — (X 7925.58/372 nan-hrn) X 8 br/akift = X 170.44/ahift
PECIIT OP STAIDAED 172 X 1671 — (X 170.44/$ 96.00) 1 100 = 177.5 X
CALCULATED APPROVED STOPE MEASURED CONTRACT INSPECTED
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Percent Variance = (Actual Tons - Est. Tons)/(Est. Tons)
= (702 tons - 610 tons)/6l0 tons 
= 15 percent
This indicates that the disparity between the initial 
tonnage estimate and the actual number of tons mined exceeds 
the allowable variance of 5 percent that was established for 
this contract. Therefore, the total incentive affiliated 
with the completion of the project must be adjusted to 
account for this tonnage discrepancy. This is accomplished 
b y :
Initial Estimated Incentive = $ 6886.90
Tonnage Variation Adjustment:
(Actual Tons - Est. Tons) X (Bonus Rate/Ton)
(702 tons - 610 tons) X ($ 11.29/ton) = + $ 1038.68
Contract Additions = $ 0.00
TOTAL CONTRACT INCENTIVE $ 7 925.58
Although this problem assumed no contract additions were 
made during the duration of the project, it is quite common 
for mine administrators to attach supplemental work 
contracts to stoping agreements. As previously discussed, 
Time-Based productivity standards are determined for 
individual stopes based upon specific assumptions. If a 
unpredicted event occurs that possesses a significant 
impairment to the productivity of the miners, such as a
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cave-in or rock burst, the contract administrator can 
implement a supplemental contract to remedy the situations 
and establish an incentive for getting the stope back in 
production. In addition, supplemental contracts and 
additions can also be issued for activities, like long-hole 
drilling, unexpected timber work, and raise repair, that 
would run congruently with the primary stope contract.
Now that the total contract incentive has been 
established ($ 7925.58), the prorated shares of this bonus 
can be determined and dispensed to the participating 
employees. Mike Taylor, for example, in Table 3-12 has 
compiled 171 man-hours on this contract. His share of the 
incentive is determined through a weighted average shown 
below:
EMPLOYEE BONUS = (Total Incentive)X(Employee Hrs/Total Hrs)
= ($ 7925.58) X (171 man-hrs/372 man-hrs)
= $ 3643.21
This value represents the amount of incentive Mike Taylor 
has earned for his participation in the contract. By 
subtracting the balance paid in the form of advances during 
the two pay periods prior to the completion of the contract, 
the final settlement (the amount the company owes the 
employee) can be calculated:
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Final Settlement (Residual Owed) equals:
= Individual Bonus - Pay Advance 
= $ 3643.21 - $ 2404.88 -= $ 1238.33
If variable percentages of holdback are utilized for 
different pay advances, then holdback amounts must be 
itemized and weighted with respect to the employees who 
worked under the contract during individual pay periods to 
determine a equatable distribution of any holdback residuals 
in the final incentive settlement.
To gauge the performance of the miners participating in 
the contract and to insure that the contract rate is greater 
than day's pay, a comparison between the two are made. The 
contract rate was calculated in Table 3-12 to equal $ 170.44 
per shift and the day's pay standard utilized for this 
example is $ 96.00/shift. Therefore:
[($ 17 0.44)/($ 96.00)] = 177.5
This infers that the miners participating in this contract, 
based upon their productivity, have earned 77.5 percent more 
than the base pay standard and 18 percent greater than the 
expected average of 1.5 times day's pay ($ 144.00/shift).
Finally, the calculation sheet utilized in this example 
(Table 3-12) has designated places for the signatures of the 
mine administrators who review the stope to insure it is in
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compliance with contract specifications, those who measured 
the stope, and the person who is in charge of calculating 
the Final Contract Payout. This enables rapid resolution of 
potential problems associated with contract measurements or 
calculations and can be used as a tool to communicate 
between the engineering staff, production supervisors, and 
upper mine management.
Volumetric Contract Systems
Volumetric Incentive Programs are the most popular form 
of contract mining utilized in the industry today. These 
systems allocate incentive allotments based upon 
productivity standards that are measured in relationship to 
the volume of material that has been excavated during a 
given period. Stope Measurements are generally in units of 
bank cubic feet ("cubes") or short tons. Volumetric Systems 
exhibit elements characteristic of Time-Based Programs as 
well as historic Piece-Rate systems, and are amenable to a 
wide variety of mining systems and stope parameters.
Program Design
These systems segregate the activities performed in a 
stope into four categories: breaking (drilling/blasting), 
mucking, timbering, and miscellaneous tasks. The evaluation
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of the mining rate (i.e., breaking and mucking) is directly 
related to the volumetric stope measurements discussed 
above. Timbering is usually measured with respect to the 
number of cubic feet of timber consumed within a stope. The 
miscellaneous class is indicative of secondary activities 
that possess a definitive process and value, like bolting or 
setting stulls. These types of stope contracts typically 
attempt to minimize the scope of activities independent of 
breaking or the mucking of ore, including sand prep, raise 
timbering, or stope repair. Table 3-13 illustrates a 
contract sheet for a standard Back Stope Cut. In this 
figure, dollar values for slushing, breaking, and timbering 
are contingent upon the stope1s width. Each price grouping 
that is founded on the same characteristics is called a 
schedule. An operation will typically possess a different 
contract sheet for every mining system, equipment variation, 
and stope configuration it employs. In addition, depending 
on the critical variables that impact productivity, such as 
stope width or cut height, there can be as many as 2 0 price 
schedules per contract.
Price standards affiliated with different schedules and 
contracts are determined through a process similar to the 
one described under Time-Based Systems. Time studies and 
historical production data enable engineers to ascertain
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TABLE 3-13 Volumetric Contract Schedule Sheet
SCHEDULE: ______S-12______ EFFECTIVE DATE: Jan. 2, 19XX
CONTRACT: Back Stopes APPROVED BY: _________________
Including the following conditions:
- 6 Ft Cut Height, Less than 10 Ft Vein Width
- Double Breasted (2 Miners, 1/3 Nipper)
- Double Shifted
- Equipment: Stopers and Slushers
- Slushing Distance: 0 - 100 Ft
- Average Rock and Environmental Conditions
The work hereinafter mentioned will be performed in a good 
workman-like manner and satisfactory to Management.
PRICES:
Width Breaking Slushing Timbering
Schedule (ft) ($/cft) ($/cft) ($/cft)
S (12)-1 < 4 0.78 0. 27 0 .22
S (12)—2 4 - 5 0.67 0. 27 0.22
S (12)-3 5 - 6  0.57 0. 27 0.22
S (12)-4 6 - 7  0.48 0.27 0.22
S (12)—5 7 > 0.40 0.27 0 .22
Stulls: $ 3.00 each
Slusher Move and Setup: $ 75. 00 per move
Double Slushing: $ 0 . 15 per eft
Rockbolts: 4 Ft $ 2.25 each
6 Ft $ 2.35 each
8 Ft $ 2.45 each
Mats $ 1. 50 each
NOTE: Overbreak will not be paid for.
BASE PAY: Regular Classification
The undersigned miners agree to perform the work mentioned 
above, according to the terms, conditions, and 
specifications outlined above, in a safe minerlike manner 
and satisfactory to Management.
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average standards for productivity. These standards are 
intimately linked to an activity rate which represents what 
an average miner should accomplish under normal operating 
conditions. As with most other systems, these contracts are 
designed to allow the miner to earn some appreciable amount 
above the day's pay rate, typically in the range of 1.3 - 
1.7 times the standard. Adjustments for environmental 
conditions and stope characteristics which differ from the 
norm (e.g., temperature, rock conditions, and vein dip), can 
be modified through the manipulation of the price standard. 
However, in every Volumetric Contract System examined within 
this study, not one made allowances for these factors 
through a structured format. Rather, these systems allowed 
the mine superintendent or contract engineer to compensate 
for these factors during the execution of the contract by 
adjusting the final wage settlement.
At the conclusion of the contract period, which may or 
may not coincide with an operation's established pay 
periods, the contract administrator measures the stope and 
determines the volume excavated during the period. 
Unfortunately, the duration of most production contracts 
exceed more than one scheduled pay period and thereby, 
require the contract engineer to estimate what proportion of 
the cut has been completed and formulate individual employee
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pay advances. As was iterated earlier, the potential for 
overpaying employees by over estimating stope productivity 
is a real concern, particularly in large Back Stopes that 
can take several months to complete. Therefore, pay 
advances are calculated using a holdback in a process 
similar to the one employed for Time-Based Programs. The 
holdback amount varies considerably in these programs 
ranging from 10 - 65 percent and appears to be dependent 
upon the nature of the stope, the perceived diligence of the 
participating miners, and the confidence the contract 
administrator has in estimating specific stope parameters.
As such, the percent holdback can vary between different 
crews, as well as stopes.
The prorating of activities is another common facet of 
these systems, particularly in operations that utilize 
Breast Down Stoping techniques. Prorating is used to 
estimate the amount of work that will be completed between 
the time the stope is measured and the end of the contract 
period, where some percentage of this estimate will be 
advanced during the period. Time constraints in some 
operations require the contract administrator to survey a 
stope prior to the end of the pay period. In this 
situation, pay advances usually incorporate a percentage of 
the contract engineer's estimate of work the miners will
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complete before the conclusion of the period. For example, 
consider an operation utilizing a weekly pay period which 
extends from Sunday through Saturday and generally performs 
stope measurements on Friday mornings to determine pay 
advances. If the miners are in the process of drilling a 
round, the contract administrator will include a percentage 
of that round into the pay advance by adding additional 
cubic feet to the amount broken. The next survey, however, 
will subtract this amount from the derived total volume 
broken for that period. This process of prorating rounds is 
referred to as "banking cubes".
The final stope settlement adheres to the same general 
procedure discussed previously. At the conclusion of the 
cut or stope, the work area is surveyed where the total 
volume excavated is recalculated. This volume equates to a 
specific dollar value for breaking and mucking. Adding 
these values with the financial contributions earned through 
timbering and miscellaneous tasks, a total incentive is 
calculated for the period. The allocation of incentives to 
individual employees are based on a weighted average of the 
number of man-hours each miner participates in the contract.
Program Considerations
There are several inherent shortcomings often related to
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implementation of these systems. They include: the lack of 
concrete procedures for adjusting performance standards for 
specific operating factors, the equitable distribution of 
employee contract allotments, and the degree of influence 
placed on shifters regarding employee earnings.
The subjective nature affiliated with the way most mines 
compensate contract settlements for unpredictable factors 
that inhibit employee performance often creates numerous 
labor-related problems. In many situations, the company 
feels that it is "giving something away", without any 
additional effort from it's employees. From the employees 
perspective, the company can appear as if they are being 
"ripped off" and not being properly compensated for factors 
beyond their control. This adversarial relationship can 
promote numerous interpersonal problems, particularly 
between employees and the people administrating the 
contracts (i.e., contract engineers and the mine 
superintendent). Furthermore, it can create a situation 
that the utilization of incentives may actually hinder 
employee performance. Inversely, mine administrators that 
are overly generous in adjusting contract standards can 
impair the benefits produced through the implementation of 
the incentive program. There is also a tendency for miners 
to become dependent on these contract additions and expect
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additional compensation on every contract. To mitigate 
these potential problems, most mines have adopted some 
discrete manner through which they can compensate for these 
factors by increasing the total contract settlement, yet 
appear less subjective nature (i.e., the addition of 
imaginary muck or timber cubes).
It is important that after the derivation of either 
preliminary and/or adjusted standards, the entire contract 
be examined to insure that it complies with the operating 
goals and strategies of the mine. For example, in Table 
3-13 the relationship between different price schedules 
encourages miners to minimize stope width, even through it 
is physically harder to mine, because the price per cubic 
foot broken is higher. This situation might be utilized in 
an operation with dilution problems. On the other hand, the 
implementation of a contract without analyzing it's 
potential repercussions can cause "side effects" detrimental 
to the operation. A classic example is that of an operation 
that experienced severe rockfall problems and theorized it 
could achieve better back support in headings by placing a 
high unit value to bolting. To the company's dismay, miners 
found that they could earn higher incentive earnings by 
bolting rather than mining and needlessly bolted on 4 foot 
centers. Therefore, an operation needs to be cognizant of
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how incentive standards will potentially effect its labor 
force and devise methods of altering the system to influence 
employee performance which compliments their program 
obj ectives.
As previously discussed, it is highly desirable to keep 
stope miners on contract working continuously in the same 
area until the completion of the stope or cut. However, it 
often becomes necessary to temporarily reassign miners from 
one work area to another. Therefore, an individual employee 
may have hours invested in several different stope contracts 
for any given time period. It was the contention of several 
operators that miners under these types of situations are 
subject to spending more time on a base pay rate than other 
conventional contract systems because these contracts do not 
compensate for conditions such as mechanical inavailability 
of equipment, operating delays, and scheduling difficulties.
Shifters and production foremen play an integral role in 
the daily operation of this system and are largely 
responsible for the decisions which impact upon it's 
potential success or failure. In many organizations, 
shifters dictate where miners work, which stope contracts 
they participate in, the number of hours each miner spends 
on either day's pay or contract, and the progression of the 
stope or cut. In addition, shifters mandate what projects
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need to be accomplished within a stope and monitor the 
number and placement of rock support systems. These types 
of decisions require that shifters possess a working 
knowledge of the operation, be highly experienced in all 
phases of underground mining, and have a good rapport with 
the miners. In these situations, the social relationship 
between shifters and miners can generate a multitude of 
problems in these systems, including favoritism, unjustified 
employee earnings, and an increase in conflicts between 
miners. While these supervisors are held accountable to the 
mine superintendent and engineering staff, there are 
discrete practices that shifters can perform that will 
enable specific miners to earn higher wages or minimize 
strenuous labor. For example, on the basis of friendship a 
shifter may record less hours on a particular contract than 
the miners actually worked. This causes the stope 
productivity to appear higher than it would normally be and 
translates to higher wages for the employees. Therefore, 
the mine superintendent must take an active role in 
regulating the execution of these contracts. Due to the 
responsibilities incurred by the shifters, the number of 
stopes and production areas that each shifter can 
effectively supervise is nearly one-half the number 
associated with Time-Based Programs.
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It should be noted that in many double breasted stoping 
applications, a contract is issued for each side of the cut. 
The miners in this stope would then participate in each 
contract on an equal basis, regardless of the side worked. 
This enables the mine superintendent to make concessions for 
potential disparities between different sides of the stope. 
It also encourages the miners to work as a team by helping 
one another and sharing resources. It does, however, assume 
that both breasts of the stope are being mine at 
approximately the same rate.
Contract Example
To illustrate the intricacies of this contract system, 
an sample stope will be used to simulate how individual 
incentive allotments are calculated and distributed. To aid 
in this evaluation, the following conditions have been 
assumed:
Standard Breast Down Stoping Method 
- Contract Duration Includes 1 Cut (36 rounds)
Single Shifted (2 men)
Double Breasted Stope (1 miner on each side)
5.7 ft Average Stope Width 
9.0 ft Average Cut Height 
Contract Pay Period equals 1 Week
STEP #1: ACTIVITY STANDARDS
For simplicity, it will be assumed that the value
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affiliated with the formation of price standards has already 
been determined through a process of analyzing time studies, 
historical production data, and project simulation. Because 
this example stope, labeled 1000-722, is double breasted, 
two separate contracts will be issued in which both miners 
will participate. Table 3-14 represents a contract sheet 
that has been developed for the characteristics of this 
stope. To simplify calculations, it is presumed that both 
breasts of the stope are identical and therefore, the 
contract standards derived in Table 3-14 are applicable to 
both contracts. Price schedules for breaking and slushing, 
in this example, are dependent upon the critical variables 
related the stope1s width and height. As such, the Price 
Schedule for the conditions prescribed in this cut is 
S (14)-3 .
STEP #2: PAY ADVANCES
At or near the conclusion of the pay period, the 
contract administrator will measure the total volume of 
material that has been removed from the stope. This survey 
will also include estimates for broken muck remaining in the 
stope as well as prorated activities. In addition, most 
contract engineers will also review the progress of the cut 
with respect to insuring that it complies with both contract
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TABLE 3-14 Volumetric Contract Schedule Sheet 
for Stope 1000-722
SCHEDULE: ______S—14______ EFFECTIVE DATE: Jan. 2, 19XX
CONTRACT: Breast Down Stopes APPROVED BY: ________________
Including the following conditions:
- Less than 12 Ft Vein Width
- Double Breasted (2 Miners, 1/3 Nipper)
- Single Shifted
- Equipment: Jacklegs and Slushers
- Slushing Distance: 0 - 100 Ft
- Average Rock and Environmental Conditions
The work hereinafter mentioned will be performed in a good 
workman-like manner and satisfactory to Management.
PRICES:
Breaking ($/cft)
Width Cut Height Slushing Timbering
Schedule (ft) 9* 12* ($/cft) ($/cft)
S (14)-1 < 4 0.84 0.63 0.27 0.22
S (14)—2 4 - 5  0.76 0.57 0.27 0.22
S (14)-3 5 - 7  0.62 0.46 0.27 0.22
S (14)—4 7 - 9  0.52 0.39 0.27 0.22
S (14)—5 9 > 0.44 0.33 0.27 0.22
Stulls: $ 3 . 00 each
Slusher Move and Setup: $ 75. 00 per move
Double Slushing: $ 0.15 per eft
Rockbolts: 4 Ft $ 2.25 each
6 Ft $ 2.35 each
8 Ft $ 2 . 45 each
Mats $ 1. 50 each
NOTE: Overbreak will not be paid for.
BASE PAY: Regular Classification
The undersigned miners agree to perform the work mentioned 
above, according to the terms, conditions, and 
specifications outlined above, in a safe minerlike manner 
and satisfactory to Management.
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and mine specifications, verify bolting/support procedures, 
and inspect timber work and other related projects. This is 
accomplished to insure that shifters are performing to the 
expectation of mine management and to verify production 
reports. From these survey notes, the engineer can create 
summary sheets for each stope and work area (Table 3-15). 
These sheets are a synopsis of the stope survey and are 
formulated to aid in the calculation of incentive 
contributions. Because the survey summary compiled for this 
example is based on the inspection of a double breasted 
stope, each side is independently recorded to accommodate 
the separate contracts issued for each breast of this cut.
It is important to realize that the total stope volume 
measured in Table 3-15 also includes any mining that 
occurred prior to the beginning of the contract period. To 
determine the volume mined for any specific period, it 
becomes a simple process of subtracting previous production 
surveys.
Assume: Mining Begins Jan. 7
Stope Volume Measured (Jan. 14) = 835 cf
Stope Volume Measured (Jan. 21) = 1756 cf
Stope Volume Measured (Jan. 28) = 2985 cf
Volume Mined Between Jan. 21-28 = 2985 - 1756 = 1229 cf
The time in which the stope is measured is also recorded
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TABLE 3-15 Stope Measurement Sheets
STOPE: 1000 -722 INSPECTION DATE: Jan. 28, 19XX
SIDE: NORTH SIDE. SIDE #1 INSPECTION TIME: 11:30 AM
CONTRACT SCHEDULE: S-14 CONTRACT PERIOD: Jan 21-Jan 2 8
Reference Spad/Point: BM 1000-52
Distance Width Height Comments






30 5.7 9 . 3
35 6.0 9.1
40 5.6 9.0
42 5.2 9.2 Turning Point
45 5.4 9.4 Bearing: N35W
50 5.6 9.1
55 5.8 9.5
58 5.5 9.1 Face
VISUAL INSPECTION:
BOLTS TIMBER
STULLS MATS 4 6 8 Type eft
8 9 42 14
PRORATED ACTIVITIES:
DRILLING: Comments - Breast Down Round (5.8 ft x 9 ft) 
Completed 4 holes - 6 ft Round 
Intend on Drilling Out and Blasting
MUCKING: Comments - None
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on these sheets and is crucial from the perspective of 
prorating employee activities. Assuming stope surveys are 
conducted on the last day of a contract period, the amount a 
contract administrator will advance for work being performed 
is often a function of the time remaining in the shift. In 
this example, the stope was measured at 11:30 AM and the 
miner on Side #1 was drilling a 6 foot breast round. If the 
contract administrator was confident in the abilities of 
this particular crew, it would be logical to assume that the 
miner on Side #1 would detonate the round before the end of 
the shift. Therefore, prorating the drilling contribution 
in this stope could appear as:
Side #1:
Activity: drilling 6 ft Breast Down Round
Round Size: 5.7 ft X 9 ft X 6 ft = 310 cf
Holdback Percentage = 40 percent
Breaking Advanced = (310 cf) X (1.0 - .4) = 186 cf
This implies that 186 cubic feet will be advanced in the 
form of broken cubes on the contract issued for Side #1.
Similar advances are calculated for mucking and timbering.
As such, assuming the miner on the south side of Stope 
1000-722 (Side #2) was slushing during the stope survey 
discussed above, the contract administrator would estimate 
the volume of material the miner should be able to muck, 
given the stope's configuration, the type of equipment
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employed, and the specific operating conditions. To 
illustrate this example, assume:
Side #2:
Activity: Single Slushing
Adjusted Slushing Rate = 120 Cubic Feet/Hour
Time Remaining on Contract = 2.5 Hours
Estimated Cubic Feet of Muck in Stope = 450 cf
Holdback Percentage = 50 percent
Slushing Advanced = (120 cf/Hr X 2.5 Hr) X (1 - .5) = 150 cf
Therefore, 150 cubic feet would be advance for slushing on 
Side #2. It should be noted that the estimated number of 
total units slushed must be less than the total volume of 
muck in the stope. Holdback percentage for both these 
estimates are designated by the contract administrator based 
on his confidence in the miners working at this heading and 
the physical nature of the stope. Despite the subjective 
nature of this process, it provides the flexibility required 
by the company to insure contract advances are 
representative of employee earnings.
Once stope measurements have been completed, the 
contract engineer will examine the daily production reports 
compiled by the shifters (Table 3-16). These forms are 
nearly identical to the shifter reports already examined, in 
that they record the activities performed in each stope, 
including the number and type of rounds pulled, the
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TABLE 3-16 Daily Shifter's Report
STOPE REPORT
SHIFTER: Mike Smith DATE: Jan. 16. 19XX 1st Shift
STOPES RESPONSIBLE: 1000-211(N&S).1000-722(N&S).2000-3 5 0 (N)
HOURS
STOPE MINERS ACTIVITIES Cont Base
1000-211 Tim Jones Cycled 6' Breast (North) 
9 - 4 ft Bolts w/ Mats 
2 Stulls
8 0
Bill Smith Slushed (South Side) 
Repaired Chute 1090
4 4
Ed Meyers Stope Cleanout/Mucking 
(South Side) 
Nipping - 1000 Level
4 4
1000-722 Bret Cook Cycled 6' Breast (North) 
4 - 6 ft Bolts w/o Mats
8 0
Mike Olsen Cycled 6' Breast (South) 
5 - 4 ft bolts, 1 Mat
8 0
2000-350 Tim Walker Drilled - BackStope Round 6 2
(North) Pete Jones Moved and Worked on Slusher 




installation of bolts, and the completion of other contract 
activities, like slusher moves, timbering, double slushing. 
In addition, these reports also log the work location of 
each employee and the hours they spend working on contract 
and day's pay. In operations that utilize wage or contract 
cards, this information can be corroborated by employees and 
used to mitigate potential abuses stemming from 
interpersonal conflicts between miners and shifters.
By combining these reports with the survey summaries, 
many operations develop contract data sheets for each stope 
and work area (Table 3-17). These sheets itemize every 
contract activity performed during a specific pay period as 
well as include estimates for overbreak, prorated advances, 
and material consumption. Most contract data sheets also 
include detailed sketches of the stope and it's development 
with respect to established survey points. Although this 
form is used to monitor the progression of the cut and does 
not incorporate employee hours, it is used to assimilate pay 
advances and final contract settlements.
Overbreak is a form of dilution and is defined as 
material that is excavated beyond the geometric boundaries 
specified by geologist(s), engineer(s), and/or the 
production staff (i.e., shifters and the superintendent). 
There are several practices used to account for this
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TABLE 3-17 Contract Data Sheet
STOPE: 1000-722 SIDE: North - Side #1
CONTRACT BEGAN: Jan. 7. 19XX
Contract Period Jan. 7-14 Jan.15-21 Jan.22-28
Distance: Ref. Pt to Face 








58 . 0 
5 .72 
2985
Period Advance 16.3 16.8 24 . 9
Period Stope Width 5. 68 6 .09 5 . 48
Period Stope Volume 835 921 1229
Overbreak - Period 25 50 25
- Cumulative 25 75 100
Contract Adjust. (Supt.)
- Period 0 0 0
- Cumulative 0 0 0
Initial Breaking Volume 810 871 1204
Breaking Pro-Rated
- Previously Advanced 0 100 186
- Currently Advanced 100 186 0
Breaking Holdback
- Percent 20% 20% 20%
- Volume 182 191 204
Breaking Vol. Paided 
- Period 728 766 814
- Cumulative 728 1494 2308
Initial Mucking Volume 810 871 1204
Broken Muck in Stope
- Period 110 130 60
- Cumulative 110 240 300
Muck Pro-Rated
- Previously Advanced 0 55 0
- Currently Advanced 55 0 150
Mucking Holdback
- Percent 20% 20% 20%
- Volume 151 137 259
Mucking Vol. Paided
- Period 604 549 1035
- Cumulative 604 1153 2188
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TABLE 3-17 Contract Data Sheet [Continued]
STOPE: 1000-722 SIDE: North - Side #1
CONTRACT BEGAN: Jan. 7, 19XX
Contract Period Jan. 7-14 Jan.15-21 Jan.22-28
Bolting (ft) 4 6 8 4 6 8 4 6 8
- Period 6 3 16 7 20 4
- Cumulative 6 3 22 10 42 14
Mats - Period 0 4 5
- Cumulative 0 4 9
Stulls - Period 3 2 3
- Cumulative 3 5 8
Timber - Period 0 0 0
Type:
Units:(eft)




- Period 208 162 216
- Cumulative 208 370 586
- Anfo
- Period 150 625 990
- Cumulative 150 775 1765
- Powder
- Period 195 25 30
- Cumulative 195 220 250
- Other (Period)
Remarks and Comments Slusher
Move-Setup
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material when assessing contract volumes. The two most 
common procedures are to incorporate the volume attributed 
to overbreak to the total mucking volume and not pay for 
breakage or to simply subtract from the total volume of both 
breaking and mucking and not pay for either. To determine 
overbreak volume for a given cut, the designated width for 
each round must be recorded. This becomes a rather 
difficult process, particularly if slab rounds are used or 
if the stope is in bad ground conditions. It is generally 
the shifters responsibility to oversee this process and to 
include these estimates in the shifters report. For the 
remainder of this section, overbreak will not be paid for 
either through mucking or breaking.
The next step is to perform the actual computations that 
determine the contract advance for a specific pay period.
In most operations, the information derived from the 
contract summaries is compiled into a contract log. This 
journal is essentially an accounting record of each pay 
advance through the duration of the contract. These logs 
can be configured in a number of formats. The configuration 
of this record is largely dependent on the managerial 
structure and accounting system employed at a particular 
operation. Tables 3-18, 3-19 and 3-20 illustrate different 
categorical entries for one type of contract log. This log
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TABLE 3-18 Contract Log - Breaking
BREAKING LOG
STOPE: 1000-722__________
SIDE: Side #1 (North)
SCHEDULE: S (14) -3____________  CONTRACT BEGAN: Jan. 7, 19XX
Contract Period Jan. 7-14 Jan.15-21 Jan.22-28
Rounds (ft) 4 6 8 4 6 8 4 6 8
- Period 4 1 2 4
- Cumulative 4 5 2 5 6
Measured Stope Volume
- Period 835 921 1229
- Cumulative 835 1756 2985
Vol. Adjustment (Supt.)
- Period 0 0 0
- Cumulative 0 0 0
Breaking - Overbreak
- Period 25 50 25
- Cumulative 25 75 100
Previous Pro-Rated Vol. 0 100 186
Total Payable Volume
- Period 810 771 1018
- Cumulative 810 1581 2599
Pro-Rated Volume
- Period 100 186 0
- Cumulative 100 286 286
Breaking Holdback 20% 20% 20%
- Period 182 191 204
- Cumulative 182 373 577
Total Paid Volume
- Period 728 766 814
- Cumulative 728 1494 2308
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TABLE 3-19 Contract Log - Mucking 
MUCKING LOG
STOPE: 1000-722
SCHEDULE: S (14) -3
MUCKING
SIDE: Side #1 (North)
CONTRACT STARTED: Jan. 7, 19XX
Jan. 7-14
PERIOD 
Jan.15-21 J an.2 2-2 8
Rounds (ft) 4 6 8 4 6 8 4 6 8
- Period 4 1 2 4
- Cumulative 4 5 2 5 6
Measured Stope Volume
- Period 835 921 1229
- Cumulative 835 1756 2985
Vol. Adjustment (Supt.)
- Period 0 0 0
- Cumulative 0 0 0
Overbreak - Period 25 50 25
- Cumulative 25 75 100
Previous Pro-Rated Vol. 0 55 0
Broken Muck in Stope
- Period 110 130 60
- Cumulative 110 240 300
Total Payable Volume
- Period 700 686 1144
- Cumulative 700 1386 2530
Pro-Rated Volume
- Period 55 0 150
- Cumulative 55 55 205
Mucking Holdback 20% 20% 20%
- Period 151 137 259
- Cumulative 151 288 547
Total Paid Volume
- Period 604 549 1035
- Cumulative 604 1153 2188
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TABLE 3-20 Contract Log - Financial Calculations 
CONTRACT INCENTIVE LOG 
STOPE: 1000-722_________  SIDE: Side #1 (North)
CONTRACT PERIOD: Jan. 7-14 Jan.15-21 Jan.22-28
SCHEDULE: S (14)—3 S (14)—3 S (14)-3
EARNINGS: ($)
Bolts - Period 27.60 52 .45 54 . 40
- Cumulative 27.60 80.05 134.45
Mats - Period 0 .00 6.00 7 .50
- Cumulative 0 . 00 6.00 13 . 50
Stulls - Period 9 . 00 6 .00 9 .00
- Cumulative 9 . 00 15 .00 24 . 00
Timber - Period 0.00 0 .00 0 .00
- Cumulative 0.00 0 .00 0 .00
Misc. - Period 75. 00 0.00 0 .00
- Cumulative 75.00 75.00 75 . 00
BREAKING:
Total Paid Volume
- Period 728 766 814
- Cumulative 728 1494 2308
Contract Earnings
- Period 451.36 474.92 504.68
- Cumulative 451.36 926.28 1430 .96
MUCKING:
Total Paid Volume
- Period 604 549 1035
- Cumulative 604 1153 2188
Contract Earnings
- Period 163.08 148.23 279.45
- Cumulative 162.08 311.31 590.76
TOTAL CONTRACT EARNINGS
- Period 726.04 687.60 855.03
- Cumulative 726.04 1413.64 2268.67
TOTAL CONTRACT HOURS
- Period 32 . 0 32.0 40 . 0
- Cumulative 32. 0 64.0 104.0
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differentiates the influence attributed to individual 
activities based on adjusted volumetric variables. Table 
3-18, for example, is a summary of the calculations used to 
determine the breaking volume advanced for each pay period. 
Similarly, Table 3-19 demonstrates the procedure for 
determining the muck volume advanced for the same period.
The volumes derived in these tables are the basis from which 
incentive contributions are calculated. In addition, the 
volume used in each of these two categories will generally 
be different, even though they originate from the same 
measured stope volume. Differences in these volumes stem 
from policies governing overbreak, environmental and 
operating adjustments, holdback percentages, and the 
prorating of activities. Table 3-20 is similar to a 
financial spreadsheet, in that it calculates the monetary 
incentives advanced to employees for each period. The 
accumulated values represented in these figures will be used 
to determine the final stope settlement at the conclusion of 
the cut.
The first phase in this process is to determine the 
appropriate volume associated with each activity (i.e., 
breaking and mucking) which will be used to calculate the 
pay advance for a given period. To illustrate the 
technique, the volume used to calculate the breaking advance
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in Table 3-18 will be calculated for Side #1 during the 
period, January 14-21. The volume of material removed from 
this work area, as measured by the contract administrator, 
is equal to 1756 cubic feet. It must be remembered that 
this volume also includes any rock mined from previous pay 
periods, as well as material that has been advanced as a 
result of prorating activities. Subtracting these two 
factors from the total volume measured equals the actual 
volume mined during the period.
Assume: Total Measured Volume = 17 56 eft
Volume Mined During Previous Period = 835 eft
ProRated Volume from Previous Period = 100 eft
Actual Volume Mined (Jan.14-21) = 1756-835-100. = 821 eft
Before this value can be used to determine incentive 
contributions, however, it must be adjusted to negate the 
effects of overbreak and to compensate for adverse 
conditions that might have impaired employee productivity. 
As was discussed earlier, adjustments for detrimental 
operating conditions is a subjective evaluation largely made 
at the discretion of the mine superintendent. It is 
generally a cyclical process where the contract will 
initially be calculated without any adjustment. Depending 
on the disparity between the incentive rate earned by the 
miners and the designed rate for the contract, the mine
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superintendent may add "cubes" to either breaking or 
mucking, to compensate for these deleterious factors. In 
this example, it will be assumed that no adjustments for 
these factor have been made.
Adjusted Total Volume = 821 - 50 + 0 + 186 = 957 eft
The cumulative sum of all the Adjusted Total Volume through 
the duration of a contract is the basis from which the total 
incentive for that activity will be calculated.
This value is then multiplied by a holdback percentage 
to determine the volume to be paid in a particular advance. 
Holdback, as was previously iterated, can vary between 
activities and pay periods and is determined by the contract 
administrator's confidence in the stope survey. Holdback, 
in this example, for both mucking and breaking is 20 percent 
and timbering is 30 percent.
Total Volume Paid = Adjusted Total Volume - Holdback Volume
= 957 - ((957) X .20) = 766 eft
This volume, 7 66 eft, when multiplied by the appropriate
Assume: Actual Volume Mined 821 eft 
50 eftOverbreak Volume (Not Paid) 
Superintendent's Adjustment 
ProRated Breaking Volume Advanced
0 eft 
186 eft
Assume: Adjusted Total Volume = 957 eft
Breaking Holdback = 2 0 percent
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schedule rate equals the total incentive that will be 
advance for breaking during this period.
Generally, the total contract advance is then determined 
by multiplying each activity by it's respective rate, where 
the sum of the values equal the total contract advance for 
the period. This calculation is usually performed on an 
established form, called a Contract Advance Sheet (Table 
3-21). This form also distributes and allocates the total 
advance to the employees who participated in the contract. 
Table 3-21 includes the total volume advanced for both 
breaking and mucking as well as their associated schedule 
rates. In addition, timber cubes, bolting, and 
miscellaneous activities are itemized, including their 
values. Holdback is sometimes utilized for timbering and 
miscellaneous stope activities, particularly in large 
projects like timbering in a Square-Set Cut. Because of the 
short time duration associated with bolting, it does not 
make sense to use a holdback process. The total number of 
contract hours spent in the stope are also recorded.
Because two contracts were issued for this stope (one for 
each side), each miner will receive advances from both 
contract sheets, as illustrated in Tables 3-21 and 3-22.
As was stated, the contract advance is allotted to the 
miners by a weighted average based upon the number of hours
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TABLE 3-21 Contract Advance Sheet
CONTRACT PERIOD: Jan. 15 - 21, 19XX______________________
STOPE: 1000-722________  SIDE: Side #1 (North)
SHIFTER:   MEASURED BY: _______________
CALCULATED BY: CHECKED BY:
BREAKING | MUCKING
_____________1_________ _ _





1 -------  1
1 1 S(14)-3 0.62 5 474.92
| 549 eft 1 1 S(14)-3 0.27 $ 148.23
1 |Bolts: 16-4 ft| 2.25 $ 36.00
1 | 7-6 ft| 2.35 $ 16.45
1 | Mats: (4) | 1.50 $ 6.00
1 jStulls: (2) | 3.00 $ 6.00
TOTAL ADVANCE $ 687.60
$ 687.60 divided by 32 Hours, Equals $ 21.49 Hourly Rate
Contract Hours
CONTRACT MINER






TOTAL CONTRACT EARNINGS 32 $ 687.60
DAILY CONTRACT RATE $ 171.90
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TABLE 3-2 2 Contract Advance Sheet
CONTRACT PERIOD: Jan. 15 - 21, 19XX______________________
STOPE: 1000-722  SIDE: Side #2 (South)
SHIFTER: _________________  MEASURED BY: _________________
CALCULATED BY: CHECKED BY:
BREAKING |
_____________I _ _






1 1 S(14)-3 0.62 $ 424.08I 414 eft 1 1 S(14)-3 0.27 $ 111.78I |Bolts: 10-4 ft| 2.25 $ 22.50I | 8-6 ft| 2.35 S 18.80I | Mats: (3) | 1.50 $ 4.50I |StulIs: (9) | 3.00 $ 27.00
TOTAL ADVANCE $ 608.66
$ 608.66 divided by 32 Hours, Equals S 19.02 Hourly Rate
Contract Hours
CONTRACT MINER






TOTAL CONTRACT EARNINGS 32 $ 608.66
DAILY CONTRACT RATE $ 152.16
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they contribute to the contract. Because this is a double 
breasted stope, each employee's hours are split between both 
breasts of the stope, Tables 3-21 and 3-22. By dividing the 
Total Advance for a contract by the total recorded man- 
hours, an hourly contract rate for the pay advance is 
determined for each side of the stope. Multiplying the 
number of hours a particular employee has accrued on each 
contract by the respective contract rate, the Total Advance 
for that contract is calculated. Summing the Total Advance 
for both contracts produces the total incentive advanced to 
the employee. In some union operations, the calculated 
advance for a stope may be subject to COLA'S based on the 
number of hours each employee participates in both 
contracts. In the unlikely event that the hourly contract 
rate is less than the day's pay standard, the contract 
engineer may modify the percent holdback. If the incentive 
rate is still too low, a day's pay rate will be used. To 
illustrate this process, the incentive pay advance for Bret 
Cook is calculated by:
Side #1:
Total Contract Advance = $ 687.60
Total Contract Man-Hours = 32 Man-hours
Contract Man-Hours (Bret Cook) = 16 Man-Hours
Contract Rate = ($ 687.60)/(32 Man-Hrs) = $ 21.49/Man-Hr




Total Contract Advance 
Total Contract Man-Hours 




Contract Rate = ($ 608.66)/(32 Man-Hrs) = $ 19.02/Man-Hr 
Incentive Advanced (Bret Cook) = $ 19.02/Hr X 16 Man-Hours
Therefore, the total incentive advanced to the employee 
equals:
Total Incentive Advanced (Bret Cook) = $ 343.80 + $ 304.33
= $ 648.13
Contract Rate Advanced/Hr = $ 648.13/32 Man-Hours
= $ 20.25/hr
Contract Rate Advanced/Shift = $ 20.25/hr X 8 Hrs/shift
The total earnings paid to Bret Cook, including base wages 
and the contract advance, equals:
Base Wages Earned = $ 12.00/hr X 8 Hrs (Day's Pay) = $ 9 6.00
Total Earnings/Period = $ 648.13 + $ 96.00 = $ 744.13
The contract rate advanced to Bret Cook, in this example, is
1.7 times the day's pay standard of $ 96.00 per shift. The 
total advance for this period is then recorded in the 





STEP #3: FINAL STOPE SETTLEMENT
At the completion of the cut and prior to sand 
preparation, the contract engineer, usually accompanied by 
the mine superintendent, will perform the final stope 
survey. This survey will measure the total volume of 
material removed from both breasts of the stope and inspect 
the cut to insure that it corroborates with the information 
recorded in the shifter reports and the contract log, as 
well as conforms to the specifications outlined in the 
contract. The results of this survey, in most systems, are 
processed to determine the pay advance for the last period, 
as if the stope had not yet been finished. This is done to 
alleviate problems created by the rotation of employees 
through the stope or if the holdback percentage or price 
schedules have fluctuated during the course of the contract. 
Once the advance has been calculated and recorded in the 
contract log, the final settlement payment can be 
calculated.
Because of the frequency at which this stope is surveyed 
and the fact that it is a Breast Down Stope, errors 
attributed to surveying and volumetric measurement are 
distributed equally during each pay period and should have a 
negligible effect on the Final Stope Settlement. This is
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not the case with operations utilizing Backstoping, Rill, or 
Square-Set Mining Systems, as was discussed in Time-Based 
Programs. These systems can possess significant disparities 
in volumetric surveys, due to the inability of the contract 
engineer to perform precise measurements of the stope. In 
this example, the final settlement is generated by residual 
earnings attributed to holdbacks on timber, breaking and 
mucking volumes, and other miscellaneous activities. There 
are a number of different approaches to determine the 
individual allotments of these earnings depending on several 
factors, such as if holdback percentage and/or price 
schedules have remained constant through the duration of the 
contract. If they did remain constant, as in this example, 
the Total Measured Volume, determined in the final stope 
survey (less any adjustments), minus the Total Volume 
Advanced equals the Adjusted Holdback for that activity. 
Multiply this value by its respective price schedule and 
summing all the activities, the total value for the adjusted 
holdback can be determined. This value can then be 
multiplied by a weighted average to determine individual 
allotments for the stope settlement. To illustrate this 
procedure, assume:
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Stope: 1000-722, Side #1 (North)
Date of Cut Completion: Jan. 31, 19XX
Final stope Volume Measurement = 3112 eft 
Muck Remaining in Stope = 0 eft
Breaking: Total Measured Volume = 3112 eft
Total Overbreak Volume = 100 eft
Total Superintendent's Adjustment = 0 eft
Total Volume Advanced = 2308 eft
Adjusted Holdback = (3112 - 100 + 0) - 2308 = 704 eft
Mucking: Total Measured Volume = 3112 eft
Total Overbreak Volume = 100 eft
Total Superintendent's Adjustment = 0 eft
Total Volume Advanced = 2188 eft
Adjusted Holdback = (3112 - 100 + 0) - 2188 = 824 eft
Assuming that this represents the extent of the contract 
holdback, the total contract payout for Bret Cook equals:
Assume: Breaking Schedule [S(14)-3] = $ 0.62/cft 
Mucking Schedule [S(14)-3] = $ 0.27/cft
Contract Settlement = (704 X .62) + (824 X .27)
= $ 436.48 + $ 222.48
= $ 658.96
The Contract Settlement, calculated above, represents the 
residual earnings owed for one side of the stope. This 
process must be replicated for the other breast as well, 
where the sum of both settlements equals the final stope 
payout which is distributed to the employees.
The allocation of the Final Stope Settlement into
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individual proportions is performed through a weighted 
average based on the time an individual contributes to the
contract with respect to the total number of man-hours
accrued on the contract. This process is essentially the 
same as was discussed in Step #2. For example, the Final 
Contract Settlement earned by Bret Cook equals:
Assume: Total Hours - Bret Cook (Side #1)
Total Hours - Bret Cook (Side #2)
Total Contract Hours (Side #1)
Total Contract Hours (Side #2)
Contract Settlement (Side #1)
Contract Settlement (Side #2)
Final Payout (Bret Cook) equals,
= ($ 658.96 X (57 MH/118 MH)) + ($ 587.74 X (38 MH/74 MH))
= $ 318.31 + $ 301.81 = $ 620.12
These calculations are generally performed on a sheet 
similar to Tables 3-21 and 3-22, often called a Contract 
Settlement Sheet. Again, because two contract were issued 
for this stope, there will be two final settlement forms per 
stope.
In applications where the either the holdback percentage 
or the price schedule has changed between pay periods, the 
contract engineer will be forced to perform a weighted 
average based on the hours and holdback affiliated with each
pay advance. The rationale is that the collective value of
the adjusted holdback will not be proportional to the
= 57 Man-Hours
= 38 Man-Hours
= 118 Man-Hours 
= 7 4 Man-Hours
= $ 658.96 
= $ 587.74
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holdback contributions associated with individual pay 
periods. Therefore, an inequitable distribution of the 
final settlement could occur if employee participation in 
the stope was not consistent through the life of the 
contract (e.g., employee's being rotated through a stope).
STEP #4: RECORD KEEPING
From the examples presented in this section, it is 
apparent that this contract system generates a significant 
amount of paper work for both shifters and the contract 
engineer. These records, however, are vital to the success 
of these programs. The potential for overpaying employees 
because of prorating activities, measuring errors, and 
recording inaccuracies, is substantial, particularly in 
contracts that possess numerous advances. Therefore, a 
system that monitors the progress of a contract via a 
thorough documentation procedure will mitigate many of these 
problems.
Linear Contract Systems
Although utilized in limited applications, these systems 
present an effective means of influencing employee 
performance for specific geologic and operating parameters. 
While used exclusively in cyclical mining systems, such as
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Breast Down Stoping, Linear Contract Programs resemble 
Time-Based Contracts in structure as well as implementation. 
These systems incorporate all the activities characteristic 
of mining a specific cut, excluding sand preparation, raise 
work, and stope repair/development, into a performance 
standard based on the linear advance of the stope.
Therefore, it is highly amenable to systems that progress 
linearly along strike, like conventional Breast Down - Cut 
and Fill, Square-Set, and Rill Mining Methods. This does, 
however, require that the cut remain fairly uniform in 
geometric configuration (i.e., width, height, and dip) and 
operating stature. The appeal of this systems is that it is 
conceptually straightforward and the ease at which incentive 
allotments can be calculated. As such, miners can virtually 
determine their own earnings for any given period of work.
Program Design
Linear Contract systems are formulated in much the same 
way as Time-Based Programs. Productivity standards are 
established by individually evaluating each activity in the 
mining cycle. Standards represent the time affiliated with 
completing each task, for a given set of constraints, as 
performed by a miner(s) with average skills and abilities 
working at day's pay rate. As was earlier iterated,
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determining the standard for each task is agonizing process 
that must be performed by a competent and experienced 
administrator and is developed through a combination of time 
studies, historical data, and the designer's expertise.
Like Time-Based Contracts, these standards can incorporate 
elements characteristic of operating delays and downtime, 
such as equipment maintenance, mechanical inavailibility, 
and/or operating interference.
Once these standards have been ascertained, they are 
tallied to produce the average productivity associated with 
mining a particular cut. A relationship must be developed 
between the average productivity of a stope and the critical 
variables that will influence productivity, including 
equipment type, cut geometries, and operating environment. 
For each anticipated set of operating conditions, the 
contract administrator must possess a predetermined means of 
compensating the overall performance standard of that 
particular stope.
The first step in tailoring a productivity standard for 
a specific stope is to calculate the actual time it takes to 
mine or "cycle" a single round of the cut, for a given set 
of operating parameters. Once this time increment has been 
determined, it can be divided by the actual working minutes 
within the contract period to equal the rounds cycled in
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that period. Simply multiplying this value by the average 
linear advance for a single round, equates to a standard 
based measured in units of feet per contract period. To 
illustrate this example:
Assume: Performance Standard (1 rd, 2 miners) = 437 min.
Round Depth = 6 ft
Pay Period = 1 Week
Total Shift Minutes = (8 hrs/shift X 60 min/hr) = 480 min
Less: Average Travel Time (Measured)
Beginning of Shift: 22 min
End of Shift: 20 min
Lunch (Company Policy): 30 min
Personnel Time (Company Policy): 30 min
Stope Startup/Teardown (Measured): 32 min
- 134 min
Total Working Time/Shift = 34 6 min
Total Working Time/Period = (346 min) X (5 shifts/period)
= 1730 min/period
Rounds/Period = (1730 min/period)/(437 min/round)
= 3.96 rounds/period
Advance Standard/Period = (3.96 rounds) X (6 ft/round)
= 23.75 feet/period
This infers that the standard for this stope is 23.7 5 linear 
feet. Because this rate exemplifies what two average miners 
on day's pay should accomplish within the period,
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productivity exceeding this standard will translate to 
additional monetary remuneration. Furthermore, this 
standard can be expressed in terms of dollar per foot by 
dividing the advance rate by the day's pay earnings for the 
contract period. Assuming that each stope possess a two man 
crew and the rate for day's pay is $96.00 per man-shift, 
then:
Day's Pay Earnings/Period = ($ 96.00/shift X 5 shift/period)
= $ 480.00/period
Day's Pay Earnings/Period (2 man crew):
($ 480.00/period X 2) = $ 960.00/crew/period
Day's Pay Standard/Linear Ft. Advance:
($ 960.00)/(23.75 ft) = $ 40.42/Linear Ft.
This rate indicates that each miner will make $ 2 0.21 per 
linear foot of stope advance if they mine at a day's pay 
rate.
As with the other contract systems examined in this 
chapter, most programs are designed to enable the miner to 
earn a designated percentage above the day's pay rate. In 
regards to Linear Contracts, this percentage can be 
manipulated by simply adjusting the total number of minutes 
comprised in the stope productivity standard.
ARTHUR LAKES LIBRARY
COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES 
GOLDEN, CO 80401
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Since linear advance is function of distance, measured 
from the working face to an access raise or muck chute, time 
standards will incrementally increase the further from the 
chute the face advances, this is particularly evident for
4
mucking. Most systems compensate for this declining 
productivity by utilizing performance adjustments which 
reduce the total productivity standard in relationship to 
the cut length. These adjustments are formulated into 
specific distance intervals, where each interval corresponds 
to a specific standard. For example, Table 3-23 illustrates 
how these performance standards can be structured to decline 
with distance.
Table 3-23 Performance Standards Versus Distance
Interval Distance 
(Linear Feet)
Standard 0-50 51-100 101-125 126-150 150 +
Lin Ft 
Period
23.75 22 .75 21. 50 20.00 18 .25
$/Lin.Ft 40.42 42 .20 44. 65 48 .00 52 . 60
By developing these stopes into a configuration amenable 
to double breasting, the labor cost per foot can effectively 
be reduced, in some situations, by as much as 40 percent. 
Adopting a program of this type, similar to the mining
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systems discussed in Volumetric Contract Programs, will 
necessitate the recalculation of performance standards for 
each activity in the mining cycle.
The next step in this process is to determine an 
appropriate incentive rate that will reward employees for 
productivity which exceeds the established standard.
Although this can be achieved through several techniques, 
the three most popular methods are Straight Line, 
Accelerated, and Partial Rate Programs. To illustrate the 
application of each method, productivity adjustments for 
stope advance will be neglected in the following examples.
straight Line Methods attempt to enhance productivity 
through a system that yields the employee a fixed rate for 
every foot the stope is advanced beyond the standard. A 
summary of this process is illustrated in Table 3-2 4. The 
first line of this table shows the base standard for this 
cut. For each additional foot the miners advance the stope, 
they are paid an additional $ 40.42. The calculations 
inherent to this method are quite simple. The total advance 
is multiplied by the rate to equal the total earnings for 
both employees during the period. The labor cost to the 
company for each linear foot advanced in the stope remains 
constant, while the earnings accrued by each employee 
increases by a fixed rate.
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Table 3-2 4 Straight Line Contract Rates
Employee Earnings
Advance Rate Total Labor Cost
(ft) <$/ft) Earnings ($/ft) Period ($/hr)
23.75 40.42 960.00 40.42 480.00 12 .00
24.75 40.42 1000.40 40. 42 500.20 12 . 50
25.75 40.42 1040.82 40. 42 520.41 13 .01
26.75 40.42 1081.24 40 . 42 540.62 13 . 52
27 .75 40.42 1121.66 40 . 42 560.83 14 .02
Another method of determining incentive proceeds is to 
establish a system where an incremental percentage of the 
base rate is paid for each foot of advance beyond the 
standard. This system is called a Accelerated Rate Method. 
The incremental percentages are determined by targeting 
values for both employee earnings and expected performance. 
Productivity standards are designed to enable the average 
contract miner to earn a wage greater than day's pay. In 
doing this, a company must establish what it feels is an 
appropriate wage level for stope miners as well as the 
expected average advance rate for a given period. This 
production rate is different than the one used to determine 
the activity standards and is based on a analysis of the 
average historic productivity of a miner on contract. From 
this analysis multipliers which represent a percentage of 
the standard rate are determined. These multipliers are
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structured into a system so that the incremental earnings 
per foot increase for each additional foot of stope advance 
beyond the established standard. Table 3-25 illustrates 
this process for a single stope heading with the following 
assumptions:
Expected Contract Rate = 1.2 5 times day's pay
= $ 120.00/shift
Expected Stope Advance = 30.75 feet/period
As this table demonstrates, the interval rate for every foot 
mined in excess of the standard increases arithmetically 
by .05 percent of standard rate. At the expected stope 
advance of 30.75 feet, the rate for the period equals $ 
1200.51, which is 1.25 times the base rate. Table 3-26 
exemplifies the relationship of these rates with respect to 
employee earnings and mine labor costs. The interesting 
aspect of this table is that the labor cost per linear foot 
of stope advance declines until it exceeds the established 
standard of 29.75 feet. Inversely, the hourly wage rate for 
employees accelerates for each additional foot mined. This 
type of program is unique from the perspective of fulfilling 
two of the most common goals of an operator, providing a 
viable incentive program that can motivate employees while 
being receptive their needs and directly lowering the labor
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TABLE 3-25 Accelerated Contract Rate Calculations
Advance Mult Interval Rate
(Ft) Factor Rate (S/Period)
23.75 0.00 j __ Base Pay Standard = 960.00 j
24.75 0.70 j 28.29 960 + 28.29 = 988.29 |
25.75 0.75 j 30.32 960 + 28.29 ♦ 30.32 = 1018.61 |
26.75 0.80 j 32.34 960 + 28.29 ♦ 30.32 ♦ 32.34 = 1050.95 j
27.75 0.85 j 34.36 960 ♦ 28.29 ♦ 30.32 ♦ 32.34 34.36 = 1085.31 j
28.75 0.90 | 36.38 960 + 28.29 ♦ 30.32 ♦ 32.34 34.36 + 36.38 = 1121.69 j
29.75 0.95 | 38.40 960 ♦ 28.29 ♦ 30.32 + 32.34 + 34.36 + 36.38 ♦ 38.40 = 1160.09 j
30.75 1.00 j 40.42 960 + 28.29 + 30.32 +• 32.34 + 34.36 + 36.38 ♦ 38.40 + 40.42 = 1200.51 |
31.75 1.05 j 42.44 960 + 28.29 ♦ 30.32 ♦ 32.34 + 34.36 + 36.38 ♦ 38.40 40.42 + 42.44 1242.95 |
32.75 1.10 | 44.46 960 + 28.29 «• 30.32 + 32.34 ♦ 34.36 36.38 + 38.40 40.42 ♦ 42.44 + 44.46 — 1287.41 |
T-3894 194
TABLE 3-2 6 Accelerated Contract Rates
Interval Employee Earnings
Advance Rate Total Labor Cost
(ft) Earnings <$/ft) Period ($/hr)
23.75 _ _ _ 960.00 40 . 42 480.00 12 . 00
24.75 28.29 988.29 39 .93 494.15 12 .35
25.75 30.32 1018.61 39.56 509.31 12 .73
26.75 32 . 34 1050.95 39.29 525.48 13 . 14
27.75 34.36 1085.31 39 . 11 542.66 13 . 57
28.75 36. 38 1121.69 39 . 02 560.85 14 . 02
29.75 38. 40 1160.09 38.99 580.04 14 . 50
30 .75 40 . 42 1200.51 39 . 05 600.26 15 .01
31.75 42 .44 1242 .95 39 . 15 621.48 15 . 54
32 .75 44.46 1287.41 39.31 643.71 16 .09
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cost attributed to mining.
The third method is a combination of the first two, 
where a constant rate per linear foot of advance is paid in 
addition to a fixed percentage of the day's pay rate. Often 
called a Partial Rate Program, the intent of this method is 
to optimize a ratio between the labor cost per foot and the 
rate at which miners are paid. Incentive rates are based on 
multiplying each foot of advance by a constant rate, then 
adding a fixed percentage of day's pay. Both the advance 
rate and the percentage multiplier are determined by the 
same process as described in Accelerated Programs and are 
dependent upon the desired goals of the company. For 
example:
Assume: Contract Rate = $ 20.21/Linear Ft
Day's Pay/Period (2 men) = $ 960.00 
Contract Percentage = 50 percent
Percent Factor = ($ 960.00)-((.50)X ($ 960.00)) = $ 480.00 
Advance Rate
23.75 (23.75 ft) X ($ 20.21/ft) + ($ 480.00) = $ 960.00
24.75 (24.75 ft) X ($ 20.21/ft) + ($ 480.00) = $ 980.20
25.75 (25.75 ft) X ($ 20.21/ft) + ($ 480.00) = $ 1000.41
26.75 (26.75 ft) X ($ 20.21/ft) + ($ 480.00) = $ 1020.62
In this example, it is important that the rate for the 
average standard (i.e., 23.75 ft) equal the day's pay rate
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for the period ($ 960.00). Table 3-27 illustrates the 
calculation table for the example above. In this method, 
the cost of labor continues to drop with each additional 
foot of advance, while employee earnings increase at a 
constant rate. This process possess the optimal situation, 
from a mine's perspective, in that labor costs continue 
to
Table 3-27 Partial Rate Contract Program
Employee Earnings
Advance Total Labor Cost
(ft) Earnings ($/ft) (Period) ($/hr)
23.75 960.00 40 . 42 480.00 12 . 00
24.75 980.20 39 . 60 490.10 12 . 25
25.75 1000.41 38.85 500.21 12 .51
26.75 1020.62 38. 15 510.31 12 . 76
27.75 1040.83 37.51 520.42 13 .01
decline with improvements in employee proficiency. The 
major drawback with this system is that employees may feel 
the incremental increase they receive in monetary rewards, 
at some point, are not worth the extra effort to achieve 
additional productivity.
While considerations for distance adjustments in the 
standards presented above were excluded for simplicity, they 
would be included in most contract programs.
T-3894 197
Contract Example
To illustrate implementation of this method, an example 
of a contract program typifying the characteristics of the 
Straight Line Method, described in Table 3-24 above, will be 
examined. Again, the standards developed for this system 
includes all activities characteristic of mining a specific 
cut, excluding work affiliated with stope development and 
sand preparation. For simplicity, it will be assumed that 
these standards have already been calculated.
STEP #1: CONTRACT IMPLEMENTATION
Once the contract standard and rate schedule for a stope 
have been determined, a contract sheet is issued (Table 
3-28). In most programs, the format of this sheet is very 
much like those addressed in Time Based Systems, containing 
a synopsis of the stope specifications, the relationship 
between contract rates and linear advance, the measuring 
period (which correlates to the performance standard), and 
the interval data for calculating distance adjustments.
Often there are spaces for both the contract engineer and 
the miners to sign to mitigate any possible
misunderstandings and to insure that each miner understands 
the expectation of management and the incentive system.
In some situations, it may be necessary to perform some
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TABLE 3-28 Linear Based Contract Performance Sheet
STOPE: 2000-464 DESIGN DATE: Sept. 4, 19XX
CUT NUMBER: 3 STARTING DATE: Sept.11, 19XX
MEASURING PERIOD: 1 Week, (Sunday - Saturday)
STOPE CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS:
Includes: All activities associated with mining, rock 
support, equipment maintenace, and safety.
Standard Breast Down Rounds
- 8.7 ft Average Stope Width
- 9.0 ft Average Stope Height (Flat Back)
- 6.0 ft Round Depth, Single Breasted Stope (2 men)
- Equipment: Slushers, Jacklegs (Single Slushing)
STOPE CONTRACT STANDARDS:
Period Interval Employee Earnings
Advance Rate Total
(ft) <$/ft) Earnings (Period) ($/hr)
23.75 40 . 42 960.00 480.00 12 .00
24.75 40.42 1000.40 500.20 12 . 50
25.75 40 . 42 1040.82 520.41 13 .01
26.75 40.42 1081.24 540.62 13.52
27.75 40.42 1121.66 560.83 14 . 02
28.75 40.42 1162.08 581.04 14 . 53
29.75 40.42 1202.50 601.25 15.03
30.75 40.42 1242.92 621.46 15. 54
DISTANCE ADJUSTMENTS:
Distance measured from ore chute to the working face.
Distance Interval Rate Adjustment
(Linear Ft) ($/Linear Ft)
0.00 50 .75 0 . 00
50.75 - 100.75 0.50
100.75 - 125.75 1.25
125.75 - 150.75 2.25
150.75 + 3.50
CALCULATED BY APPROVED BY
T-3894 199
activity that was not included in the initial stope 
standard, such as a timber set or a slusher move. In these 
cases, a value will be determined for the activity and will 
be paid similar to a piece rate program. It is highly 
desirable, however, that this is infrequently done because 
it disrupts the basic intent of the system.
STEP #2: PAY ADVANCES
As with Time-Based and Volumetric Contract Programs, the 
average duration of a cut, and consequently the contract, 
generally exceeds more than one pay period. Therefore, a 
process of distributing partial payments of the incentive 
prior to the cut's completion is quite common. The 
principle advantage of this system is the ease at which 
these settlements are calculated and that holdback 
percentages are minimized.
The first step in this procedure is to measure the 
stope. This process is generally quite simple, where the 
distance between the face and a fixed point adjacent to the 
raise or ore chute (e.g., survey spad) is measured. If 
previous measurements or pay periods have been made, the 
advance for the period is calculated by subtracting the last 
stope measurement from the previous periods. For example:
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Measurement (Period Ending Sept. 24, 19XX) — 54.50 Lin. Ft 
Measurement (Period Ending Sept 18, 19XX) = 26.25 Lin. Ft
Advance (Sept.18 - Sept.24) = 54.50 - 26.25 = 28.25 Lin. Ft
The stope advance for the pay period, in this example, is 
2 8.25 linear feet. In order to improve their advance rate, 
miners will often mine a cut smaller than specified in the 
contract or drill round patterns that leave the back uneven 
which can effect the productivity of the next cut. Although 
it is the shifters responsibility to oversee the progression 
of the cut and to insure these types of conditions do not 
develop, the contract engineer will also check to verify 
that the cut is being mined to the specifications of the 
contract.
Once the stope has been measured, the next step is to 
calculate the total incentive earned for the period. If the 
entire stope advance for the period falls into a single 
distance adjustment interval, such as 0 - 50 feet, the 
incentive can easily be determined by multiplying the 
measured advance by the established rate. For example:
Assume: Beginning Point (Measured Sept. 18) = 2.00 ft
Ending Point (Measured Sept. 24) = 3 0 . 2 5  ft
Linear Advance/Period = 28.25 ft
Because both points are contained within the Distance
T-3894 201
Interval (0 - 50 ft), then:
Distance Adjustment = $ 0.00/ft
Incentive/Period = (28.25 ft) X ($ 40.42/ft + $ 0.00/ft)
= $ 1141.87
Through the duration of any given contract period, the 
odds that a measurement will be incorporated in a single 
distance interval is small. Therefore, measurement 
calculations must segregate each segment into a defined 
distance intervals. In this example, Table 3-29 represents 
the Contract Advance Sheet where the stope advance for the 
period is 28.25 feet (beginning at 26.25 feet and ending at 
54.50 feet), and encompasses two adjustment intervals. The 
incentive derived from both intervals are combined to equal 
the incentive for the period. This is illustrated by the 
following calculations:
Distance Interval: 0 - 50.75 Feet
Advance/Distance Interval = 50.75 - Initial Measurement
= 50.75 Ft - 26.25 Ft
= 24.50 Linear Ft
Incentive/Period = (24.50 Ft) X $ 40.42 = $ 990.29
Distance Interval: 50.75 - 100.75 Feet
Advance/Distance Interval = Final Measurement - 50.7 5
= 54.5 Ft - 50.75 Ft 
= 3.75 Linear Ft
Incentive/Period = (3.74 Ft) X ($ 40.42 + $ 0.50) = $ 153.04
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TABLE 3-2 9 Contract Advance Calculation Form
STOPE: 2000-464
CUT NUMBER: 3
TIME OF SURVEY: 1:30 pm
DESIGN DATE: Sept. 4 , 19XX 
STARTING DATE: Sept.11, 19XX 
PAY PERIOD: Sept. 1 8 - 2 4
Measured Stope Advance (Sept. 24): 54.50 LFt 
Measured Stope Advance (Sept. 18): 26.25 LFt
Measured Muck Residual (Sept. 24): 250 CFt 
Measured Muck Residual (Sept. 18): 100 CFt
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TOTAL INCENTIVE/PERIOD = Interval (1) + Interval (2)
= $ 990.29 + $ 153.04 
= $ 1143.33
It must be noted that the Total Incentive for the period 
calculated above, assumes that no muck remains within the 
stope and the next round has not be started (no prorating).
Because the activities associated with production are 
tied to linear measurements of the stope, the length mined 
at any given time can be quickly translated to an incentive. 
Therefore, due to the structure of this system, a holdback 
percentage of the total incentive may be extraneous. It is 
used, however, in circumstances where the prorating of 
activities is performed or when the stope has not been 
cleaned out (i.e., muck remaining in the stope).
For the reasons described under Volumetric Systems, it 
often becomes necessary for the contract engineer to survey 
the stope prior to the end of the contract period. In these 
situations, the administrator will estimate what should be 
accomplished before the end of the period, based on his 
perception of the miner's abilities, stope characteristics, 
and other factors, and pay a percentage of this work in the 
current contract advance. In Volumetric Systems, these 
estimates were in the form of cubic feet broken or mucked.
In most Linear Systems, however, these activities are 
measured and paid as a function of stope advance
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(i.e., linear feet). In these systems, each activity 
associated with mining the round possess a predesignated 
value based on the amount of time the activity consumes with 
respect to the total round. A simple example for a 6 foot 
round is presented below, incorporating the three basic unit 
activities of drilling, blasting, and mucking.
In this evaluation system, it is evident that the sum of the 
activities do not equal the linear advance expected from a 6 
foot round (4.5 feet). This is in effect a holdback which
is paid in the following pay period. If an activity is only
partially completed, the activity standard can be multiplied 
by the percent of completion to determine the amount to be
advanced. For example, if a contract administrators deems
that a round is 50 percent drilled out, then .75 feet will 
be advanced.
In addition, most Breast Down Stoping Methods leave a 
considerable amount of muck along the ribs of the stope 
which is usually cleaned out at the end of the cut. 
Therefore, the contract administrator will typically 
subtract some portion of the total incentive as a holdback 








called a muck residual calculation, is subjective from the 
perspective that the contract engineer will estimate the 
amount of muck remaining in the stope during each period.
By subtracting the estimates obtained between two 
consecutive surveys, the muck residual for that period can 
be determined. A common technique equates the estimated 
volume of muck, on the basis of operating time, to a linear 
advance rate. For example, the time required to muck a 15 0 
cubic feet of ore may be equivalent to mining a specified 
percentage of a round (e.g., 10 percent), this percentage 
can then be represented in feet of advance:
Advanced Holdback (Mucking):
(6 ft/round) X .10 = 0.60 Linear Ft
This residual holdback will be subtracted from the
calculated linear advance for the period
In the example presented in this section, the measured
advance for each interval has been calculated





TOTAL MEASURED ADVANCE 28.25 ft
From these values, each advance for a given interval must be
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adjusted for prorated activities (past and present) and any 
assessed holdback. As illustrated in Table 3-29, 2.00 feet 
were advanced in the previous pay period for drilling and 
blasting. This amount must be subtracted from the interval 
from which it was previously advanced. In addition, from 
the current stope survey, the contract administrator 
advanced 1.25 feet to the total cut length during the 
present period. This was determined by estimating what 
percentage of each activity has been completed, then 
multiply this value by the prorated standard associated with 
these activities. The sum equals the length advanced for 
that period. In this example:
Activity Standard % Completed Lin. Ft. Advanced
Drilling 1.50 ft 50% 0.75 ft
Blasting 0.50 ft 0% 0.00 ft
Mucking 2.50 ft 20% 0.50 ft
TOTAL LENGTH ADVANCED = 1.25 ft
The next step is to calculate the amount of holdback 
attributed to mucking and/or other activities. In this 
example, only holdback associated with mucking is employed. 
The holdback in terms of linear feet previously discussed, 
is finally calculated by multiplying this volumetric 
percentage by the average drilled length of a round. To 
illustrate this process:
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Assume: Round Size (8.7 ft X 9.0 ft)
Round Depth = 6.0 ft
Measured Muck in Stope (Sept. 24) = 250 eft
Measured Muck in Stope (Sept. 18) = 100 eft
Muck Residual/Pay Period = 150 eft
Total Round Volume = (8.7 ft X 9.0 ft X 6.0 ft) = 470 eft
Volumetric Percent = (150 cft/470 eft) X 100 = 32%
Total Mucking Holdback/Period (Lin. Ft.) = (.32) X (6.0 ft)
= 2.0 ft
Once these factors have been calculated, they can be summed 
and multiplied by their respective rates to determine the 
total advance for the period (Table 3-29).
After the incentive has been calculated, individual 
allotments to the participating miners are determined. This 
process is identical to weighting calculations performed in 
both Time-Based and Volumetric Contract Programs (Table 
3-2 9)• The total incentive advanced is divided by the total 
number of contract hours spent in the stope for that period. 
This equals the contract rate, which must be compared to the 
day»s pay rate to insure that it is greater. If it is, this 
rate is consequently multiplied by the number of hours 
contributed by each miner to determine individual incentive 
allotments•
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Calculating the total incentive for Accelerated or 
Partial Rate Systems are performed in a similar process, 
however, these systems can become a rather cumbersome and 
labor intensive task. Therefore, these methods are 
generally calculated from established rate tables and are 
highly amenable to computer application.
STEP #3: FINAL CONTRACT SETTLEMENT
The final settlement, including any residual holdback 
payouts, are calculated by completing the last stope 
measurement after the stope has been cleaned out. Incentive 
payments are determined in exactly the same method described 
in STEP #2. At this point, the only residual holdback 
should be for muck that remained in the stope prior to clean 
out. The holdback is then paid back based on the percent 
withheld from each period. The total holdback for mucking, 
in this example, is separately itemized allowing the 
contract engineer at the conclusion of the cut to divide the 
residual amount proportionally to the miners.
STEP #4: CONTRACT REPORTING
One of the principle advantages of this system is the 
ease and expedience of the measuring and calculation 
process. In addition, accounting procedures are minimal
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compared to some of the other contract systems. The major 
drawback is the time consuming process of establishing 
productivity standards for each stope or different operating 
procedures. This system requires that the geologic and 
stope configurations do not change during the progression of 
the stope. If changes occur, a new contract must be issued 
which reflects the new operating characteristics. This 
system operates more efficiently in situations where the 
same miners participate in a particular contract 
continuously. This can be a problem in operations with 
significant man-power limitations or when there is a large 




As discussed in Chapter 1, the principle thrust of this 
thesis is the application of contract incentives in 
production areas. It would be a great omission, however, 
not to address the basic concepts attributed to several 
other types of contract applications in the underground 
hardrock industry. These supplemental systems incorporate 
all facets of the mining process, including stope and drift 
development, construction and repair projects, haulage, and 
exploration. As with stope contracts, there are numerous 
variations dependent on an operation's particular 
characteristics. It is the intent of this chapter to 
briefly examine the historical utilization of incentive 
contracts in these applications for variable operating and 
geologic parameters. As with Stope Contracts, the 
preponderance of this data was acquired from sources that 
requested to remain anonymous. Therefore, unless otherwise 
cited, all reference material contained within this chapter 
was derived from personal communication with these 
undisclosed industrial sources.
Development Contracts
Development Contracts, in terms of participation, are
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perhaps the most common form of incentive in the mining 
industry. They are routinely utilized in the development of 
drifts, raises, winzes/shafts, stopes and production areas 
as well as for geologic exploration (i.e., longholing and 
diamond drilling). Due to the wide range of applications, 
there are a multitude of different contract structures in 
use. As with stope contracts, the unique conditions of a 
particular operation will also influence a diversification 
of these programs. There are, however, basic program 
classifications that represent the bulk of these systems. 
These classifications parallel the stope contracts 
previously discussed in Chapter 3. The most popular form of 
Development Contract is based on volumetric measurements. 
This system determines the incentive contributions earned 
through drilling, blasting, and mucking and is supplemented 
through fixed monetary incentives attributed to specific 
activities, such as timbering, bolting, and the installation 
of utilities or rail. Other methods include Time-Based 
Programs, Piece-Rate Systems, and contracts based on Linear 
Advance.
Volumetric Contract Systems
The implementation of Volumetric Systems for mine 
development is nearly identical to the programs addressed in
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Chapter 3. These systems allocate incentive allotments 
based upon productivity standards that are measured in 
relationship to the volume of material that has been 
excavated during a given contract period. Standards are 
determined through a combination of time studies, historical 
production records, and time simulations. From these 
studies, contract engineers can formulate productivity 
standards for different activities, given a specific set of 
operating, environmental, and geologic conditions. For 
mucking and breaking, these activity standards are 
multiplied by a desired wage rate, then divided by a 
productivity standard measured with respect to the mining 
rate to equal a incentive rate per unit mined (i.e., $/Cubic 
Foot). This rate is usually incorporated into a schedule, 
based on the critical variables that where used to calculate 
the standard.
In activities, such as raise work or shaft sinking, there 
are numerous components that would be difficult to correlate 
to the volume mined. Therefore, miscellaneous "add ons", 
like those discussed in Chapter 3, are quite common. "Add 
ons" are simply tasks that possess a predetermined value 
which, upon their completion, are then added to the total 
contract earning at the conclusion of the period. For 
example, a 6 foot 3-Cap timber set might equal $ 2 4 5.0 0/set.
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Different timber configurations will have a diverse range of 
monetary incentives. In many systems, the location of the 
task will also impact the total incentive attributed to the 
activity. A good example is the added difficulty generally 
associated with timbering a winze versus a raises. The cost 
affiliated with timbering the same set in each location, in 
these systems, would not be equivalent.
The prorating and holdback procedures discussed in 
Chapter 3 are applicable to most Volumetric Development 
Contracts. In fact, of the contracts reviewed in this 
study, these systems possessed a higher percentage of 
holdback than their stope counterparts. This is probably 
due to the difficulty in obtaining accurate survey 
measurements in development areas so that precise contract 
advances can be calculated. For example, a decline filled 
with muck or a raise torn down for blasting.
In Volumetric Development Contracts, just as stope 
contracts, these systems rely extensively on the individual 
abilities of an operation's shifters. These production 
superiors are responsible for every facet of a development 
project, including the number of hours a particular miner 
spends on contract. Because of the large number of 
miscellaneous activities often associated with these 
projects, the authority of these shifters is even further
T-3894 214
increased. Therefore, it is imperative that provisions for 
monitoring employee performance be adopted in the system and 
that the mine superintendent and contract administrator take 
an active role in the development of each activity.
The determination of individual pay allotments for both 
pay advances and the final contract settlement is a function 
of a weighted average based on the participation of each 
employee with respect to the total hours spent on contract. 
The process is essentially the same as that derived for 
stope miners.
Time-Based Contract Systems
Time-Based Programs present a novel approach for 
incorporating all the activities necessary to complete a 
project, including factors affiliated with equipment 
maintenance, rock support, safety, the installation of 
utilities, etc.. Monetary incentives are distributed based 
on the expedience of the miners in completing the project. 
Performance standards associated with each activity are 
individually evaluated for the specific work area and are 
used to determine the amount of labor required to complete 
the desired project at an average day's pay rate. If the 
employees complete the project quicker than the established 
standard, in terms of man-hours, a bonus will be allocated
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to the participating employees proportionally based on the 
project duration. For example, if the contract duration for 
a two man crew working at a day's pay rate was 130 man­
shifts to drive a 500 foot rail drift and they actually 
completed in 100 man-shifts, then the miners would earn 1.3 
times the day's pay standard.
Tailoring standards for specific projects at particular 
work areas is a difficult feat. As was discussed in 
Chapter 3, standards are principally derived from extensive 
time studies, historical records, and through the use of 
production simulations. This process requires the contract 
administrator to foresee potential operating and geologic 
constraints and estimate their influence, so they can be 
incorporated into the project standard. There are two 
principle problems that arise from this process. The first 
is that the contract engineer may not know the geologic or 
rock conditions which may emerge during the progression of a 
drift, raise, or winze. In a stope contract, the contract 
administrator generally has access to the proposed cut from 
a raise, an I-Drift, or the previous cut from which he can 
draw conclusions. This, however, is not the case with most 
development.projects. For example, during the course of 
sinking winze, any multitude of situations might arise that 
were not incorporated within the design of the contract or
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its standards and would have a detrimental effect on the 
miners ability to exceed the standard (e.g., significant 
water problems). The other major problem is that the entire 
project must defined for these systems to function properly. 
This implies that precise drifting distances be know. In 
many operations, drifting is often performed in virgin 
ground as exploration tool or used to intercept ore bodies 
or other workings were the exact distance is not known. 
Therefore, problems are often created for determining 
appropriate time durations for these contracts. Both these 
situations must be addressed in the context of the contract 
policy. "Add ons" or supplemental contracts are quite 
common in many of these applications. Holdbacks and 
advances are also utilized in these programs and are nearly 
identical to their stope counterparts, except that tonnage 
estimates are rarely used.
The allocation of incentives to individual miners is 
made by the same process outlined in Chapter 3, through a 
weighted average of the time each miner contributed to the 
contract.
Piece Rate Contract Systems
The intent of Piece-Rate Systems is to compensate each 
employee for every productive activity he/she accomplishes,
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where the collective sum of these activities during a given 
period directly determines the incentive allotment for that 
employee. The essence of this program is identical to the 
Piece-Rate Systems discussed in the previous chapter.
Because each employee is paid in accordance with the 
activities they perform, the structure does not change 
whether a miner is working in a stope or a drift. The types 
of activities performed, however, will undoubtedly change. 
These types of systems are highly amenable to the 
characteristics often associated with development headings, 
such as unpredictable operating conditions and the 
implementation of mining systems that rely on specialized 
unit activities (e.g., timber work). Both methods of 
Piece-Rate Systems, Task Bonus and Card-Rating Programs, 
work equally well for most operating schemes. However, with 
the potential variability of operational, environmental, or 
geological conditions, Card-Rating Programs present an 
effective means of compensating for these parameters 
through the implementation of different discount 
percentages.
The structure of these programs can create distinct 
divisions between different "classes" of employees based 
upon experience, tenure, or ability. In most development 
applications, specialization causes a disparity in incentive
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earning potential based on the location and the types of 
activities which are performed. In addition, unit earnings 
attributed to specific activities, such as shaft sinking, 
can possess a higher expected potential than the completion 
of the same activities in a different development setting. 
The contract engineer, based on his experience, will 
establish rates he deems appropriate to compensate for the 
danger and labor intensity of certain development 
activities. To illustrate this rating system, below are a 
few classifications of miners ranked with respect to their 
designed "expected" incentive earnings:
Shaft Miners: 1.75 times Day's Pay ($ 168.00/Shift)
Raise Miners: 1.60 times Day's Pay ($ 153.60/Shift)
Stope Miners: 1.45 times Day's Pay ($ 139.20/Shift)
Drift Miners: 1.40 times Day's Pay ($ 134.40/Shift)
These types of classifications are often formally integrated 
in wage agreements for union operations.
As with the stope contracts, Piece-Rate Systems used in 
development projects are intimately dependent upon immediate 
supervisors and shifters to dictate which activities need to 
be performed, who participates in them, and if they are 
completed correctly. Coupled with the problems of verifying 
and recording every significant activity that each employee 
accomplishes, time constraints mandate that shifters
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supervise small groups of employees. The interpersonal 
problems and reporting inaccuracies that often originate 
from these situations usually necessitate the need to rotate 
miners with respect to work areas and shifters. It is 
imperative that the mine superintendent and contract 
administrator maintain a clear presence underground and 
scrutinize productivity and contract reports.
Holdback, pay advances, and the Final Contract 
Settlement are calculated through a process that duplicates 
the one examined in the previous chapter. Contract cards 
are often used to verify shifter production reports and to 
add additional documentation to substantiate incentive 
allocations. The principle advantages of this type of 
program are that incentive earnings can be quickly 
ascertained, holdback payments are minimized, scheduling and 
operational flexibility are maintained, and the belief that 
each employee is responsible for his own success or failure 
is preserved.
Linear Advance Contract Systems
Systems that base productivity measurements on the 
linear advance of workings, such as drifts, raises, and 
winzes, are highly amenable to many development applications 
and can accommodate several of the constraints which may
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hinder other types of contracts. These systems incorporate 
all the activities in developing a specific heading, 
including rock support, timbering, the installation of 
utilities or rail, etc., into a performance standard based 
on the linear advance of the project. Productivity 
standards are developed in a process similar to the one 
described in Time-Based Contracts, where time studies, 
historical production data, and operating simulations are 
used to evaluate each activity in the development cycle. 
Standards are tailored to represent the operating and 
geologic conditions of specific work areas and can encompass 
elements associated with operating delays and downtime, such 
as equipment maintenance or mechanical inavaliability.
As with the Time-Based Programs examined above, problems 
can develop in situations where development work, like 
drifting, is being done in areas with little to no 
information which can be formulated into the standards. 
Fortunately, unlike Time-Based Systems, contract adjustments 
to compensate for these factors can easy be installed in the 
midst of a contract period. In applications where the exact 
destination of a working is unknown or the distance to a 
target can not be determined, it possess no effect on this 
system because it is not dependent upon the duration of the 
project. These systems, however, function much more
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efficiently if the operating parameters remain fairly 
consistent through the course of the project.
Development Contracts of this type can include any one 
of the three rate schedules introduced in Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, the implementation of distance corrections to 
compensate for haulage can be a critical factor in the 
productivity of development projects such as in long 
drifting applications (e.g., greater than 1000 ft), extended 
I-Drifts where muck may have to be double slushed, and in 
the sinking winze, where hoisting constraints associated 
with production interference or portal haulage are involved. 
These conditions can impede the progress of a heading 
significantly. The distribution of incentives to the 
participating employees is identical to that of the Linear 
Stope Contracts previously outlined.
Construction Contracts
The implementation of incentive contracts in 
construction applications is also extremely common in many 
underground operations. Projects must be well defined to 
alleviate any misunderstanding during the execution of the 
contract, including design specifications, equipment to be 
utilized, and acceptable tolerances. Projects can range 
from the construction of powder magazines and shaft stations
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to the excavation of sumps or the installation of chutes.
In many of these systems, the miner acts as a 
pseudo-contractor in that he agrees to perform a specific 
activity at a set rate, where the motivation is to finish 
the project at a rate which would correlate to a higher wage 
than the day's pay standard. For example, assume that a 
contract has been issued to two miners for the construction 
of a sump which would pay a contract rate of $ 2880.00.
Assume: Project Contract Rate = $ 2880.00
Day's Pay Rate = $ 96.00/Shift
Average Duration (Day's Pay) = $ 2888.00/$ 96.00
= 30 Man-Shifts
Therefore, at a day's pay rate it should take two average 
miners 15 shifts to complete the project. If the miners 
actually completed it in 9 shifts, then the actual incentive 
rate equals:
Contract Earnings = $ 2880.00/(9 Shifts X 2 Miners)
= $ 160.00/Man-Shift
Incentive Rate = $ 160.00/Man-Shift - $ 96.00/Man-Shift
= $ 64.00/Man-Shift
Standards associated with a specific project are generally 
established through historical records and modified by the 
contract engineer to account for explicit operating
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conditions and managerial objectives. This process is, in 
essence, the same as described in the Piece-Rate Contracts, 
where each activity in the project is identified, evaluated, 
and ultimately given a representative value. The sum of 
these values, with the addition of adjustments, equals the 
incentive attributed to the project.
Because a single project can overlap more than one pay 
period, procedures for measuring and allotting pay advances 
must be defined. Although contract programs can be designed 
to eliminate holdback accounts for certain projects, it is 
routinely utilized in most types of construction programs. 
The contract administrator will generally estimate what 
percent of the project has been completed and advance some 
proportion of that to the participating miners. Holdback 
can also be instrumentally used to insure that a project is 
completed to design specifications. This is accomplished by 
holding back predesignated percentage of the bonus until the 
project has been inspected and approved by either the mine 
superintendent, the contract engineer, or both.
Another method which historically has been used is a 
variation of the system previously discussed. This program 
pays for each activity performed by an employee during the 
course of the project. In most practices, this contract 
program is identical to the systems used in either
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development or stoping applications. This program is often 
advantageous from the perspective that employees specialized 
in performing certain activities can produce a better 
product quicker. For example, a shaft station may 
incorporate different groups of miners proficient in 
timbering, pouring concrete, and steel work, much more 
efficiently than a single crew performing each task. In 
addition, construction projects which do not require the 
breaking and mucking of rock, minimize the necessity of 
utilizing a holdback. This is particularly the case in 
applications that are comprised of numerous activities which 
are short in duration. In these situations, the need to 
withhold a proportion of the value attributed to these 
activities is further minimized because of the declining 
utilization of prorating. One problem, however, that often 
arises with projects that incorporate several people doing 
different activities is the continuity of all the components 
contained in the project. Because each miner is paid with 
respect to the specific activity that he performs, there can 
be a inherent incentive for the miner to disregard things 
which may be detrimental to the project but will improve the 
efficiency of his particular activity.
Regardless of the type of contract program implemented, 
construction projects require the constant supervision by
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shifters to insure that the project is being completed 
within specification outlined in the contract. In addition, 
it is important that construction materials be readily 
available to the miners working on the project to mitigate 
the problems that often develop if employees feel that they 
are unable to succeed on a contract due to a company 
oversight.
Repair Contracts
Repair contracts possess a diverse range of applications 
and are often implemented in older operations that require 
continual maintenance (e.g., mines utilizing timbered shafts 
and winzes), and/or in mines prone to rock bursts, squeezes, 
or cave-ins. The intent of these contracts is the same as 
any other, to provide an incentive for miners to increase 
their efficiency and to influence a variety of potential 
factors, including managerial objectives. The methods used 
can vary widely but, in actual structure, parallel the two 
programs previously presented with respect to construction 
contracts. The first method assigns a monetary value to a 
specific project, where the speed of its completion dictates 
the incentive rate earned by the miners. While this program 
is generally ideal for most operating scenarios, there can 
be significant problems in determining appropriate project
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standards, particularly in repair contracts related to 
damaged structures or as a result of rock failures. In 
these situations, an accurate assessment of the project 
damage or its severity may be impossible to ascertain. In 
addition, situations can arise that are completely foreign 
to an operation where there is insufficient information for 
the contract administrator to formulate an equatable value 
standard for the project.
The other method involves the implementation of the 
Piece-Rate Systems outlined above. Because these programs 
pay for the completion of individual activities, tasks can 
be performed as they emerge. The flexibility of these 
programs allows for rapid modifications without adversely 
effecting the contract or an employee's opportunity of 
earning an incentive.
In many operations, Guaranteed Contracts are issued to 
mitigate the dilemma of establishing standards. A 
Guaranteed Contract is simply a guaranteed wage rate that is 
allocated to specific employees irrespective of performance. 
Although the use of these contracts eliminate the need to 
estimate employee productivity for a multitude of given 
constraints and operating factors, including dangerous 
working conditions, it defeats the primary essence of an 




As was iterated in the initial introduction, contract 
systems can be incorporated in all facets of the mining 
process and encompass nearly every activity performed 
underground which produces quantifiable output. Traditional 
operating philosophies introduced contract systems as a 
method of attenuating the influences attributed to 
production "bottlenecks", where the rate of production is 
inhibited by a limiting factor in the sequence of mining.
In many instances, production is governed by the excavation 
rate within an operation's stopes and production areas, but 
this is not always the case. Limited muck holding capacity 
underground, long haulage distances, and/or deep shafts can 
create production limitations originating from haulage and 
hoisting constraints. In addition, stopes are a major 
capital investment. From an economic perspective, it is 
prudent for an operation to minimize the nonproductive time 
between production cuts. In a Cut and Fill operation, this 
includes stope cleanout, sand prep/fill, and additional work 
affiliated with preparing for the next cut (e.g., advancing 
raise cribbing). As such, these types of activities have 
often been implemented into incentive programs, called
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Specialty Contracts. The following section will briefly 
address the basic concepts in the most common of these 
contracts applications.
Haulage Contracts
Haulage is an important element in the ability of an 
operation to increase the efficiency of its production 
capacity. It can directly effect the productivity of the 
production areas (e.g., stopes becoming muck bound) and 
development areas (e.g., the rotation of empty cars). 
Although bound by certain physical constraints, these types 
of programs attempt to encourage improved performance 
through more efficient operating procedures and higher 
availability. A typical contract pays either a fixed or 
accelerated rate for each ore car hauled, with a minimum 
standard equal to day's pay. The incentive rate per car is 
generally derived through time studies, historical 
production data, and/or from simulated haulage runs 
performed by managerial personnel. A standard for 
productivity attributed to miners working at a day's pay 
rate is determined, where the incentive rate corresponds to 
a desired wage level and is related to other considerations 
deemed important by management. To illustrate the process 
of establishing performance standards, an example will be
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examined for a haulage level using electric trams pulling a 
maximum of 7 cars with a haulage distance of 5500 feet. 
First, the contract engineer will analyze the working 
minutes per shift (Table 4-1). This time value is 
calculated by subtracting the time affiliated with 
traveling, lunch, personal breaks, and startup/teardown from 
the total minutes in a operating shift. Startup and 
teardown refers to the time at the beginning and end of a 
shift where miners find or stow equipment and orient 
themselves with conditions of the equipment and work area.
The next step is to determine the fixed time associated 
with nonproductive operating activities which are regularly 
accomplished during a shift (Table 4-2). These activities 
include: the rotation of the locomotive battery, inspection 
of the train, equipment maintenance, safety related 
considerations, and other types of unavoidable downtime. By 
incorporating maintenance and downtime into this standard, 
it produces an incentive for miners to increase the 
operational availability of the equipment through better 
maintenance and operating practices. This can be 
particularly evident in operations that experience 
significant dead time associated with derails. In these 
situations, the miners have an economic incentive to keep 
switches and rail in proper working order and clear of
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TABLE 4-1 Total Working Time Calculations
Total Shift Minutes = 480














TOTAL WORKING TIME/SHIFT =
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TABLE 4-2 Nonproductive Operating Activities
Battery Rotation (Measured):
Train Inspection Beginning of Shift (Policy)s






Safety Concerns (Company Policy)
Shoveling Rock Spills (Measured & Historical) 
DownTime (Measured & Historical)














The next evaluation is performed for a complete haulage 
cycle, including loading, travel time, and dumping (Table 
4-3). Queuing times associated with loading and unloading 
are incorporated within the standard. Individual times for 
specific activities have been determined through simulation 
and time studies, where the completed cycle for the standard 
is verified by historical production data. The standard 
derived for this cycle time can include such things as 
cleanup of chute spillage to encourage cleaner loading and a 
full compliment of ore cars to promote efficient operating 
procedures.
Once these studies have been completed, an operating 
standard for the level can be determined. From Tables 4-1, 
4-2, and 4-3, the standard is calculated as follows:
Assume: Total Working Time/Shift = 388 Min
Total Fixed Operating Time/Shift = 135 Min
Total Cycle Time = 77 Min
Number of Cars/Train = 7 Ore Cars
Total Haul Cycles/Shift = (388 Min - 135 Min)/77 Min
= 3.29 Cycles 
= 3 Cycles
Total Cars/Shift = (3 Cycles X 7 Cars/Cycle) = 21 Cars
The unadjusted standard for this example is 21 ore cars. 
While the total haul cycles per shift equals 3.29 round 
trips, only 3 trips are used to calculate the standard,
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TABLE 4-3 Haulage Cycle Calculations
Loading (Measured & Simulated)
Loading (2.7 Min/Car X 7 Cars): 
Chute Cleanup:
Haul Time (Measured & Simulated)
Unloading (Measured & Simulated)
Unloading (1.6 Min/Car X 7 Cars):
Grizzly
Cleanup











where the fraction of a trip is dropped due to operational 
realities. This standard can be adjusted to coincide with 
the other objectives as well as other contract programs. It 
should also be compared with historical records to insure 
that the calculated standard is in compliance with the 
established norm. This example was a illustration of the 
one method of determining a haulage standard, where the 
intricacies of a particular operation were not considered. 
The evaluation process can be more complex, depending on the 
characteristics of the operation and the intent of the 
contract designers.
Once a standard has been established, the incentive rate 
can be determined. Most haulage contracts pay a rate based 
on a per car basis, which can either be accelerated for each 
additional car exceeding the standard or can be paid on a 
flat rate scale. Establishing rate schedules for either 
methods is nearly identical to the process addressed in 
Linear Based Contract Systems in Chapter 3. In accelerated 
rate programs, an incremental percentage of the base pay 
standard is earned for each car cycled, where the rate 
incrementally increases with the addition of each car. The 
percentage levels can be determined in several ways, 
including targeting the "expected11 productivity of the 
haulage crew and assigning a specified rate which will
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equate to a desired wage predetermined by management 
(e.g., 1.3 - 1.6 times day»s pay) or by determining the 
incremental savings to the operation through increased 
productivity and including a percentage of this rate.
A flat rate system is usually much easier to manage, 
where each additional car cycled translates to a constant 
monetary incentive. At the conclusion of the contract 
period, the number of cars dumped are multiplied by the 
fixed rate to equal the incentive payment.
As with the formulation of other standards, they should 
be designed with respect to the individual parameters 
associated with a specific haulage level. Concessions are 
made to compensate for equipment variations, different 
operating conditions, and the physical characteristics of
the level (e.g., water in the drift or difficultly in
pulling particular chutes). Other considerations include 
the contract duration and the participation of several crews 
in the same contract. The duration of a contract can range
from a single shift to an entire month and is often
dependent on the variability in the haulage crews and the 
length of the pay periods. If several trains are running on 
the same level, they can often be incorporated under the 
same contract. This can present benefits since they become 
bound by a common goal and thereby, mitigate the potential
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for conflicts caused by interference or limited supplies.
Lastly, determining an average haul distance is usually 
done by taking a weighted average of haul distances between 
different chutes and the unloading pocket with respect to 
the frequency in which each chutes is pulled. Table 4-4 
illustrates this procedure. Their are several inherent 
problems associated with establishing a distance measurement 
based on this process. The length between a work area and 
the haul destination may continually change, particularly in 
development headings and as stope production progresses. In 
addition, the frequency which material is drawn can change 
depending on a host of factors. Furthermore, in an attempt 
to increase incentive earnings, situations often arise were 
chutes that are either close to the haul destination or are 
easy to pull have a higher frequency of use. These problems 
can be limited by keeping the contract duration short, 
continually upgrading the standards until a equilibrium is 
reached, and specifying the location from which ore is 
taken.
Hoisting Contracts
For the same reasons discussed in Haulage Contracts, 
hoisting limitations can create situations amenable to the 
utilization of contract systems. In many operations, the
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TABLE 4-4 Average Haul Distance Calculations
LEVEL 10 00 - HAULAGE SCHEDULE
Frequency 
Haul Distance Chutes Pulled 
Chute (ft) (Number/Shift) Dist. X Freq.
1020 745 3 2,235
1230 1,010 2 2 , 020
1490 1,270 5 6,350
1735 1,545 4 6, 180
TOTALS 14 16,785
AVERAGE HAUL DISTANCE:
(16,785 ft-Freq)/(14 Times per Shift) = 1,199 ft
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hoisting of muck is a limiting operational constraint 
because the expansion of underground production areas have 
exceeded the hoisting capacity of a given shaft. In 
addition, the hoisting of muck generally incorporates the 
expertise of 3 or more people (i.e., hoistman, skiptender, 
and a surface hand) and requires a conscientious effort by 
all three. Typical hoisting contracts exhibit many 
characteristics of haulage contracts, where each skip 
hoisted beyond an established standard presents an 
incremental bonus. These systems can be based on an 
accelerated scale or a fixed rate.
Sand Prep/Stope Cleanout Contracts
In mining systems that do not incorporate sand prep/fill 
or stope cleanout in the primary stope contract,
Supplemental Contracts can be designed to minimize the 
downtime between production cuts and to improve the quality 
the workmanship. Sand Preparation Contracts are generally 
paid in accordance with the size and number of bulkheads 
that need to be constructed, the type of piping network to 
be used, and the volume of fill to be pumped in. Incentives 
are usually time dependent, where the speed of this cycle 
directly determines the incentive rate earned for the job.
In situations where a bulkhead fails due to poor
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workmanship, the sand cleanup and construction of the new 
bulkhead are completed by the crew at no incentive.
Stope Cleanout Contracts can be included in a Sand 
Preparation Contract or can be issued separately. These 
contracts include the extension of raise cribing, the ore 
chutes, piping, and/or any other activity required to 
initiate the next cut. These contracts are often a flat 
rate dependent of the activities which need to be preformed. 
In both these contract, the exact specifications must be 
included to alleviate potential misunderstandings with the 
miners.
Nipper/Mine Helper Contracts
In many mining systems, the productivity of stope miners 
is dependent on the support they receive from other 
personnel. This is particularly true in labor intensive 
applications employing large quantities of timber. These 
support people are often referred to as nippers and are 
generally responsible for furnishing one or more stopes with 
supplies (e.g., timber and explosives). In many systems 
they also perform a wide variety of tasks including cutting 
timber, assembling blackwicks, and servicing equipment.
These contracts attempt to tie a financial inducement to the 
stopes a nipper services, thereby creating a common element
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between the success of a stope and the monetary remuneration 
of the nipper. Most nipper contracts are based on a 
percentage of the total settlement earned by the 
participating stopes, in addition to a wage earned by the 
day’s pay standard. To illustrate, a Nipper Contract 
Settlement is calculated below:
Assume: Number of Stope Serviced = 2
Total Contract Earnings (Stope #1) = $ 2 318.12
Total Contract Earnings (Stope #2) = $ 1623.64
Incentive Percentage Rate = 3.5 percent
Day's Pay Standard = $ 87.00/Shift
Duration of Contract Period = 2 weeks
Contract Earnings/Period = ($ 2318.12 + $ 1623.64) X .035
= $ 137.96/Period
Total Earnings/Shift = ($ 137.96/5 Shifts) + $ 87.00/Shift
= $ 114.59/Shift
Therefore, this employee would earn 1.3 times the day's pay 
standard.
Long Holing and Diamond Drilling Contracts
These contract systems compensate miners for drilling 
holes and taking samples for exploration purposes. They are 
routinely utilized to insure these activities are performed 
correctly, expediently, and with minimal damage to the 
equipment. Furthermore, in the event these activities 
disrupt production, Exploration Contracts serve as a way of
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compensating miners for the lost opportunity associated with 
being "off" their Production or Development Incentives. 
Generally these systems pay with respect to the depth of 
hole drilled, where a unit incentive per linear foot of 
advance is earned. These rates can be dependent on the hole 
length, the type and frequency of sampling, the equipment 
employed, the hole orientation, and location in the mine. 
Standards are usually based on the number of feet that can 




Due to the inherent requirements of contract systems, 
their application is not a viable practice in all operating 
scenarios. Requisites of Individual Incentive Programs 
include the tangible performance of activities that produce 
a verifiable output and the need to isolate the 
contributions made toward productivity by specific 
employees. In addition, the expense incurred administering 
these systems may not offset the gains in operational 
efficiency and/or other contract objectives. This is 
particularly evident in mechanized mining systems, where the 
impact upon an operation by changes in labor productivity is 
minimal compared to the operating capacities of the 
equipment. Even in these applications, the utilization of 
incentives were often found to possess many beneficial 
attributes over conventional Base Wage Systems. Most 
notably, in improved operating efficiency, increased 
equipment utilization and availability, and compliance with 
specific managerial objectives. These systems, known as 
Group Bonus Incentives, collectively united groups of 
employees toward common operating goals. The recent 
insurgence of Bonus Incentives appears to be attributed to 
the displacement of conventional production contracts in
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highly mechanized operations and to supplement nonproduction 
and supporting personnel (e.g., those other than contract 
miners) in labor intensive operations. The intent of this
chapter is to briefly describe the types of Bonus Systems
routinely employed within the industry and to address the 
reasons for their utilization.
In essence, Group Bonus Incentives distribute monetary 
rewards to defined labor groups in recognition of achieving
some level of success in obtaining specific organizational
goals or objectives. Success, in most cases, is defined and 
measured with respect to preestablished standards affiliated 
with productivity, financial proficiency, cost reductions, 
and/or a combination of these factors. The basic philosophy 
of these systems are very similar to those embodied in most 
contract programs. As discussed, it is imperative that the 
formulation of a contract system for a specific activity be 
compatible with the objectives of an entire operation, 
ideally unifying diverse classifications of employees toward 
common goals (e.g., safety and operating efficiency). This 
"team" concept is the focal point for the inception of Bonus 
Incentives. These systems compensate a group of employees, 
often based of their job classification, for collectively 
accomplishing a desired objective. Many operators feel the 
organization of these incentives establish a united cause
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through which a climate of mutual cooperation produced.
Elements responsible for the rapid acceptance of Bonus 
Systems can also include factors largely unrelated to the 
economic considerations presented above. This is 
predominately evident in older mining districts where an 
operator may prefer to eliminate Supplemental Contract 
Programs (e.g., haulage, repair/construction, nippers, etc.) 
in lieu of a Flat Base Pay System. If these operators have 
utilized incentive programs for a significant length of 
time, employees come to expect these systems and, in many 
cases, would impair an operation's productivity dramatically 
if all forms of incentives were removed. Evidence of this 
has been seen during the last several years in Canadian 
mining operations. Bonuses, therefore, in these situations 
act as a intermediary solution to mitigate labor strife.
The size of the group incorporated into a specific Bonus 
Program is dependent on the objective of the incentive and 
the organizational structure of the operation. Some mines 
employ bonuses solely directed at specific groups of 
workers, based on either job classifications (e.g., general 
labors, haulage, maintenance, etc.) or by workplace, often 
differentiated by level, access, or geographic location. 
Other systems can be constructed to encompass the entire 
operation, including the mill, or can combine ingredients
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associated of both systems.
The duration of these systems can also vary considerably 
based on the intent of the incentive. Although, a vast 
majority of the programs reviewed in this and other studies 
have indicated that the designed duration of most bonuses 
are on a monthly basis. Program periods of two weeks, 
quarterly, semiannual, and annual were also observed. The 
determining factors for these periods appear to be based on 
the volume of production, the characteristics of the labor 
force, the stability of the company or mine, the type of 
standard employed, and the ratio between standard wages and 
incentive earnings. In addition, many companies chose to 
extend the incentive period so that the bonus allotments 
distributed to employees appear in large sums. This 
practice can psychologically aid in the acceptance of the 
program.
Bonus Programs
The structure of these Bonus Systems are largely 
dependent upon the type of standard by which mine 
productivity or performance is gauged. Due to the unique 
conditions of individual operations, the range of potential 
standards is exceptionally large. Standards, however, must 
be concrete and tangible, lending themselves to rapid
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measurements in predesignated intervals, where the results 
are optimally subject to public knowledge. There are four 
principle classifications of standards presently being used 
in the industry, they are: Production Based, Financially 
Based, Cost Based, and assorted combinations of these three. 
The following sections will briefly examine each of these 
systems and demonstrate how each determines the total 
operating bonus.
Production Based Bonuses
Production Bonuses are popular throughout the country in 
both metallic and coal operations. Typically called Muck 
Bonuses, these systems are based on either the production of 
rock (including ore, waste, or a combination of both) or the 
number of pounds or ounces of the primary target metal 
produced in a given time interval. While systems utilizing 
a tonnage standard are generally the most expedient and 
least complex standard to measure; they often create 
problems related to dilution, particularly in deposits where 
the ore can not visually be distinguished from development 
muck or parent rock. Therefore, systems were developed 
which use the amount of metal produced within the mill 
concentrates or the metal contained in a smelter shipment as 
the incentive standard. This method is particularly
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advantageous to operations that exhibit a fixed 
concentration ratio in their mill and the grade of the 
concentrate is marginal for smelter acceptance. Therefore, 
these systems encourage miners to be cognizant of dilution 
and to cooperate with geologists and engineers with respect 
to economic stope geometries. Other benefits include: a 
concrete means of measuring and documenting productivity 
(e.g., smelter settlement sheets), lower operating costs, 
and a climate of participation between the company and the 
employees. It becomes mutually beneficial for both parties 
if the total metal production increases. Despite these 
advantageous, drawbacks associated with these programs 
include: the long processing time affiliated with some 
milling procedures, determining metal production at the 
beginning and end of a incentive interval for continuous 
feed mills, and the long turn-around time associated with 
smelter payments for a specific concentrate lot or shipment.
Regardless of the production based method chosen, the 
rate at which the bonus is paid can be predicated on either 
a flat rate or an accelerated system. A flat rate 
production bonus is conceptually fairly straight forward. 
Over a specific interval, a production standard for the 
bonus is established. This standard is usually determined 
through the same processes discussed previously, including
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targeting a specific production level and a desired employee 
wage rate using historical production records and time 
studies. If the production over the specified period 
exceeds the established standard, an incentive, based on a 
flat rate for every unit of production in excess of the 
standard, is proportionally distributed to the participating 
employees. For example:
Assume: Incentive Period = 1 Month
Bonus Standard = 8,000 Tons/Month
Bonus Rate = $ 2.7 5/Ton
Actual Production/Period = 13,254 Tons
Bonus Production = 13,254 Tons - 8,000 Tons = 5,2 54 Tons
Total Bonus Earned/Period = (5254 Tons X $ 2.75/Ton)
= $ 14,448.50
If 7 0 people are participating in the bonus on an equal 
basis, this translates to an average share of $ 206.41 per 
person for the bonus period. Most systems of this kind 
attempt to gauge the bonus so it comprises between 8 - 2 0  
percent of their base wages.
An accelerated system is similar in concept to a Linear 
Contract Program, where designated production intervals 
possess specific bonus rates. Incentives for each interval 
are calculated and summed to equal the total incentive for 
the period. To illustrate this procedure, assume that
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Table 5-1 presents the established production based bonus 
rates for the following example:
Assume: Incentive Period = 1 Month
Bonus Standard = 8,000 Tons/Month
Actual Production/Period = 13,2 54 Tons
Bonus Production = 13,254 Tons - 8,000 Tons = 5254 Tons
Bonus
Bonuses Earned: Tonnage Rate Incentive
Interval #1 ( 1-1500 Tons): 1500 T X $ 1.50/T = $ 1500.00
Interval #2 (1501-2750 Tons): 1250 T X $ 1.92/T = $ 2400.00
Interval #3 (2751-3750 Tons): 1000 T X $ 3.36/T = $ 3360.00
Interval #4 (3751-4500 Tons): 750 T X $ 5.38/T = $ 4032.00
Interval #5 (4501-5000 Tons): 500 T X $ 6.72/T = $ 3360.00
Interval #6 (5001-5500 Tons): 254 T X $ 4.80/T = $ 1219.20
Totals 5254 T $ 15871.20
The total bonus earned in this example is $ 15,871.20. By 
adjusting either the tonnage interval and/or it's associated 
rate, an optimal incentive distribution can be obtained for 
the specific objectives of an operation. As with Linear 
Contract Programs, these interval percentages can be 
manipulated to into a multitude of configurations.
Interval systems can be calculated with respect to 
direct payment for each employee. This is significantly 
different than the example presented above, where the rate 
affiliated with each interval actually corresponds to an 
incentive rate per unit of time, usually a man-shift. This
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TABLE 5-1 Accelerated Bonus Rates for a Production 
Based Bonus System




1-1500 | 1501-2750 2751-3750 3751-4500 4501-5000 5001-5500 5501-5600 |
I 1
| RATE ($/T> |
I ____________ I
$ 1.50 j $ 1.92 S 3 .36 S 5.38 % 6 .72 $ 4 .80 $ 3.00 j
J I
j Interval j 
| Earnings |
1 <*> 1
i_ ____ __ i.
$ 1500 j $ 2400 $ 3360 $ 4032 S 3360 $ 2400 $ 1500 |
1 1 
| Interval | 
| Percentage | 
| Change |
| + 160% + 140% + 120% - 16.7% - 28.6% - 37.5% |
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rate, in most cases, is not accumulative and is multiplied 
by the number of man-hours contributed by each employee to 
determine their incentive bonus for the period.
Financially Based Bonuses
Bonus systems are also amenable to standards based on 
the economic health and prosperity of a company. These 
standards vary widely and can range from tracking the net 
earnings and profits of the company to the use of complex 
financial formulas which can combine corporate financial 
indicators with the metal price, annual investments, debt, 
smelter payments, stock prices, and numerous other monetary 
considerations. In reality, many of these programs appear 
in the form of profit sharing plans but possess the 
qualities of Conventional Bonus Incentives. The intent of 
these systems are to unite the miners and the company in a 
common goal, the economic success of the company. This 
assumes that there is a correlation between the miner's 
productivity and their efficient use of materials and 
equipment and the financial prosperity of the company. From 
a company perspective, it also distributes some of the risks 
inherent with an operation to the employees (e.g., metal 
prices, geology, and operating conditions).
The most common Financial Based Program is to establish
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a schedule that equates a bonus payment with a company's net 
income or profits. The complexities of calculating these 
factors for a specific mine necessitates that the duration 
of the bonus period be fairly long, such as a 3 month or 6 
month period. Furthermore, the bonus can be distributed in 
any number of ways, ranging from a flat payment per employee 
to a percentage of their gross income. Table 5-2 
illustrates a schedule used to determine the quarterly 
employee bonuses based on the net income of a operation. An 
example of this method, using the rates on Table 5-2, is 
presented below for a fictitious employee.
Assume: Mine's Quarterly Net Income = $ 7 68,412.76
Employee's Quarterly Income = $ 7,500.00
Bonus Rate From Table 5-2 ($ 750,000 - $ 1,000,000):
= 7% of Employee Income
Employee's Quarterly Bonus Allotment = (.07) X § 7,50 0
= $ 525.00
The significant disadvantages associated with this system 
are that the bonus periods are generally so long, these 
programs appear to lose some of the incentive for miners to 
increase performance and the sophistication of some systems 
prohibit the ability of a individual employee to either 
verify or predict his incentive payment.
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TABLE 5-2 Financially Based Rate Schedule
Bonus Payment
Company Net Income Based on a Percent of















These programs measure productivity and employee 
performance with respect to the reduction in per unit costs 
affiliated with mining. Units can be either expressed 
relative to tons of production or in the amount of metal 
produced in mill concentrates. Reductions in this cost can 
be achieved by increased production, declines in direct 
operating costs, better operating efficiency, and/or a 
combination thereof. A schedule is designed, similar to the 
process described in Financially Based Systems, that relates 
a specific cost interval with a bonus rate. The rate can 
either correlate to a percentage of the employee's earning 
for that period or a factor which can be multiplied by the
number of man-shifts the employee worked during the
incentive duration. For example, assume that Table 5-3
illustrates the rate schedule for an operation. Costs are
measured with respect to the number of tons produced within 
the bonus period. Therefore, the bonus for an individual 
employee equals:
Assume: Bonus Duration (MAY) = 1 Month
Operating Cost/Ton (MAY) = $ 97.15/Ton
Employee Man-Shifts/Period = 2 3  Man-Shifts
From Table 5-3, Bonus Rate = $ 15.75/Man-Shift
Employee's Bonus Allotment = ($ 15.75/MS) X 23 MS = $ 362.25
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TABLE 5-3 Cost Based Rate Schedule
Bonus Payment 
Cost Per Ton Produced Based on Employee
Bonus Period - MAY Man-Shifts Worked/Period
110.00 - 105.00 $ 14.25/Man-Shift
105.00 - 100.00 $ 14.7 5/Man-Shift
100.00 - 95. 00 $ 15.7 5/Man-Shift
95.00 - 90.00 $ 17.0 0/Man-Shift
90.00 - 85 . 00 $ 18.50/Man—Shift
85.00 - 80 . 00 $ 2 0 .25/Man-Shift
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Standards for these rates can vary to meet the requirement 
and objectives of an operation. It is obvious that this 
method presents an advantageous situation for the company, 
where employees participate in a percentage of the saving 
generated by lower unit costs. There can be, however, 
considerable difficulties with calculating the total cost 
incurred by an operation, particularly in large companies 
which share resources among different operations.
Other Bonus Systems
There are numerous other Bonus Systems that have been 
designed that incorporate many of the elements described in 
the previous three methods. The structural disparity 
between these programs reflect different methods of gauging 
operational performance relative to changes precipitated by 
a mine's employees. Bonus formulas used to calculate 
incentive earnings should integrate the factors an operation 
feels is a true representation of productivity or other any 
other objective of the program. There are presently several 
consultants that specialize in isolating these factors for 




Once a bonus has been determined, the allocation of 
incentives to the individual miners can be distributed in a 
multitude of ways, including in conjunction with other types 
of programs. The simplest method, in terms of structure, is 
to divide the total incentive by the quantity of labor 
worked during that period, usually measured in man-shifts or 
man-hours, to determine the incentive rate (i.e., dollars 
per man-shift). This rate is then multiplied by the number 
of shifts a particular employee works in that period, to 
achieve that employee's incentive payment. For example, the 
following calculations illustrate this procedure by 
determining the incentive allotment earned by a miner:
Assume: Total Bonus/Period = $ 21,476.00
Total Bonus Man-Shifts/Period = 1722.5 Man-Shifts
Employee Man-Shifts/ Period = 21 Man-Shifts
Bonus Duration = 1 Month
Incentive Rate = ($ 21,476.00)/(1722.5 Man-Shifts)
= $ 12•47/Man—Shift
Employee Bonus Earned = $ 12.47/Man-Shift X 21 Man-Shifts
= $ 2 61.83/Month
The bonus rate, which can also be specified in units of 
dollars per hour, can effectively raise an employee's 
standard base wage by more than 2 0 percent. In this
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example, the labor contributed during a period includes a 
fraction of a man-shift. This predominately occurs in 
situations where an employee did not complete an entire 
shift during the month or because rotating employees into 
and out of specific work groups. Overtime recorded in these 
systems can be approached from several different avenues 
depending on the objectives of the company. There are, 
however, three principle methods largely employed. They 
include: adding the overtime hours or shifts incurred 
directly to the calculation of the incentive rate, 
multiplying the overtime contribution by a weighted factor 
before adding it to these calculations, or simply paying 
employees independently for overtime based on a fixed wage 
rate. Using a variation of the previous example, these 
three methods are illustrated below:
Assume: Total Bonus/Period
Bonus Duration






Method #1: Direct Addition
Incentive Rate = ($ 21,476.00)/(1580 Reg MS + 102.5 OT MS)
= $ 12.7 6/Man-Shift




= 1580.0 Man-Shifts 
= 102.5 Man-Shifts
= 20 Man-Shifts 
= 7 Man-Shifts
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Method #2: Multiple Rate
Assume: Wage/Overtime Shift = 1.5 X Wage/Regular Shift
Incentive Shifts = (1580 Reg MS + (1.5 X 102.5 OT MS))
= 1733.75 Man-Shifts
Incentive Rate = ($ 21,476.00)/(1733.75 Man-Shifts)
= $ 12•39/Man—Shift
Employee Shifts Earned = (20 Reg MS + (1.5 X 7 OT MS)
= 30.5 Man-Shifts
Employee Bonus Earned = ($ 12.39/MS) X (30.5 Man-Shift)
= $ 377.90/Month
Method #3: Flat Rate
Incentive Rate = ($ 21,476.00)/(1580 Reg MS) = $ 13.59/MS
Employee Bonus Earned = ($ 13.59/MS) X (20 Reg MS)
= $ 271.85/Month
In operations that are dependent on overtime work to meet 
production or development requirements, Methods #2 or #3 can 
effectively be used, even though they are dramatically 
different. Method #2 weights the hours attributed to 
overtime heavier than regular operating work hours, so that 
individual employees who work overtime are rewarded, in 
addition to standard wages, for doing so. Furthermore, the 
calculation of incentive shifts and the incentive rate use
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weighted shifts which can differ from the actual number of 
days worked. Method #3 encourages the equal participation 
in overtime by the collective workforce. This is 
accomplished by calculating the total bonus for a period, 
including the productivity contributed by employees working 
overtime, and dividing by the number of total man-shifts 
worked during the normal operating schedule for the period. 
This infers that the more hours the labor force works 
overtime, the larger the total bonus and ultimately, the 
bonus rate for the period will be. By not including 
overtime in the rate calculation, it often creates a climate 
where peer pressure will encourage miners to work more 
overtime than they would naturally. It must be remembered 
that these Bonus Programs only supplement wages, where an 
employee would earn a specified wage for working overtime, 
exclusive of the bonus.
The most common methods of allocating bonus incentives 
to employees is through a process of class weighting, where 
the share allotments are biased and are dependent on a 
miner's work classification, tenure, experience, and/or 
several other potential factors. This infers that employees 
such as raise miners would receive larger bonus payments 
than general laborers by virtue of their status. These 
types of systems also encompass the distribution of
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incentives based upon a percentage of an employees wage 
standard or earnings in a given period, such as the example 
presented in Table 5-2. This technique differentiates 
employees because of variable wage rates attributed to 
different classifications, skill levels, and tenure. Often 
these factors are compiled into a structured system, usually 
for the purposes of designing a wage scale, where each 
employee is assigned a grade. This grade is a reflection of 
the skills the employee possess, the type of experience he 
has, and the kind of work he is presently doing. Not only 
does the grade indicate the standard wage rate (Day's Pay) 
for the employee, but it can also denote the incentive 
weighting factor as well. To illustrate this example, 
assume the standard day's pay rate for a general underground 
laborer is $ 74.00; if a raise miner earns $ 96.00/Shift, 
then:
Bonus Share (Raise Miner) = ($ 96.00/$ 74.00) = 1.30
This implies that the raise miner would earn 1.3 times the 
incentive as the general laborer. There is a natural 
incentive, even without the bonus system, for miners to want 
to increase their skills and abilities so that they can 
advance to a higher grade for better jobs, increased 
prestige, and higher wages. The introduction of a weighted
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bonus system encourages miners to elevate their grade and 
can be an effective tool for retaining and acquiring quality 
skilled miners in a tight labor market.
Compatible Programs
Another major advantage of Bonus Incentives is that they 
have successfully been implemented in conjunction with other 
employee programs related to safety, absenteeism, and 
training. To accommodate these programs, incentive 
standards are designed to encourage employee participation 
through monetary incentives. Often the manner in which the 
bonus is allocated can promote or influence employee 
actions. A common example utilized by many operations 
employing bonus systems is to structure the incentive 
distribution system in such a way that an employee receives 
penalties against his bonus share for unexcused absences, 
tardiness, or unsafe acts. In most systems, if a miner 
receives a written warning for a safety violation or is 
involved in a accident deemed his fault, the bonus 
contribution he would have earned for the period is negated 
and is distributed to collective labor force.
The training of miners is usually more effective in 
operations with bonus schemes than in operations employing 
contract programs. In contract systems, unless a miner is
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teamed with an inexperienced employee, there is no incentive 
for a experienced production miner to share his knowledge.
In the context of a bonus system, on the other hand, there 
is a large incentive for experienced personnel to teach new 
employees efficient ways of doing things in order to 
increase productivity and thereby, the bonus. Using a 
weighting system to distribute incentive allotments should 
also increase the willingness of miners to pass along 
information to inexperienced employees because they receive 
a larger percentage of the incentive resulting from 




This chapter will briefly address the special 
considerations that influence the implementation and 
operation of the Contract Incentive Systems presented in 
Chapter 3, including those factors which can effect the 
success or failure of these systems. Furthermore, the 
principle parameters used to select and tailor an incentive 
program for a particular set of operating constraints, 
characteristics, and objectives will also be examined. This 
chapter is comprised of two distinct sections: Operational 
Considerations and Incentive Selection and Design. 
Operational Considerations focus on a combination of issues 
that an operator must be cognizant of during the 
implementation and operation of a Contract Incentive System. 
This topic will also emphasize specific factors that can 
influence the potential performance of these incentives 
based on program configuration, mine characteristics, 
managerial objectives, and method of implementation. The 
second section, Incentive Selection and Design, will 
establish a procedural analysis through which a preliminary 
contract system can be constructed. In addition, critical 
design parameters used to gauge and refine these preliminary 
contract programs will also be examined.
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The analyses presented in these two sections are by no 
means inclusive, in terms of factors or impact. The scope 
and variability of operating variables, geology of deposits, 
and labor conditions inherently impede the ability to 
quantitatively isolate the relationship between specific 
operational factors and labor efficiency or mine 
productivity in all operating scenarios. The impact of any 
given factor, whether it be beneficial or detrimental, can 
vary between different operations and is dependent on the 
unique conditions for a particular mine. The parameters 
presented in the chapter that are used to select, design, 
implement, or operate a Contract Incentive System are based 
on generalities but are consistent with the majority of 
industrial sources observed during this study.
As with the previous three chapters, the preponderance 
of the information contained in this chapter has been 
acquired from sources wishing to remain anonymous.
Therefore, unless otherwise cited, all reference material 





The intent of most incentive systems is to influence, 
encourage, and compensate employees that exert an effort 
toward the pursuit of something deemed important by 
management. An incentive program is a structured process 
that alters the performance of labor through employee 
motivation. Although most systems use financial inducements 
to encourage labor proficiency, there are numerous 
nonmonetary methods that also promote this type of 
motivation. Examples include job status, recognition, 
competition, peer pressure, obligation, and self-respect. 
While not all these traits may be desirable, each possesses 
a unique quality that enables an operation to effectively 
capitalize on their collective application in specific 
operating scenarios. In many situations, these nonmonetary 
incentives are often more influential than the motivation 
created by the lure of increased earnings. It is important 
that an operation understand how it's particular labor force 
responds to different types of motivation and how it can 
efficiently formulate these factors into their incentive 
program to maximize labor performance, productivity, and/or 
obtain other design objectives.
There are several commonly employed practices which have
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been devised that augment or enhance the inherent financial 
motivation attributed to conventional incentive systems.
For example, incorporating smaller employee groups within a 
single incentive contract can establish and promote a 
greater interdependency between workers participating in the 
contract. In many situations, this can create peer pressure 
on the least productive members of the group to be more 
efficient. Another common approach is to publicly post 
contract settlement sheets in the miner's dry, so that every 
employee knows, on the basis of contract earnings, who the 
most and least productive miners were for any given pay 
period. This often incites competition for status and 
recognition as well as pressure for miners to perform at or 
above certain levels or risk being criticized by their 
peers. In many cases, it can also be an effective 
instrument by the company to convey specific messages to 
it's miners, such as fostering employee confidence in 
company policy toward nondiscriminatory wage practices or 
compensating miners who work in particular stopes difficult 
or dangerous to mine.
These practices, however, often present problems 
stemming from interpersonal conflicts between miners, 
employee resentment toward selected managerial supervisors, 
and/or how crews or stopes are chosen and allocated. in
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most situations, these difficulties can be mitigated through 
concrete operating policies, attentive shifters, and 
consistent managerial practices.
Administrative Costs
As addressed in Chapter 2, incentive systems should only 
be utilized in operations where a quantifiable net benefit 
is realized from their application. Therefore, this 
analysis must also include the costs associated with 
administrating these incentive programs. These costs, 
including direct and indirect components, can be 
significant, particularly in Contract Systems requiring a 
high degree of supervision (e.g., Piece-Rate Contracts). 
Table 6-1 illustrates the cost disparity between a mine 
operating a Volumetric Contract System versus a strict Day's 
Pay Wage System without an incentive program. In this 
example, the benefits, such as increased productivity, 
decreased operating costs, or some other operating element, 
must offset the Total Contract Cost of $ 238,164 each year. 
This can translate to $1.90/ton for a 500 tons per day 
operation. Determining the net realization attributed to a 
Contract System can be difficult to ascertain in optimal 
situations. This is especially true in operations which are 
utilizing Contract Incentives for reasons other than changes
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TABLE 6-1 A Comparison of Administrative Costs Associated 
with Operating a Volumetric Contract System 
Versus a straight Wage System
Assumptions: Weekly Employee Pay Periods 
21 Operating Stopes/Work areas 
2 Production Shifts/Day - 48 Weeks/Yr
Volumetric Contract System Base Wage System
Shifter Costs:
# of Stopes Supervised/Shifter
# of Required Shifter/Shift
# of Required Shifters/Day
Shifter Differential
Differential Shifter Costs 
Salary a $ 35,000/Yr 
Benefits a 25 Percent
Total Differential Shifter Cost
4 - 5  Stopes/Shifter 
(21 Stopes/4 Stopes/Shifter) 
= 5 Shifters
2 Shifts X 5 Shifters/Shift 





7 - 8  Stopes/Shifter 
(21 Stopes/7 Stopes/Shifter) 
= 3 Shifters








Total (21 Stopes) 
Bookkeeping/Contract Payroll 
Total (21 Stopes)
Total Ackninistrative Differential 
Total Acknin. Man-Hrs/Hine/WK 
Total Differential/Mine/Week 
Total Differential/Mine/Year 
Total Acknin. Differential Cost 
% 35,000/Yr = $ 18.23/Man-Hr 

















TOTAL CONTRACT COST/YEAR S 238,164.10/Yr
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in labor productivity or for the reduction of costs (e.g., 
dilution).
Unified Workforce
Some mine administrators have seen a direct correlation 
between labor efficiency and the cohesiveness of its 
employees working toward a common goal. This relationship 
is similar to the analogy of the team concept, presented in 
the discussion on Bonus Systems. Ideally, by designing 
Contract or Bonus Systems which are mutually beneficial to 
other incentive systems, a common cause is developed which 
can promote a climate advantageous for everyone, including 
the company. This is particularly important in labor 
intensive operations, where employees are intimately 
dependent upon each other. For example, a production stope 
can not be mined efficiently if the stope miners are waiting 
for supplies or are muck bound. Therefore, these miners are 
directly dependent upon support personnel, such as skip 
tenders, nippers/miner helpers, haulage workers, and 
repair/maintenance crews, to perform their jobs expediently 
so that they can earn incentives for production. In some 
operations, this has been the source of significant 
dissension between different classes of underground miners.
The role of support employees, as defined previously, is
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also integral to the performance of most mines. Production 
is often limited by the capacity of a mine to haul or hoist 
muck, develop new stopes and workareas, and the operational 
downtime affiliated with repair and maintenance. In these 
cases, the efficiency of support personnel may have a 
greater impact on the overall performance of an operation 
than the actual productivity attributed by stope and 
production miners. In addition, stopes represent a large 
capital investment. From an economic perspective, once a 
stope has been developed, it should be mined continuously 
until complete. Therefore, a mine should develop as much 
production capacity (stopes) as the infrastructure and 
support personnel can optimally manage. This reiterates the 
importance of maximizing the efficiency and productivity of 
support and nonproduction miners.
For these reasons, it often becomes beneficial to tie 
these support employees to an incentive, either through 
Bonus Systems or Conventional Performance Contracts, which 
parallel the primary focus of the Production Contract in 
u s e .
Emplovee-Companv Relations
The rapport between the company and it's employees is an 
important factor which is often overlooked at many
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operations. The traditional mindset that an adversarial 
relationship between these two parties is normal can be 
conducive to chronic problems in even well designed 
incentive programs. This is particularly evident in union 
operations that employ contract systems. If employees feel 
that they are being taken advantage of by the implementation 
of impractical standards or deceitful measuring and 
settlement practices employed by the company, it may give 
them, at least from their perspective, a motive and 
justification for sabotaging the incentive program. This 
situation directly contributes to the rapid deterioration of 
employee relations. The shear economic dependence of these 
operations on labor productivity and performance, leaves the 
company in a precarious position, where disgruntled 
employees can have a significant impact on the viability of 
an operation. As stated earlier in Chapter 2, incentive 
programs should not be adopted as a device to salvage labor 
relations in an operation already plagued by employee strife 
or turmoil. These pragmatic applications have historically 
accelerated the degeneration of these programs and have 
generally led to further labor complications. In order for 
any incentive program to be successful, both parties must 
respect the integrity of each other and presume that each is 
functioning in good faith. There are several practices that
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can be employed by operator to mitigate these problems 
during the execution of a program. These practices include 
adopting concrete incentive policies and standards which are 
strictly followed and understood by the employees, 
utilizing systems which can be clearly comprehended from a 
standpoint of developing standards and incentive allotments, 
incorporating policies to promote communication and input 
from the miners directly to management, and developing 
systems which are mutually beneficial to both the employee 
and the company.
System Initiation
The acceptance of a incentive system by the labor force 
is a requisite for the program fulfilling its objectives.
It is imperative that the employees have confidence in the 
program from its inception. The technical aspects of the 
program aside, an incentive system has a greater chance of 
being accepted if it is properly "packaged11, including the 
way it is presented by management to the employees and how 
its initiated.
Compatibility with Existing Compensation Systems
Digressing to the discussion on compensation in 
Chapter 2, the implementation of incentive systems will an
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effect on the structural balance of the total employee 
compensation package. It is important to insure that the 
motivational incentive and designed objectives of the system 
will coincide with those of established programs (i.e., 
behavioral programs, entrepreneurial pay, and employee 
perquisites) and will not be adversely effected by program 
conflicts. This is particularly the case in operations 
utilizing both subjective and objective employee pay 
systems. In addition# since the incentive rate associated 
with most programs are initiated with respect to an 
operation's base wage system, including the structure for 
employee classification, advancement, and seniority, these 
programs must also be incorporated within the design 
analysis.
Time Studies and Simulations
As addressed in Chapter 3, the determination of most 
incentive standards are performed through a process of 
correlating time studies and simulations with actual 
production data. This evaluation, although tedious, 
provides information critical to the development of accurate 
standards for specific operating variables. In essence, 
time studies isolate individual activities and record the 
labor requirements necessary to complete them, usually
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itemized in man-hours. Most studies will also incorporate 
the evaluation of activities that are not dependent on labor 
requirements, such as tramming and hoisting. In these 
examples, a flat time rate would normally be used, where 
units are recorded in either minutes or relative to the 
completion time per ton of material (i.e., minutes/ton). 
Although simplistic in form and usually delegated to junior 
engineers or summer students, obtaining accurate time data 
which is representative of the activities being reviewed can 
be extremely difficult. Furthermore, the impact of these 
studies on the development of a successful incentive system 
can not be overstated, because they represent an essential 
ingredient in the formulation of performance standards and 
their associated rates.
The largest potential obstacle for the acquisition of 
accurate performance data can occur if miners become aware 
of the study and its intended purpose. Historically, time 
studies in these situations often reflect productivity far 
below the level normally considered a day's pay rate. To 
mitigate these inaccuracies, many operations have attempted 
to recreate these studies by using shifters or engineers to 
perform specific activities in lieu of actual miners. These 
mocked scenarios, often called time simulations, can 
artificially reproduce activity standards for a variety of
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different environmental and operating conditions. The 
drawbacks associated with this technique revolve around time 
constraints and the opportunity cost affiliated with labor, 
equipment, and production areas. In addition, the 
managerial staff performing the simulation may not be as 
proficient as the production personnel or have trouble 
determining what an average day's pay work level is. 
Therefore, it is important that time studies and simulations 
should be compared with the mine's historical production 
data, as well as information gathered from surrounding 
operations, before any performance standards are finalized.
Standard Evaluations and Adjustments
Incentive programs have a tendency to deteriorate with 
time due to variations in productivity brought about by 
miners learning more efficient practices, changes in 
equipment, different mining parameters, and refinements in 
operating techniques. Evidence of program degeneration can 
routinely be found in operations that have employed the same 
standards and rates over a extended period of time, usually 
in the form of escalating employee earnings. Therefore, 
standards must be periodically reviewed and adjusted to 
compensate for these factors. Changes should only be made 
if the disparity between the standard and the actual
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performance is significant. This will generally alleviate 
the problems created by employee skepticism if standards are 
changed to often.
It is important to remember that the deterioration of 
performance standards can be an indication that the 
incentive system is functioning properly, where employees 
are developing more efficient techniques associated with 
working in the stope environment. As such, an operator must 
attempt to isolate the cause of this phenomenon by 
determining what factors have accompanied the increase in 
employee performance. If the increase is solely attributed 
to employee efficiency, mine management must recognize that 
periodic changes in the standards, if done frequently, can 
stifle the incentive for employees to continue to find 
avenues for increased labor proficiency.
Stope Measurements
There are a multitude of methods for measuring stopes 
and production areas to evaluate employee performance and 
productivity. The specific survey technique utilized by an 
operation will generally be dependent upon the method which
has historically been employed, the personnel preference of
\
the mine manager or superintendent, and the operating 
characteristics of the mine. In most Breast-Down Vein
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Mining Applications, the contract engineer will measure the 
length of a stope from a designated point on the raise 
(e.g., the timber cap, a survey spad, or the timber slide 
rope) to the working face (Figure 6-1). From this tape, 
left and right lateral measurements are taken on regular 
intervals and/or when there is a significant variation in 
the stope width. This is done so that the total stope 
volume and dilution attributed excessive mining widths can 
be calculated. This is generally done for the entire stope 
during each survey because it allows a graphic 
representation of the work being performed in the stope over 
time. It also enables the contract administrator to 
determine the volume of rock mined based on areas measured 
from a planimeter or computerized digitizer. This is 
particularly important in operations that routinely utilize 
slab rounds or in stopes that possess multiple faces.
In situations where the stope deviates along vein strike 
(i.e., the distance between the face and the reference point 
is not a straight line), the length can be broken into 
linear line segments. As illustrated in Figure 6-1, Line 
Segment l extends from the reference point to a known 
distance along the stope rib, where the stope deviates.
Line Segment 2 extends from this point to the current face.
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Figure 6-1 Stope Survey Data
STOPE: 1000-722 INSPECTION DATE: Jan. 28, 19XX
SIDE: NORTH SIDE. SIDE #1 INSPECTION TIME: 11:30 AM______
CONTRACT PERIOD: Jan 21-Jan 28
Reference Spad/Point: BM 1000-52 (Located on Raise Cap)
Commentsgment Distance Left Right Height
000-52 0.0
5.0 6.0 6.2 9.1
10. 0 5.7 6.4 9.3
15.0 5.4 6.6 9.4
20.0 5.2 6.4 8.9
25.0 4.7 6.8 9.4
30.0 4.1 7.0 9.3
32 . 4 4.0 10.5 9.4
35.0 3.5 7.5 9.1
40. 0 2.8 9.4 9.0
42.8 0.0 11.6 9.2
2 45.0 1.9 9.9 9.4
2 50. 0 3.6 7.6 9.1
2 55.0 5.8 6.2 9.5
2 58.2 5.5 5.8 9.1
Bearing: S52E





It is important that the angle between these line segments 
be known. This angle can be calculated by forming a 
triangle with a tape measure between two known points on 
each line segment. Once the distances for each leg of the 
triangle is measured, the angle of deviation between the 
line segments can be calculated. With the angle of 
deviation, the overlapping of lateral measurements, and the 
distance for each line segment, a stope can be accurately 
reconfigured to determine what changes have occurred between 
surveys.
The height of the stope (back height) is also an 
important variable, often measured on a regular distance 
interval. In Breast-Down Stopes, these measurements are 
generally made to insure that the cut meets the initial 
specifications outlined in the contract or bonus. In many 
situations, large variations in the cut height can cause 
significant problems in mining the next cut. Therefore, 
some operations pay an additional bonus (e.g., a Flat Back 
Bonus) if the stope back height remains constant through the 
duration of the cut. This type of bonus is particularly 
common in contract systems where miners are rotated through 
a stope block (e.g., Piece-Rate Systems). In Breast-Down 
Stopes, this measurement can be used to calculate the total 
volume of rock drilled and blasted. In all cases, the type
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of stope measurements and their necessary accuracy is 
dictated by the type of cut and contract incentive utilized.
The time at which the stope survey is made and the 
contract settlement calculated, is dependent upon the 
accessibility of a particular stope. In most conventional 
Breast Down Stoping Methods, for example, the final stope 
survey can be completed after the stope has been cleaned out 
and prior to the introduction of backfill. However, in many 
situations, access constraints prevent this from occurring. 
For example, Back Stoping Methods, like Shrinkage, Open, and 
Multiple Lift Cut and Fill Stoping, can create stope heights 
prohibitive to an accurate survey. Therefore, it may be 
necessary to measure the stope during or after the 
introduction of fill or periodically through the duration of 
the cut when stope access is conducive to measuring, 
irrespective of when pay advances are calculated.
The actual measurements comprised in any stope survey 
are highly dependent upon the type of contract system 
employed and the operating parameters for a specific cut. 
Regardless of the type of survey method employed, it should 
remain consistent through the duration of a contract. This 
consistency must include surveyors, measuring techniques, 
and equipment. If these practices do not remain constant, 
the operation leaves itself vulnerable to employee
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criticism.
Many mines choose to verify the volume of ore and waste 
mined and determined through stope surveys by comparing them 
to production data recorded from independent sources, such 
as haulage, hoisting, milling, and sandfill. One potential 
method is to perform an ore and waste balance for the pay 
period. An ore balance is a comprehensive flowsheet which 
correlates volumes of ore mined with respect to downstream 
activities (e.g., milling) for a given unit of time. In 
these systems, the total volume mined from each stope is 
compared to the number of cars pulled from each chute and 
transfer point, the number of skips hoisted, the volume of 
ore in underground holding pockets, chutes, and surface 
stockpiles, and total mill feed. A waste balance should 
also be performed to account for dilution and possible 
mixing with the ore.
Another common practice is comparison of the total 
volume of fill required within a stope. Knowing the 
specific gravity of the fill, the percent of solids within 
the slurry, and the volume of the pour; the total volume of 
the stope can be calculated. Problems affiliated with this 
type of comparison include piping losses, sand leaks around 
bulkheads and drains, and determining fill volumes when 
sectional or partial pours are used.
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Stope Bidding
Operations that utilize Contract Mining Systems must 
employ a policy governing how Stope Contracts are awarded. 
Even with the modification of standards, some stopes possess 
qualities that make them more opportune than others, in 
terms of earning potential. In addition, the detrimental 
working conditions of some stopes (e.g., high temperature 
and humidity) may not offset the additional compensation 
associated with lower standards. Therefore, an operation 
must have a equitable way of allocating these job 
assignments, particularly if there is a high demand to work 
in specific stopes. One method of doing this, is a process 
called Stope Bidding. There are dozens of variations of 
this process. In essence, contracts that are about to begin 
are posted so that the miners can review them. The 
employees, who are then interested in a specific contract, 
form partnerships and submit an application to participate 
in that stope. Mine management then reviews the 
applications and chooses the miners that will be the primary 
participants in the contract. This selection process is 
usually based on a predetermined set of criteria, such as 
seniority, experience, training, efficiency ratings, and 
current work assignments. Miners wishing to apply for these 
contracts must also pass a variety of prerequisites in order
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to be eligible to participate in certain types of stopes. 
Often in union operations, these preconditions are a 
negotiated element incorporated within the general labor 
agreement. In order to maintain operating flexibility and 
reduce the bureaucracy associated with these programs, many 
mine operators are attempting to discard Bidding Systems and 
assign workplaces on the basis of scheduling, labor 
availability, and employee proficiency.
Costs of Skilled Labor
The impact of labor on the overall performance of an 
operation has been a principle contention of this thesis 
since Chapter 1. In many respects, the more proficient and 
skilled a given workforce is, the more operating 
flexibility and latitude an operator is afforded.
Therefore, the acquisition of quality, skilled miners is an 
important element for a successful mine, particularly given 
the current status and size of the underground labor market. 
While Contract Systems are rarely visualized as a tool for 
attracting and retaining quality miners, it often has that 
result. The lure of high contract wages can attract skilled 
miners searching for better work opportunities as well as 
retain highly motivated and skilled employees. Contract 
Systems also enable production personnel to evaluate
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employees based on relative contract performance. This is 
particularly helpful in allocating miners to stopes in 
operations which do not employ Contract or Stope Bidding.
Another important aspect of Contract Systems is that 
there is an inherent motive for experienced miners not to 
teach less skilled employees. Many operations attempt to 
mitigate this by forming partnerships between skilled and 
unskilled miners under the same contract. This creates an 
environment where the experienced miner is forced to pass 
along some of his expertise or risk contract earnings. This 
practice can generate significant employee conflicts unless 
done with some tact and insight. One proven way has been to 
team older, experienced contract miners who may have 
declining physical abilities with younger, stronger, 
unskilled underground labors.
Supervisory Personnel
Shifters and other immediate supervisory personnel 
exert enormous influence over the daily operation and 
ultimately, the viability of most incentive systems. This 
is particularly evident in Piece-Rate and Volumetric 
Contract Systems. Therefore, the design of any incentive 
program should incorporate the input and concerns of 
shifters and production supervisors. Because these
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employees act as an intermediary between the miners and the 
company, they are often put into a position of having to 
defend the incentive system on the company's behalf. While 
this situation should not occur and is the responsibility of 
the mine superintendent and contract engineer, it is 
important that these supervisors have confidence and trust 
in the incentive program. If not consulted prior to its 
installation, shifters are more likely to feel resentful 
toward any incentive system regardless of its merit. From 
historical results, this situation will adversely effect 
employee confidence in the program and can seriously damage 
employee-employer relations.
Safety Related Concerns
Safety is a major concern related to the use of incentive 
programs and in particular, Contract Systems. Critics of 
Contract Incentives have historically opposed their 
implementation on grounds that they are inherently 
dangerous. Their principle contention is that miners, in an 
attempt to maximize production, are more apt to take chances 
and expose themselves to situations that pose a greater 
prospect for injury or death. This claim has never been 
quantitatively substantiated in underground hardrock mines 
operating in North America. In fact, of the operators
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surveyed in this study, most felt that the application of 
Contract Programs in their operations actually contributed 
to safer practices because of the incorporation of safety 
and training programs within most Contract Systems and that 
these incentive programs caused production employees to 
concentrate on their work and minimized apathy. This is 
supported by research conducted by J.L. Chouinard and N.R. 
Billette (CIM Bulletin, Oct., 1986) who concluded that "no 
direct and strong correlation exists" between incentive 
programs and accidents. Regardless of the claims, 
statistical evidence from MSHA accident data and state 
industrial insurance claims seems to indicate that if a 
correlation between contract mining and accidents does 
exist, it is extremely small.
Union Considerations
The existence of one or more unions can play a large 
role in how and what types of wage and incentive systems are 
adopted by an operation. The scope of this topic, however, 
is far too expansive for the confines of this thesis, but 
there are several things that an operator should be aware of 
prior to the installation of an incentive program.
Typically, most unions have historically been opposed to 
contract mining on the premise of safety, the protection of
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mine jobs, and that these programs promote competition among 
the workforce. However in districts which have historical 
utilized these incentive systems, most labor unions have 
acceded to their implementation because of membership 
demands. Unions, on the other hand, often support the 
adoption of conventional Bonus Programs, in lieu of Contract 
Systems. Bonuses are generally conceived as conducive to 
unification of the labor force, which is consistent with the 
doctrine of most unions.
An operator also needs to be cognizant of the fact that 
many unions seek to include these incentive programs as a 
negotiated element incorporated within a labor agreement.
As such, performances standards, bidding procedures, price 
rates, and other program related topics become subject to 
union influence. If these topics become embedded within a 
labor agreement, the operation often loses the flexibility 
needed to maintain an efficient and productive system. This 
is particularly true in operations that experience variable 
mining conditions and/or produce metals subject to volatile 
markets•
Incentive Selection and Design Parameters
The remaining portion of this chapter will focus on the 
principle parameters used to select and tailor a Contract
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System for a given set of mine and operating 
characteristics. This process is predicated on the 
relationships between program design and specific 
characteristics as seen in the industry. It also includes 
the observations, experiences, and opinions of different 
mine operators and contract engineers gathered during the 
course of this thesis. As previously stated, the scope and 
variability of operating variables, geology of deposits, and 
labor conditions prevent the standardization of a model that 
will produce an optimal incentive system for every operating 
scenario. Therefore, the process formulated in this section 
is intended to establish a preliminary model which an 
operator can modify to meet their particular objectives.
This analysis is divided into three primary steps: Mine 
Evaluation, Incentive Selection, and Program Design (Table 
6-2). The first step, Mine Evaluation, reviews and analyzes 
factors associated with the target operation, including it's 
labor force, mining system, and location. The second step, 
Incentive Selection, assesses the utilization of an 
incentive system for the parameters studied in Step #1. It 
also determines the type and structure of the preliminary 
production model which would best meet the needs and 
objectives of the operation. The last step, Program Design, 
refines the incentive system through operating simulations
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TABLE 6-2 Steps Affiliated with Establishing a 
Preliminary Contract System
STEP #1 - Mine Evaluation









- Social and Economic Factors 
Historical Data
STEP #2 - Incentive Selection
- Part #1: Determine if an Incentive is Warranted
- Part #2: Determine if Operation is Best Suited By a
Bonus or Contract Incentive
- Part #3: Determine the Best Contract System for the
Information Gathered from Step #1
STEP #3 - Program Design
Isolate Constant and Variable Program Factors
- Construct Core Contract
Incorporate Operating Strategies within Performance 
Standards
Mock Program Simulations 
Financial Analysis
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to optimize program objectives. These simulations are based 
on an iterative process of changing parameters to achieve 
system goals as well as identify potential program side 
effects. In addition, program costs and benefits are 
analyzed and contract standards constructed.
Mine Evaluation
The first step in this analysis is to compile objective 
information regarding factors which will effect program 
decisions made in Steps #2 and #3. Table 6-3 illustrates an 
example of the types of questions which should be 
incorporated within this study. To many companies, 
assembling a list of this sort may seem academic. It is, 
however, important aspect of this analysis from numerous 
perspectives. It mitigates the chance of important and 
possibly obvious factors from being overlooked and enables 
an operator to objectively evaluate the status of the mine. 
Also, many of these factors will be used repeatedly to 
determine performance standards for different work areas, 
geologic conditions, and operating configurations. In 
addition to the topics addressed in Table 6-3, there are 
several other considerations that will effect the design and 
implementation of an incentive system: these factors are 
discussed below.
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TABLE 6-3 Project Evaluation For a Production Stope
Geologic Conditions:
Rock Conditions 
Ore and Parent Rock 
Vein Dip and Angle Consistency 
Variability in Stope Uidth 
Stope Pitch (Linear Along Strike)
Method of Determining Cut Uidth 




Equipment Types to be Utilized 
Variability of Operating Factors 
Stope Configuration
(e.g., Height/Uidth/Length)
Double or Single Breasted 
Activities Comprising the Mining Cycle 
Environmental Conditions 
Labor Requirements 
Number of Present Employees 
Production vs Total 
Skills Required by Stope Miners 
Time Required to Acquire Skills 
Disparity between Employee Skill Level 
Single, Double, or Triple Shifted
Labor Considerations:
Does the Operation have a Union:
If So: Is it a Closed Shop 
Nunber of Unions 
Percent of Employee Particpation 
Percieved Relationship to the Company 
Length of Time the Union has Existed 
Employee Support of the Union 
Competition for Skilled Employees 
Availability of Unskilled and Skilled Labor
Future Projections:
Projected Changes in Market/Price 
Projected Changes in Production 
Projected Mine Life 
Projected Changes in Ore Grades 
Projected Labor Costs and Relations
Managerial Factors:
Labor Relations
Operational Expertise of Upper Management
Operational Expertise of Lower Management
Operational Expertise of Shifters
Current ResponsibiIties of Shifters
Shifters - Experienced Miners or Management
Shifters Relationship to Production Personnel
Number of Present Shifters
Nunber of People Qualified to be Shifters
Experience With Incentive Systems
Types of Programs in Employee Compensation Package
Types of Training, Safety, Absenteeism Programs
Managerial Objectives and Goals
Perceived Operational Problems
Mine Geography:
Regional Economic Prosperity 
Distance to Urban/Residential Area 
Employees Housed/Boarded on Mine Property 
Nunber of Adjacient Operations
Types of Mining Systems Employeed 
Types of Wage Practices 
Types of Contract Systems Utilized 
Union or Nonunion
Labor Relations/Labor Agreements in Region
Historical Data:
Mine Labor Cost 
Stope vs Total 
Ore Recoverable Value 
Average Day's Pay Earnings 
Average Employee Earnings Per Pay Period 
Stope Productivity
Presently Utilizing Incentive Program 
If So; Type
How were Standards Developed and By Whom 
Average Earnings 
Contract Duration
Does it Coincides With the Pay Period 
Current Duration of Pay Period 
Average Absenteeism/Employee/Month 
Reported Accidents/100,000 Man-Hours 
Safety Violations Reported/100,000 Man-Hours
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Strategic and Managerial Planning
A critical step in this process is to determine the 
goals, objectives, and strategies of the company. This is 
not as simple as it appears and is in fact, usually a 
difficult process. In most situations, the primary motive 
of an operation is to maximize economic return or profit.
In the context of this thesis, economic return and 
profitability are considered corporate goals. The challenge 
is in trying to selectively isolate the individual 
operational components that can be changed to beneficially 
achieve these company goals (e.g., increased mine recovery). 
These individual operating components are defined as the 
operating objectives of the mine. The method in which these 
objectives are achieved is referred to as the mine's 
operating strategy. Determining these factors, when company 
goals deviate from a profit motive, further complicate this 
process. For example, constructing strategies associated 
with a mine currently producing at a net loss in a 
distressed financial market with the objectives of 
maintaining market share and retaining highly skilled 
employees in hopes of future metal price increases can be an 
immense undertaking. The application and intent of the 
corporate objectives in these two situations are quite 
different and as such, the strategies within the incentive
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structure for each operation would also reflect these 
disparities. In each case, a means of measuring the success 
or failure of the program to meet these objectives should be 
constructed and thoroughly defined.
Managerial goals and objectives must be continually 
reassessed to compensate for changing economic and operating 
conditions. Furthermore, as these program objectives change 
and are incorporated within the design of existing Contract 
or Bonus Systems, it is imperative that these strategies, in 
the form of performance standards, are consistent with the 
established framework of the program. Objectives must also 
be clearly defined and understood by the mine employees with 
respect to their introduction in the incentive system.
For a mine to be efficient, management must be able to 
isolate and assess the problems that the operation is now or 
will be facing in the near future. This can include labor 
costs, grade control, dilution, productivity, mechanical 
availability, safety, and a host of other factors. From 
this type of analysis, additional operating objectives and 
strategies can be formulated. Strategic planning by 
management is a highly effective tool for circumventing 
potential operating problems by anticipating what objectives 




Operating history has demonstrated that incentive 
programs installed in operations which do not possess the 
historical production database necessary to formulate 
accurate incentive standards are usually destined for 
failure. If performance standards are hastily established, 
based on an insufficient amount of information, the 
probability of the program producing results which are 
unsatisfactory or are contrary to it's primary objectives 
dramatically increases. In certain instances, production 
data can be acquired from operations with similar operating 
and geologic conditions to augment a mine's data base. 
However, this information should only be used to supplement 
and support the data already acquired from an operating 
mine. Program failures can be extremely expensive to 
rectify and quite damaging to employee-employer 
relationships. Often, in these situations management will 
lose creditability, making the implementation of subsequent 
programs significantly more difficult.
Managerial Expertise
Although difficult to objectively do, management must 
assess it's expertise, in terms of having the ability to
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design and formulate an incentive program which will 
accomplish its objectives. If not available, management 
should make provisions for hiring a consultant or someone 
experienced in this pursuit. From experiences derived from 
unsuccessful attempts, it is far less expensive to implement 
a program correctly the first time, than to either have to 
function with a inadequate system or try to overcome the 
problems associated with modifying the program at a later 
time. Another consideration, is that an "outsider" may 
objectively view an operation differently than those 
intimately associated with it. Employee acceptance of the 
program can also improve in this situation because it 
eliminates personality conflicts between the management 
staff designing the incentive and the miners.
Incentive Selection
This section, Step #2, will assess the utilization of 
incentive systems for the parameters previously studied in 
Step #1 - Mine Evaluation, including program structure and 
configuration. This analysis is presented in three 
parts:
(1) To determine if a incentive system is warranted for 
a given set of mine operating conditions.
(2) To determine if the operation would be best suited 
by a Bonus or Contract System.
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(3) To determine the best Contract System for the 
information derived from Step #1.
Part #1:
As discussed in Chapter 2, not all mining applications 
have the proper ingredients for a successful incentive 
system. In some situations, the introduction of incentives 
could create operational problems which were unprecedented, 
while in others, the incentive is not required and produces 
no appreciable improvement. While these scenarios are quite 
different, they depict why incentive systems should only be 
installed in operations with the potential for success where 
the benefits offset the cost of program implementation.
Prior to the design and selection of an incentive system, an
evaluation must be made to determine if an incentive is
deemed appropriate. While there are no concrete guidelines
for making this determination, there are factors which 
indicate that an incentive program may not be applicable.
The proficiency of the labor force is a foremost 
consideration. If the current workforce is highly motivated 
and productive, the utilization of incentives may generate 
no noticeable improvements and is not required.
An operation with significant labor discontent is, in 
most cases, not conducive for any type of incentive. 
Depending on the types of problems which exist and their
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magnitude, the implementation of incentives can easily 
contribute to the further deterioration of labor relations. 
Incentives, particularly Contract Systems, can not function 
if labor and management do not trust and respect each other.
Historical production data, as previously discussed, 
must exist in quantities sufficient for incentive standards 
and program structure to be determined. Even mines which 
have operated for numerous years, may contain stopes not 
amenable to incentives because of new mining systems or 
equipment utilization. Without the proper database, wage 
miscalculations will undoubtedly cause miners to lose 
confidence in mine management as well as the incentive.
The cost of program implementation and operation is 
another key element in this process. As discussed, these 
costs must be offset by the increase in operating 
efficiency, labor productivity, or some other benefit 
realized as a result of utilizing incentives. Obviously, 
this determination can not be performed prior to the 
inception of the system. Therefore, when a production 
incentive has been designed, this analysis can begin.
Part #2:
Once it has been determined that an incentive system is 
appropriate for an operation, the next step is to select the
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type of incentive best suited for the parameters outlined in 
Step #1. The two major incentive alternatives associated 
with objective performance appraisals for production stopes 
are Contract Systems and Bonus/Group-Sharing Programs. Each 
has unique requirements necessary for their effective 
utilization. As with Part #1, there are no hard and fast 
rules governing which is system should be used for every 
operating scenario. There are, however, several criteria 
that enable the contract engineer to determine which 
incentive requirements are most closely met by a mine's 
characteristics.
The type of mining system employed by an operation must 
be examined to determine the optimum incentive program which 
will accommodate it's objectives. First, an assessment of 
the labor intensity associated with the mining system(s) 
being utilized must be performed. This is accomplished by 
evaluating the individual activities that comprise the 
mining cycle of each method, with respect to the type of 
equipment employed and the physical demands on labor. If it 
is determined that productivity of the mining method is 
predominantly dictated by the operating capacity of the 
equipment, rather than on the performance of skilled labor, 
then this operation is amenable to Bonus oriented programs. 
If the inverse is true, then Contract Incentives are
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generally considered appropriate.
An evaluation of the labor requirements of a particular 
operation must be performed, in terms of the essential 
skills and qualifications of a miner, the disparity in 
skills and abilities between different classes of employees, 
and the duration and sophistication of the training required 
for production miners. In systems where inexperienced 
employees can be trained quickly (e.g., the operation of an 
LHD in a Caving Operation), Bonus Programs are well adapted. 
This is particularly true, if the mine employs a large labor 
force and the disparity in skill levels is small. In 
operations that utilize labor intensive systems, such as 
Square-Set Mining, production is largely dependent on the 
abilities of highly skilled employees, where these talents 
can take several years to perfect. Furthermore, the 
disparity in skill levels range from highly talented stope 
miners to unskilled general laborers. In this situation, 
Contract Mining Systems would usually be preferred.
Although these two examples represent extremes, they 
illustrate the selection process which distinguishes between 
Bonus and Contract Incentives for specific operating 
factors.
An important consideration in this evaluation is whether 
the performance of production miners can be objectively
T-3894 301
determined and is representative of employee effort and 
proficiency. In situations where an objective means of 
isolating the productivity of individual(s) can not be made, 
Bonus Systems become a viable incentive. The same is true 
for mining applications where labor productivity does not 
readily correlate to the effort exerted by miners or is 
highly variable in a short duration of time. Contract 
Systems, on the other hand, require that employee 
productivity be quantifiable and representative of 
performance.
Part #3:
Assuming that Contract Systems are selected in Part #2 
as the best form of incentive for the operation in question, 
this section determines which type of Contract Program is 
most amenable to the parameters studied in Step #1. While 
there are hundreds of factors which will contribute toward 
customizing a program to a specific operation, only a few 
are needed to choose the appropriate category of Contract 
Incentive. Table 6-4 illustrates the relationship between 
several of these factors and each Contract System.
Perhaps the two most important components in this 
selection process are geologic considerations and the type 
of mining system(s) employed. In most operations, stope 
geometry is usually dependent on economic considerations
T-3894 302
TABLE 6-4 General Relationships Between Contract 





Predictability of Stope Geometry: None Required
Supervisory Expertise Required: High
Amenable to Specialization: Yes
Average Skill Level (Miners): Low - Medium
Cost of Contract Implementation: Medium - High
Record Keeping Requirements: High
Program Sophistication: High
Shifter/Employee Ratio: High





Predictability of Stope Geometry
Supervisory Expertise Required: 
Amenable to Specialization: 
Average Skill Level (Miners): 
Cost of Contract Implementation: 







Some Required for 
Performance Schedules 
Medium - High 
Yes
Medium
Medium - High 
Medium - High 
Medium
Medium - High 
No
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Predictability of Stope Geometry: 
Supervisory Expertise Required: 
Amenable to Specialization: 
Average Skill Level (Miners):
Cost of Contract Implementation: 





















Predictability of Stope Geometry: 
Supervisory Expertise Required: 
Amenable to Specialization: 
Average Skill Level (Miners):
Cost of Contract Implementation: 











Medium - High 
Medium - High 
Low - Medium 
Low - Medium 
Low - Medium 
Yes
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associated with the geologic mineralization of the deposit 
and the equipment utilized for a chosen mining method. If 
this geometry is irregular, it may not be amenable to 
Contract Programs that depend on uniform stope 
configurations such as Linear Based Systems. Furthermore, 
situations where stope conditions dramatically change from 
cut to cut or during the mining of a single cut prohibit the 
use of programs founded on predicating future productivity 
(e.g., Time-Based Contracts). From these examples, the 
method in which each Contract System measures labor 
productivity is dependent upon certain geologic parameters.
The mining system employed greatly effects the type of 
Contract System utilized. Time-Based Contracts, for 
example, work extremely well in systems where ore is mined 
in horizontal cuts, regardless of the stoping method. There 
are, however, numerous problems with adapting this type of 
contract to irregular stopes created by Rill Stoping or 
Random Room and Pillar. Other operating factors which 
impact this selection process include the specialization of 
specific activities and the need to move miners from one 
stope to another. These situations can create havoc in 
trying equitably to distribute incentive earnings in some 
Contract Systems
Shifters and other immediate supervisory personnel exert
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a significant influence over the type and structure of 
contracts an operation utilizes. In Step #1, an objective 
appraisal of the mines existing supervisory staff (e.g., 
shifters, foremen, production managers, etc.) was performed. 
From this evaluation, the collective experience and 
expertise associated with these supervisors were examined as 
well as their relationship to the workforce and the company. 
This information directly determines the applicability of 
certain Contract Systems for different levels of shifter 
proficiency and prowess. For example, an operation which is 
presently using shifters that are recent college graduates 
with limited practical experience would not possess the 
knowledge a shifter must have to oversee a Piece-Rate 
Contract System. Likewise, if the shifters were once miners 
and have retained close ties to the production personnel, an 
operation must be apprehensive about introducing systems 
which depend on the shifter to make decisions that directly 
influence employee earnings. The number of people qualified 
to be shifters is another consideration that can effect the 
incentive program chosen. Both Piece-Rate and Volumetric 
Based Contract Systems require significantly more 
supervisors than the other two systems.
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Program Design
The principle intent of this section is to customize the 
Contract System selected above (Step #2) to meet the 
specific objectives and conditions of a particular 
operation. This process is cyclical in nature, where 
changes are made in an attempt to maximize the net benefit. 
Each change, however, has potential repercussions which can 
unexpectedly surface during the operation of the program. 
Therefore, each contract iteration is evaluated through a 
mock simulation to determine it's benefits, potential 
shortcomings, side-effects, and cost. The discussion 
presented is limited to addressing the major considerations 
used to tailor these programs to a particular set of 
conditions•
The first phase in optimizing any contract is to 
formulate a "core" program. While based on the contract 
format selected above, the core program is structured by key 
parameters which will remain constant throughout the 
operation. It's purpose is to provide the framework from 
which individual contracts can be made for specific stopes 
and workareas. From the analysis performed in the Mine 
Evaluation, a contract engineer can segregate operating 
factors on the basis of whether they remain constant or vary 
from one stope to another. The constant or "Base" factors
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influence the design of the core system as well as the 
strategy and structure related to the performance standards. 
Presented below are Base Factors associated with mine labor:
Number of Employees Required (Skilled & Unskilled) 
Labor Availability (Skilled & Unskilled) 
Competition/Demand for Labor Within a Region
- Wage Practices for the Operation
Traditional Contract Systems Employed by the Mine
- Wage Practices for Surrounding Operations
- Traditional Contract Systems Employed in the Region 
Labor/Union Relations
Issues Contained Within the Labor Agreement
- Economic Prosperity of the Region
- Migratory Nature of the Employees
- Employee Response to Overtime
- Employee Record Concerning Absenteeism, Safety
Next, the operating factors which do vary from stope to 
stope and effect productivity are examined. These factors, 
called Critical Variable (discussed in Chapter 3), enable 
the core contract to be effectively modified for any stope 
within the operation. These variables often include 
equipment, stope configuration, environmental conditions, 
physical labor requirements, skill level, danger, rock 
conditions, etc..
The evaluation of these factors allows mine 
administrators to form operating strategies and methods of 
reaching the company's design objectives. In most 
operations, strategies are implemented in conjunction with 
the contract performance standards. The design, structure,
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and value of these standards can dramatically alter the 
objectives associated with a particular contract. For 
example, in an area with a limited supply of quality miners 
it may be economically advantageous for a labor intensive 
operation to incorporate a graduated performance standard 
that encourages production employees to volunteer for 
overtime. Determining how to strategically obtain a desired 
objective is largely performed through a iterative process 
of trail and error. However, caution must be used. The 
introduction of each new factor (i.e., operating strategy) 
increases the sophistication of the program and can 
precipitate changes elsewhere in the contract which may not 
be desirable. Therefore, after each iteration, the program 
must be analyzed from a holistic perspective to insure it 
still consistent with it's designed objectives and is, from 
an overall perspective, a better program. While Chapter 3 
discussed how values for specific activities via their 
performance standards were determined (i.e., value weighting 
based on time or employee effort with respect to a predicted 
average wage rate), the manipulation of the weighting factor 
can emphasize specific operating activities consistent with 
managerial objectives (e.g., increased bolting).
As previously discussed, Critical Variables dictate how 
performance standards will vary between different stopes and
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workareas. Once these factors have been determined (Step 
#1) , they must be weighted relative to their impact on labor 
productivity. This information should be derived from 
historical production records and current operating data.
The relative influence associated with each Critical 
Variable corresponds to a change in the productivity 
associated with the core contract model. For example, Table 
3-5 illustrates how the productivity of a core contract can 
change with respect to stope width, rock conditions, and 
vein dip. In this example, these factors are the critical 
variables of this system. Determining the degree of 
influence on productivity for a particular variable is 
calculated through the same process as performance 
standards, as outlined for each method in Chapter 3. Time 
studies, activity simulations, and historical production 
data provide the basis for this calculation.
Because these systems are constructed to influence and 
motivate people, elements associated with the design or 
structure of a contract may not be consistent with economic 
reasoning. In many situations, the emotional considerations 
influencing the design of a program are more important than 
the physical operating parameters. This is particularly 
evident in established mining districts, where historical 
practices may dictate some elements of the contract, such as
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the duration of pay period or contract advances.
As previously discussed, the most common method of 
determining the benefit, short-comings, and estimated cost 
of a preliminary contract design is through a mock 
simulation. This process simulates the progression of an 
operating stope based on actual historic data. By changing 
the operating characteristics of the stope, the contract can 
be analyzed for a variety of conditions and variables. If 
problems arise or program objects are not fully met, 
adjustments to the program can be made and reevaluated.
From this simulation, costs for program implementation 
and operation can be estimated as well as preliminary 
productivity and design benefits. Determining the net cost 
of the program, as discussed in Step #2, is an important 
consideration to determine whether an incentive is deemed 
appropriate for a specific set of mine parameters. Even in 
situations where the net benefit appears to be negative, 
there may be some rational for installing the contract, 
particularly if the company objectives are nonmonetary in 
nature. In this scenario, mine management must weight the 





This chapter will illustrate a structured process 
through which a preliminary incentive system will be 
formulated based on the criteria established in Chapter 6.
To demonstrate this technique, a simulated model will be 
constructed using production information derived from an 
actual underground operation in conjunction with operating 
assumptions designed to enhance the example. To simplify 
the example, the incentive system will be built on the 
premise that all stopes within the operation have the same 
geometric, geologic, and environmental parameters and that 
the operating characteristics associated with each stope are 
also similar. Furthermore, this analysis is representative 
of a preliminary evaluation and provides a means of 
determining an incentive system for the characteristics of a 
specific operation.
This analysis is multifaceted and can be effectively 
divided into three components: Mine Evaluation, Incentive 
Selection, and Program Design. Mine Evaluation will assess 
the pertinent parameters which characterize an operation and 
it's workforce. Next, the suitability of an incentive 
program will be examine with respect to need, application, 
and benefit. Using these two sections, an optimal incentive
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system can be selected which will accomplish specified 
managerial objectives for defined operating characteristics. 
Lastly, procedures for establishing program standards, and 
their subsequent wage rates, will be examined as prescribed 
in previous chapters.
Mine Evaluation
The first step in this process is to conduct an 
operating and corporate evaluation, as was outlined in Table
6-3, to examine project characteristics. This analysis has 
been divided into eight categories encompassing operating, 
geologic, managerial, supervisory, labor, and historical 
considerations as well as a section for miscellaneous 
categories. In subsequent sections, these assessments will 
aid in the determination of potential incentive systems, 
performance standards, and contract designs.
Operating Analysis
Mine Description
This model has been designed for a 400 ton per day 
operation mining a narrow vein deposit with the principle 
target metals of silver and zinc. Operating data was 
acquired from selected mines located in the Spanish Bar 
District of Colorado and supplemented by assumptions which
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will simplify this analysis. Table 7-1 illustrates the 
production and operation factors associated with this 
example operation. The mining method employed is a 
conventional Cut and Fill - Backstope which is double 
breasted with access through a central raise (Figure 7-1). 
stoping is performed in horizontal cuts, where economic 
mining widths are consistent along vein dip. The average 
configuration of a stope breast (i.e., 6 ft cut height, 10 
ft stope width, and 120 ft stope length) produces 640 tons 
per cut. Each stope contains two miners (i.e., one on each 
breast) with current labor productivity averaging 8.0 tons 
per man-shift. The present mining cycle does not lend 
itself to a high degree of mechanization; stoper drills and 
slushers being the predominate equipment used.
Environmental conditions found within the stope are 
excellent with low humidity, moderate temperature, and good 
ventilation. Each stope is double shifted except when a 
lift is being filled at the conclusion of the cut.
Mining Cycle
The following is an evaluation of the primary activities 
incorporated in mining a single cut. These activities do 
not include any tasks affiliated with stope development, 
including the central raise and I-Drifts.
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TABLE 7-1 Project Characteristics Associated with











Tons Excavated Per Cut:






Production Cycle Per Cut:
Stope Productivity:
Sand Fill Preparation:












Ave. Nun. of RockBoIts/Breast Cut: 
Ave. Number of Mats/Breast Cut: 
Ave. Number of Stulls/Breast Cut: 
Ave. Num. of DriIiHoles/Breast Cut 
Time Studies:
Cut Determination:
Conventional Cut and Fill 
Back Stoping
Double Breast (1 miner per side) - Horizontal Cuts
120 ft length per Stope Breast, Geometry is Consistent with Depth
10 ft. Varies along Strike - Consistent along dip.
Economic Widths Range from 8 - 1 4  feet.
65 - 85 Degrees, Constant Dip along Strike (+/- 5 Degrees)
6 ft Back Stope Round 
Less than 2 Degrees
7200 cft/Breast Cut, 14,400 cft/Stope Cut 
12 Years
640 Tons/Breast Cut, 1260 Tons/Stope Cut
1 Cut
3 Chambered - 2 Ore Pass Timber Raise





40 Production Shifts/Stope Cut, 80 Man-shifts/Stope Cut









3, 2 Shifts for Production and Haulage, 1 Shift for Development, 




5 Percent (e.g., rock bursts, timber squeezes, slab falls, etc.) 
64 - 6 ft Split Set Bolts 
1 5 - 3  Bolt (8 ft) Straps 
5 Stulls 
: 310 Holes
Time Studies and Simulations have been Performed for Every 
Activity in the Mining Cycle.
Stope Geometry's can be accurately estimated from adjacent Cuts
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Figure 7-1 Conventional Cut and Fill - Double Breasted







- Construct Temporary Station
- Move Equipment From Lower Cut
- Extend Utilities and Vent. Lines
- Drill Backstope
- Construct Temporary Shield to Protect Raise
- Blast Backstope
- Remove Shield and Fix Blast Damage
- Move and Set Slusher
- Extend Ore Chute and Insert Grizzley
- Bolt/Rock Support




- Insert Fill and Drainage Lines
- Sand Fill Stope
- Tear Down Temporary Station
This table aids in the development of a labor analysis to 
evaluate the essential skills associated with mining, the 
degree of labor intensity, and the impact of labor on mine 
productivity.
Geologic Analysis
The characteristics of the deposit and the surrounding 
host rock directly determine or influence most of the 
operating factors examined above. Table 7-2 presents the 
geologic conditions and parameters for this operation.
While analyzing the geology may duplicate other components 
of this evaluation, it will later be used to insure that the 
mine is utilizing the proper operating systems for the 
deposit and is consistent with current economic conditions.
T-3894 317
TABLE 7-2 Project Characteristics Associated with
Geologic Factors
Ore Characteristics: Hydrothermal Sulfide Vein Deposit
Vein Geometry: 3000 ft along Strike, 8 - 14 ft Wide
Average Vein Dip: 65 - 85 Degrees
Stope Pitch: Less than 2 Degrees
Ave. Metal Grades (Inplace): Ag - 18.0 ozt/Ton
Zn - 12.9 %/Ton 
Pb - 2.5 %/Ton
Mineralization: Grade and Width Vary along Vein Strike but
Remain Constant along Dip (Chutes)
Ore Competency: Medium, Highly Fractured, Weak Stratified
Boundaries between Different Hydrothermal 
Events
Parent Rock Competency: Good - Very Good, Granitic Gneiss
30,000 psi Compressive Strength, 
Some Foliations and Igneous 
Intrusives
Ore Tonnage Factor: 178 lbs/cft
Waste Tonnage Factor: 164 lbs/cft
Ore Swell: 61 Percent




This analysis is an assessment of how a contract
engineer can determine the objectives of an operation.
This determination, in most situations, is difficult to 
ascertain. The objectives presented in this example have 
been chosen to enhance the model.
Perceived/Projected Operating Problems
Although highly subjective, determining the current and 
projected operating problems associated with a mine is 
important from two perspectives: it will be used to insure 
that the operating climate is conducive for the installation 
of incentives and will provide operators with objectives 
designed to mitigate these obstacles. Often shifters and 
other production supervisors are included in this analysis 
for the reasons presented in Chapter 6. In this operation, 
the major operating problems are perceived to be dilution, 
low stope utilization, employee absenteeism, high employee 
turnover, low labor productivity, and employee apathy toward 
safety. Future operating difficulties appear to be tied to 
a shrinking labor pool of quality miners.
Perceived/Projected Corporate Problems
Corporate management must also assess problems related
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to financial or economic issues that can ultimately effect 
the viability of an operation. Common examples include 
indebtedness, under-capitalization, the cost of borrowing, 
royalty obligations, environmental liabilities, and volatile 
metal markets. These concerns or problems are an important 
elements in influencing a mine's objectives and strategies. 
In this model, principle issues of concern include 
maximizing the return of investment, reducing the payback 
period, and environmental liability.
Limiting Operational Factors
As addressed in Chapter 6, it is generally economically 
advantageous for a mine to produce at it's maximum operating 
capacity. This is, however, rarely the case due to 
different operating efficiencies and production capacities 
associated with specific unit activities. Limiting 
operating factors commonly include hoisting, haulage, 
development, and stope production. These production "bottle 
necks" can be determined through an evaluation of the 
operation. To minimize the influence of these constraints, 
activities which limit production are often the focus of 
operating objectives and strategies. In the context of this 




By analyzing the perceived operating and corporate 
problems and the limiting factors associated with 
production, objectives can be formulated which are 
consistent with the needs of an operation. The objectives 
for this operation are presented in Table 7-3 and are 
indicative of smaller vein mines. Operating strategies for 
these objectives will be addressed in the design of the 
incentive and in the construction of performance standards.
Labor Analysis
Performing a labor evaluation is done for multiple 
purposes, including investigating the suitability of 
incentives for the operation, ascertaining the appropriate 
incentive type (i.e., Bonus or Contract Systems), and in 
designing the configuration of the program. This analysis 
will include a critique of employee skill requirements, the 
labor intensity of the mining system, union considerations, 
labor availability, and the employee-employer relationship. 
In addition, Table 7-4 presents a collective analysis of 
labor concerns.
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TABLE 7-3 Project Characteristics Associated with
Managerial and Operating Objectives
Operating Objectives
- Decrease Dilution 
Increase Stope Utilization
- Reduce Employee Absenteeism 
Decrease Employee Turnover 
Increase Labor Productivity
Improve Employee Attitudes toward Safety 
Retain and Attract Skilled Stope Miners
Corporate Objectives
Maximize Metal Production




TABLE 7-4 Project Characteristics Associated with
Labor Considerations
Production Miners/Stope:
Positions for Production Miners/Shift:
Total Positions for Production Miners/Operation: 
Total Nunber of Qualified Stope Miners/Operation: 
Total Nunber of Development Miners:
Total Nunber of UG Employees/Production Shift: 
Total Nunber of Underground Employees/Operation: 
Availability of Unskilled Labor:
Availability of Skilled Labor:
Total Employment of Skilled Miners in District:








Moderate - Low 
245
Employee Skills: An Evaluation of Employee Skills Required for Stope Miners has been Performed
Required Skill Level: Moderate - High
Mining Cycle: Not Readily Amenable to Mechanization or Automation
Mining Activities: Labor Performance is Quantifiable and Representative of Productivity
Labor Intensity: An Assessment of the Work Required in the Mining Cycle has been Performed
Labor Intensity is Considered High
Training Duration for Stope Miners: 10 - 14 Months
Skill Disparity Between Laborers and Stope Miners: High
Effects of Labor Productivity on Production: 
Present Labor Union(s):
History of Labor Union(s) at Operation: 
History of Labor Union(s) in District: 
Potential of Labor Union(s) in Near-Future: 
Employee-Employer Relationship:
Past Labor Strikes or Shut-Downs:









Employee Tenure: (Mine Operation + Development = 6.0 Years)





















To perform the activities outlined in the mining cycle, 
miners participating in production must possess expertise 
and prowess in the following specialties:
- Working knowledge of equipment, such as drills, 
slushers, timber saws, blasting paraphernalia, etc.
- Experience in drilling, mucking, blasting, sand prep, 
bolting, and timbering
- Safety and Hazard Recognition Training
While these skills are somewhat generic, it establishes a 
job classification which distinguishes employees from other 
classes of miners within the operation.
The length of time it takes to adequately train an 
individual to perform the activities prescribed in the 
mining cycle provides an indication of the type of 
incentives amenable to the mine. Typically, the longer the 
employee training period, the more apt an operation is to 
utilize a contract oriented incentive. The duration of the 
training period is generally deemed proportional to the 
skill differential of labor classifications and is an 
indication of the labor intensity associate with the mining 
system. In this example, the skill level necessary to 
perform the essential activities required by production
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employees would be classified as moderate to high and could 
take 10 or more months of training. The disparity in skill 
proficiency between stope miners and general underground 
laborers would therefore be considered large.
Labor Intensity
From the initial chapter of this thesis, it has 
repeatedly been stated that the degree of influence of labor 
upon an operation's production will dictate the type of 
incentive utilized by an operation. This infers that 
management must assess the intensity of the work required 
and determine if production is predominately predicated on 
the capability of production equipment or by the proficiency 
of skilled employees.
The employee skill requirements and mining activities 
outlined in this project scenario present a system where 
skilled labor is required to perform strenuous activities, 
such as timber work and drilling, and production is 
proportionally related to labor efficiency and productivity. 
Furthermore, the mining system employed is not amenable to a 




The existence of one or more labor unions can 
dramatically alter how an incentive system is formulated and 
implemented. As discussed in Chapter 6, this is 
particularly the case if program standards, bidding 
procedures, and design parameters are incorporated within 
the union's wage agreement. For simplicity, the operation 
described has been non-union since the mine's inception with 
no plans of union participation in the foreseeable future.
Labor Availability
The acquisition and retention of skilled and quality 
miners is an integral ingredient in the long-term economic 
survival of most labor intensive operations. The dependence 
of these mines on the productivity of labor can be 
devastating when the number and/or quality of the workforce 
declines. In addition, the cost incurred by the company to 
train miners can be significant, as can be the opportunity 
cost associated with low stope productivity related to sub 
par employees. In this example, the availability of skilled 
production miners is considered moderate and progressively 
getting worse. The availability of unskilled miners and 
general underground laborers is high.
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Emplovee-Emplover Relations
For the purposes of this simulation, the relationship 
between the company and it's employees is quite good. There 
has never been any operating slowdowns or work stoppages as 
a result of any labor dispute. Problems which do arise are 
infrequent and are principally centered on employee wage 
classification. These situations are resolved by the mine 
superintendent according to mine policy.
Supervisory Analysis
This analysis examines the present role and expertise of 
shifters and other immediate production supervisors. As 
discussed, this evaluation will later be used to determine 
the type of system appropriate for this operation. Table
7-5 illustrates the principle factors derived for this 
analysis. Shifters have from 3 - 8  years of underground 
experience and have degrees in engineering. The 
responsibilities required under the current shifter job 
classification include:
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TABLE 7-5 Project Characteristics Associated with
Supervisory Considerations
Average Shifter Experience: 2.9 Years
Average Shifter Experience Underground: 5.4 Years
Range of Shifter UG Experience: 3 - 8  Years
Percent of Shifters with Engineering Degree: 7 5 Percent
Average Shifter Work Load:
Number of Work Areas: 4 Production, 1 Develop/Repair
Number of Miners/Shift: 10 - 14 Men
Number of Shifters/Production Shift: 3
Number of Shifters/Nonproduction Shift: 1
Total Number of Full-Time Shifters: 7
Total Number of Part-Time Shifters: 1





Required Shifter Expertise: Moderate
Shifters Job Responsibilities:
- Supervise employees in activities specified by the 
mine superintendent, chief mine engineer, and chief 
geologist.
- Inspect employee work to insure that it complies and 
conforms to established mine standards.
- Monitor employee compliance with company safety 
policies.
Maintain production, safety,'operating, and employee 
records for specific areas of the mine.
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- Supervise employees in activities specified by the 
mine superintendent, chief mine engineer, and chief 
geologist.
Inspect employee work to insure that it complies and 
conforms to established mine standards.
- Monitor employee compliance with company safety 
policies.
Maintain production, safety, operating, and employee 
records for specific areas of the mine.
The average shifter oversees 4 production stopes and l 
development/repair project (i.e., 10 - 14 miners) per shift. 
During production shifts, there are 3 shifters working at 
any one time. There are a total of 7 full time shifters 
with 1 working part time as needed (e.g., sick days, 
vacations, special projects, etc.). The total number of 
other employees presently qualified and willing to be 
shifters is limited to a geologist working on the 
engineering staff.
Historical Analysis
This analysis reviews the types of compensation systems 
which have been employed, an examination of historical wage 
practices, and an assessment of the mine's production and 
operating data base. Table 7-6 presents an accounting of 
these factors for this example.
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TABLE 7-6 Project Characteristics Associated with
Historical Considerations
Wage Program Utilized: Conventional Base Wage System Based in Employee Classification,
Experience, Tenure, and Job Assignment 
Incentive System(s) Utilized: None
Past Incentive(s) Utilized: None
Other Compensation Programs: Suggestion and Entrepreneurial Programs
Program Conflicts: Compensation Program is Compatible with Bonus or Contract Incentives
Incentive Experience of Mine Management: Limited to Volumetric Contract Systems 
Incentives at Other Company Operations: Limited to Volumetric Contract Systems
Mine Labor Cost/Ton Ore: $ 18.75
Stope Production Costs/Ton Ore: S 31.80
Total Production Costs/Ton Ore: $ 154.50
Recoverable Value/Ton Ore: $ 220.00
Labor Cost:
Production Cost Ratio: 59 Percent
Average Employee Day's Pay Earnings/Shi ft:
Stope Miners: (Average)
(Range)
Unskilled UG Labors: (Average)
(Range)
Note: Range in Wages are Due to
Average Weekly Overtime Hours:
As a Percent of Total Man-Hours: 
Per Stope Miners:
Pay Period Duration:





$ 110.00 - 165.00 
$ 84.00
S 72.00 - S 96.00 
the Structure of the Base Wage System
14.8 Percent 
5.9 Hours





As a Percent of Total Shifts: 
Days Per Year:
Picking Partners and Workareas:
2.2 Percent
5.6 Days/Stope Miner
Based on Seniority and Tenure






Performed Semi-Annually Since Mine's Inception
Represents a Multitude of Operating and Stope Characteristics
Exists and is Readily Available
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Compensation Systems
The focal component of this operation's employee 
compensation package is a conventional Base Wage System 
structured relative to employee classification, experience, 
tenure, and job assignment. It has been assumed that this 
system has been inplace since the mine opened and that no 
formal incentive program has ever been utilized. All other 
remaining programs are compatible with the implementation of 
either Bonus or Contract Incentives.
Historical Wage Practices
The historical wage practices of this and surrounding 
operations influence the type and structure of incentives 
which will be accepted by an operation's employees. In the 
context of this simulation, the historical factors of major 
consequence include weekly pay periods, a significant wage 
differential between stope miners and underground laborers, 
and determining workareas on the basis of seniority.
Historical Data Base
As previously addressed, if an operation proves to be 
amenable to an incentive system, it is critical that enough 
production data exist in a variety of environmental and
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operating conditions so that accurate production standards 
can be formulated. While this determination is subjective 
and dependent on the type of incentive selected, it must be 
meticulously performed to insure that standards represent 
and generate their intended purpose. In this example, the 
mine has been in operation for 4.5 years and production has 
been recorded through concise time studies from numerous 
different stope configurations and operating conditions.
Other Considerations
There are numerous other factors which must be analyzed 
during this evaluation including the regional economic and 
social characteristics of the community surrounding the 
operation, operating factors associated with adjacent mines, 
safety considerations, and future projections affiliated 
with mine costs, reserves, and economic climate. These 
factors are illustrated in Table 7-7.
Incentive Selection
This section represents the second phase of the 
evaluation to determine if an incentive system is 
appropriate for a mine with specific operating and 
managerial characteristics. And if so, to select the type 
and structure of incentive which will meet these parameters.
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TABLE 7-7 Projected Characteristics Associated with
Miscellaneous Operating and Managerial Factors
Regional Considerations
Other Operations
Other Operations in Local Area: 5 Mines
Types of Mining Systems Employed: Same as Example Mine
Types of Wage Practices: 2 Mines Total Comp. Package Better
3 Mines Total Comp. Package Worse
Types of Incentives Utilized:
- 3 Mines do not Employ Any Type of Incentives
- 1 Mine Utilizes a Volumetric Contract System for Stope 
and Development Miners and a Bonus System for all 
Other Underground Employees
- 1 Mine Utilizes a Volumetric Contract System for Stope 
Miners with no Other Incentive Systems
Union(s) Participation: All Operations are Non-Union 
Labor Relations: 1 Mine - Good to Very Good
2 Mines - Average to Good
2 Mines - Poor to Average
Competition for Skilled Miners: Moderate but Increasing
Regional Economic Prosperity
Economic Growth: Moderate, 2 - 3  Percent
Mean Annual Income: $ 21,500/Year
Percent Unemployment: 12 Percent 
Primary Industries: Tourism, Mining, Logging
Target Operation
Distance to Urban/Residential Area: 12 Miles
Employees Housed/Boarded on Mine Property: No
Safety Considerations
Reported Accidents/100,000 Man-Hours: 8.2
Safety Violations Reported/100,000 Man-Hours: 38.2 
Safety Policies: 3 Safety Violations within a 6 Month Period
will Lead to Employee Suspension
Future Projections
Projected Changes in Operating Parameters: No
Projected Changes in Direct Operating Costs: + 2% Annually
Projected Changes in Labor Market: Decrease (Skilled Miners)
Projected Changes in Ore Value: No
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This analysis is founded on the data in the previous section 
and is performed in the following sequential steps:
Incentive Suitability, System Determination, and Program 
Selection. This evaluation is a preliminary assessment 
which has been modified to reflect how incentive programs 
are developed for a specific operating scenario.
Incentive Suitability
The first step of this evaluation is to assess the 
applicability of incentives for the operating 
characteristics presented and to deduce if these factors 
warrant the implementation of a system. From this analysis, 
it appears that the operation meets the necessary 
prerequisites for the utilization of an incentive system.
The following factors substantiate this claim:
operating performance is directly dependent on labor 
productivity
- labor productivity is slowly declining with no 
appreciable change in operating factors
the relationship between employees and the company is 
good with no history of significant labor disputes
- the mine has a readily available historic database of 
operating and production characteristics
- operating and managerial objectives are consistent 
with feasible strategies associated with incentives
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the current compensation system is compatible with 
either Bonus or Contract Incentive Programs
Program Determination
The next step is to determine the type of incentive that 
would best serve the operation with respect to need, 
application, and benefit. The two program configurations, 
in the context of this example (i.e., Production Stopes), 
are Contract and Bonus/Group-Sharing Systems.
In this project scenario, Contract Systems will satisfy 
the incentive objectives and provide a greater net benefit 
than Bonus or Group-Sharing Systems. Furthermore, this 
operation successfully meets the program requirements 
affiliated with contract type incentives:
the labor performance of individual stope miners is 
quantifiable and is indicative of employee effort
stope productivity can be objectively determined and 
measured
labor performance can be estimated and predicted for 
specific stopes and workareas
mine productivity is predicated on the performance of 
labor and not on equipment capacity
- activities affiliated with the mining cycle are 
strenuous and require skilled employees
a high degree of skill disparity between different 
classes of miners
the training duration for stope miners is long
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strategies associated with operating and managerial 
objectives can be more easily integrated into 
contract incentives
Program Selection
Since Contract Systems were selected as the optimal 
incentive in the previous discussion, this step will 
determine the best contract format for the mine's specific 
parameters. Each Contract System has unique requirements 
and requisites for utilization (Table 6-4). Determining the 
optimal contract is often a process of eliminating those 
programs which are not compatible with the characteristics 
and objectives of the mine.
The relative cost and lack of supervisory personnel with 
the appropriate qualifications and experience deter Piece- 
Rate Contract Systems as a viable program alternative. In 
addition, the need for employee specialization was not 
demonstrated. Linear Contract Systems are also not an 
option due to the variability of stope width along vein 
strike and because back-stopping methods are employed.
From the information collected in Step #1, either 
Volumetric or Time-Based Contract Incentives can be 
utilized. The optimal choice, however, appears to be the 
Time-Based Contracts for a number of reasons. At this time, 
the operation does not have the required supervisory
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personnel to implement a Volumetric Contract System. 
Secondly, since stope cuts can accurately be estimated and 
overall stope utilization is of major concern, Time-Based 
Systems become an increasingly prominent method. In 
addition, Time-Based Contracts can accomplish the objectives 
specified in this project more readily than Volumetric 
Contracts•
Program Design
The intent of this section is to customize the Contract 
System selected above to meet the specific objectives and 
conditions of the model operation. This design process has 
been divided into seven sequential steps:
Step #1: The determination of Critical and Base
Variables
Step #2: The construction of strategies to accomplish
the Incentive objectives
Step #3: To compile the operational database
Step #4: The formulation of Performance Standards
for activities associated with the mining 
cycle and production
Step #5: The design of Stope Productivity Standards
Step #6: The structural development of the Contract
Program
Step #7: An evaluation of Program Simulations and
Cost/Benefit Analysis
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This process is iterative in nature, where an attempt is 
made at maximizing the net benefit of the incentive. The 
assessment of the contract is performed during the course of 
running the simulation in Step #7. The information gathered 
from this simulation provides an indication of the potential 
benefits, short-comings, repercussions, and cost of program 
operation. Each design iteration incorporates new elements 
used to optimize the objectives of the program. For 
simplicity, this discussion will address one iteration 
through the structural development of a program, where 
characteristics of the program simulation were illustrated 
in Chapter 3.
Step #1: Critical and Base Variables
The first step in this process is to identify the base 
and critical variables for this operation. As per the 
discussion in Chapter 6, base variables are those factors 
which remain constant from one production area to another. 
They include equipment type, environmental conditions, 
support personnel, rock mechanics, mining system, etc.. 
Critical variables refer to those factors which do vary from 
one production area to another and have a significant impact 
to labor productivity. The identification of these factors 
allows a base stope performance model to be constructed
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where the manipulation of critical variables enable the 
model to be effectively modified for any stope in the 
operation. In this example, the critical variables 
identified from the Mine Evaluation include the stope width 
and vein dip. All other operating factors will be 
considered as base variables.
Step #2: Incentive Objectives and Strategies
This step analyzes the operating and managerial 
objectives (Table 7-3) associated with the operation and 
formulates strategies which can be incorporated into the 
incentive system. Many of these goals are generic and can 
be accomplished by introducing a quality contract system 
(e.g., maximizing metal production, maximizing stope 
productivity, increasing labor productivity). Other 
objectives must include strategies specifically formulated 
for that goal. For example, the operating objective of 
decreasing dilution can be accomplished by simply not 
compensating the miners for rock excavated over the 
instructed stope width (i.e., over-break). A systematic 
evaluation of each objective which identifies it's 
associated strategy must be performed. This is not a 
structured process where the impact of each strategy can be 
easily projected. Therefore, this procedure is largely
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determined by trail and error for each program iteration 
until an optimal situation is reached.
For the remaining objectives in this example; stope 
utilization can be increased if factors responsible for 
down-time (e.g., mechanical availability) were incorporated 
into the contract. Employee absenteeism and safety issues 
can be addressed by formulating speciality programs which 
run congruently with the contract and economically penalize 
employees who fail to meet the expectations of management. 
To retain skilled miners and to decrease employee turnover, 
contract rates can be structured to increase the disparity 
between unskilled and skilled miners and to increase the 
compensation level of skilled employees relative to other 
operations and in direct correlation with their effort. In 
addition, the large disparity between different classes of 
employees will provide motivation for unskilled miners to 
acquire the necessary talents to be included within 
production contracts.
Step #3 Operational Database
The intent of this step is to quantitatively determine 
the influence of critical operating variables on labor 
productivity and to isolate the time affiliated with 
performing each activity in the mining cycle. Determining
T-3894 340
these values enables productivity standards to be 
constructed for a specific set of critical variables, as 
will be discussed in the ensuing pages.
The first phase is to analyze the mining cycle 
identified in the Mine Evaluation. Each activity of this 
cycle must be broken down into it's elementary components 
(Table 3-4). For example, the activity of drilling can be 
broken down into these fundamental tasks:
- actual drilling of the round
- drill queuing and moves
- drill assembly setup and tear-down
- changing of bits and steels
- mending of air and water hoses 
oiler adjustment and filling 
drill maintenance
- oiler maintenance
- drill mechanical availability
Associated with each component is a activity interval or the 
time it takes the "average" miner to complete the task.
These times are determined through a combination of time 
studies, historical operating data, and task simulations.
By summing the time interval associated with each task, the 
total time allotted for that activity can be calculated.
This can be a formidable task since it may incorporate 
hundreds of elements where concrete information from which 
to draw assumptions is limited.
In most narrow vein applications, down-time associated
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with equipment breakdowns is the largest single factor 
effecting production. Since increased stope utilization was 
a principle objective of this incentive, equipment 
maintenance and availability will be incorporated within the 
contract. That is, projected down-time for mechanical 
availability and time associated with servicing the 
equipment will be estimated based on established norms and 
incorporated into the activity standards. If down-time for 
these factors exceed the norm, the miners will be penalized 
in the form of decreased incentive earnings. By including 
these elements within this analysis and ultimately, as part 
of the performance standard, it gives the miners an economic 
incentive not to abuse the equipment and keep it properly 
maintained.
Constructing the maintenance estimate is performed in 
accordance with the equipment manufactures suggested 
maintenance schedule with times derived from actual and 
simulated data. Therefore, each piece of equipment will 
have some unit of time allocated for it's maintenance in the 
contract. Predicting the mechanical availability of this 
equipment for a contract period is much more difficult.
This process is performed from historical production records 
of how often specific components of a particular piece of 
equipment fails or must be replaced between complete
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rebuilds. Utilizing the time it takes to make each repair 
and the duration of the contract (i.e., the mining of 1 
cut), an estimated down-time for that piece of equipment can 
be calculated. It would be impractical to record the 
operating hours for the types of equipment employed in a 
stope, therefore each estimated availability for any given 
piece of equipment is averaged over the period between 
rebuilds. As such, some contract periods will experience 
greater down-time than others. It is theorized that over 
time and several cuts that these factors average out to the 
projected norm.
Obviously, this analysis will be highly effected by the 
critical variables associated with each stope. Each 
potential variation in these variables must be ascertain to 
determine it's associated influence on productivity. For 
example, vein width will effect the number of holes drilled, 
the round configuration, the type and magnitude of rock 
support, the efficiency of the miners, and the labor 
intensity of the work. Therefore, stope width is a critical 
variable which directly effects productivity and must be 
estimated for every operating scenario. This can become 
extremely complex, particularly in operations with a large 
number of variable operating parameters. Table 3-5, for 
example, would require productivity assessments for 4 5
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different permutations of critical variables, excluding 
considerations for rock conditions. Because of this immense 
undertaking, mines attempt to minimize the number of 
variables incorporated within a single "core" contract. A 
core program, as discussed in previous chapters, is simply a 
contract where productivities have been determined for a 
given set of critical variables. When these variables 
change, it effects the established normalized productivity 
for that stope. Determining the magnitude of these changes 
for specific factors (i.e., the resultant change in 
productivity from the "core" program) is calculated from 
historical operating data through the process discussed in 
Chapter 3.
The process of allocating time data to every task 
element must be conducted for every activity in the mining 
cycle. In addition, time associated with numerous 
miscellaneous activities must also be included, such as time 
associated with barring down, making the workplace safe, and 
interruptions by shifters, surveyors, and engineers. For 
the example addressed in this Chapter, it will be assumed 
that time evaluations have been compiled for the 9 potential 
program configurations (i.e., 3 ranges of variations for 2 
critical variables) associated with this analysis. The 
results from these evaluations for a single breast cut are
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presented in Appendix C. The magnitude and number of 
variable ranges for each critical variables is determined by 
the degree of influence attributed to variable changes, the 
type of information included in the database, and the 
complexity of the calculations. In this example, Stope 
Configuration #5 will be considered the core program, since 
it represents the conditions associated with the average 
production stope.
Step #4 Performance Standards
This section structures the information obtained in 
previous steps into performance standards. Once activity 
times have been calculated for each program configuration, 
the total working time afforded to the miners must be 
determined. Table 4-1 illustrates this calculation. The 
total working time per shift from this table equals 388 
minutes or 6.5 man-hours. Dividing the total number of 
man-hours necessary to mine a single breast cut, illustrated 
in Appendix C, by the total working time per shift, the 
number of shifts per breast cut can be determined. For 






9 - 1 1  Feet 
7 0 - 80 Degrees
Total Activity Time/ Breast Cut = 4 62 Man-Hours
Total Working Time/Shift 6.5 Man-Hours/Man-Shift
(462 Man-Hours)/(6.5 Man-Hours/Man-Shift) = 71.1 Man-Shifts
That is, it takes 71.1 Man-Shifts to complete an entire 
breast cut. This translates to a labor productivity of 9.0 
tons per man-shift. The fact that this calculation is 1.0 
tons per man-shift more than the current productivity 
evaluated in the first phases of this analysis further 
justifies the utilization of an incentive. This process 
must be completed for each variable configuration. The 
results of which are presented in Table 7-8. From this 
table, the impact of changing critical variables on labor 
productivity can be quantified.
The disparity in labor productivity presented in Table 
7-8 enable relationships between critical variables and 
projected labor performance to be made. This is important 
because these relationships become incorporated within the 
stope productivity standard for the core system. From this 
standard, stope productivity can be calculated for any
Step #5 Stope Productivity Standards
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TABLE 7-8 Performance Standards Associated with 
Variable Cut Configurations
Mining Cut Labor
Stope Cut Cycle Duration Productivity
Configuration Tonnage (Man-Hr) (Man-Shifts) (Tons/M-S)
# 1 544 504 77 .5 7 . 0
# 2 544 448 68.9 7 . 9
# 3 544 431 66.3 8 . 2
# 4 640 527 81. 0 7 . 9
# 5 640 462 71.1 9 . 0
# 6 640 457 70.3 9 . 1
# 7 768 574 88.3 8.7
# 8 768 515 79.2 9 . 7
# 9 768 509 78. 4 9 . 8
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variation in the critical variables. An example of this 
process was illustrated in Table 3-5.
To evaluate these productivity relationships for changes 
in the critical variables, the influence attributed to each 
variable must be isolated. This is performed by comparing 
the productivities of different configurations which 
experience a change in a single variable, where the 
influence attributed to other critical variables is 
eliminated or minimized. In this project analysis, the 
influence attributed to stope width, for example, would be 
determined in situations where the vein dip would not 
significantly impact labor productivity. This occurs in 
three situations:
(1) Vein Dip = < 7 0 Degrees,










(2) Vein Dip = 7 0 - 8 0  Degrees,











(3) Vein Dip = > 80 Degrees,










From these scenarios, a comparison between the change of 
productivity related to width can be calculated. This 
calculation is accomplished by subtracting the 
productivities associated with stope width for each dip 
interval. The change in productivity between specific width 
intervals (e.g., < 9 Ft and 9 - 1 1  Ft) for each dip 
classification should be approximately uniform. However, in 
situations where this is not the case, it implies that 
another critical variable is influencing productivity and 
that the operating evaluation and the range of each critical 
variable need to be reexamined. A statistical variance can 
be applied to determine what is and is not acceptable. In 
this example, a 2 5 percent variance is employed.
Once each of these factors have been calculated, an 
arithmetic average is used to determine the standard change 
in productivity attribute to a specific critical variable. 
Relative to this project simulation, this calculation 
appears a s :
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Width Interval; (< 9 Feet) to (9 - 11 Feet) 
Configuration Comparisons Change in Productivities
#1 - #4 0.9 Tons/Man-Shifts
#2 - #5 1.1 Tons/Man-Shifts
#3 - #6 0.9 Tons/Man-shifts
Average Change = 0.97 Tons/Man-Shift
1.0 Tons/Man-Shift
Width Interval: (9 - 11 Feet) to (> 11 Feet)
Configuration Comparisons Change in Productivities
#4 - #7 0.8 Tons/Man-Shifts
#5 - #8 0.7 Tons/Man-Shifts
#6 - #9 0.7 Tons/Man-shifts
Average Change = 0.7 3 Tons/Man-Shift
0.75 Tons/Man-shift
The change in productivity, as calculated above, meets the
designed variance and for convenience has been rounded off.
The same process must be completed for every critical 
variable. For expediency, the calculations associated with 
vein dip have been performed with the results presented 
below:
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Vein Dip Interval: (< 7 0 Degrees) to (7 0 80 Degrees)
Configuration Comparisons Change in Productivities
#1 - #2 0.9 Tons/Man-Shifts
#2 - #5 1.1 Tons/Man-Shifts
#3 - #6 1.0 Tons/Man-shifts
Average Change = 1.00 Tons/Man-Shift
Vein Dip Interval: (70 - 80 Decrees) to ( > 8 0  Degrees)
Configuration Comparisons Change in Productivities
#4 - #7 0.30 Tons/Man-Shifts
#5 - #8 0.10 Tons/Man-Shifts
#6 - #9 0.10 Tons/Man-shifts
Average Change = 0.17 Tons/Man-Shift
0.20 Tons/Man-shift
Now that these factors have been determined, they can be 
integrated into a stope performance sheet as illustrated in 
Table 7-9. The average change in productivity is either 
added or subtracted to the core program to compensate for 
changing critical variables.
Step #6 Structural Contract Development
This step constructs the relationship between employee 
productivity and contract earnings. The major difficulty
with establishing this relationship is incorporating the 
existing base wage system into the proposed contract
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- 6 foot Stope Width
- Good Ground Conditions
BASE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS:
Includes: all activities associate with piping, raising,
mining, clean out, raise timber, all sand prep, 
and safety.
BACKSTOPE CUT 9.0 Tons/Man-Shift
- 6 foot Cut Height
- 2 Chute Sets
- Double Breasted stope
- Equipment: Stopers/Jacklegs and Slushers
- Rock Support as needed
STOPE ADJUSTMENTS:
Horizontal Stope Width:
Up to 9.0 feet




+ 0.7 5 Ton/Man-Shift
Average Vein Dip
Up to 7 0 degrees 
7 0 to 80 degrees 
80 to 90 degrees
- 1.00 Ton/Man-Shift
0 Ton/Man-Shift 
+ 0.2 0 Ton/Man-Shift
T-3894 352
program. Time-Based Systems, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
uses the miner's Days Pay wage level as the foundation for 
determining incentive earnings. The problem, however, is 
that this operation has utilized a wage system which has 
diversified the employee earnings over a large range (i.e.,
$ 110 - $ 165 per shift). In this example, days pay for 
production miners would be $ 110 per shift. This implies 
that miners previously making $ 165 per shift would have to 
make incentive earnings of 1.50 times days pay in order to 
earn their previous wage, hardly an equatable situation. In 
addition, the contract objectives for this operation include 
maintaining a significant wage disparity between skilled and 
unskilled employees as well as attracting and retaining 
quality stope miners which this system would not accomplish. 
Also, the wages of stope miners in surrounding operations 
average 30 percent more than this projected days pay level 
($ 143.00 per shift). Realizing these considerations, the 
incentive-wage structure for the first iteration of this 
model will incorporate the average stope miners base wage 
($ 138.00 per shift) as the foundation for incentive 
earnings and will use the present wage system for the days 
pay default in case no incentive earnings are achieved.
Based on these assumptions, a numerical representation 
of the economic bonus rate for a stope can be ascertained.
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For example, the bonus rate for the core contract presented 
in Table 7-9 equals:
Core Contract Productivity = 9.0 Tons/Man-Shift
Contract Base Wage = $ 138.00/Man-Shift
Bonus Rate = ($ 138/Man-Shift)/(9.0 Tons/Man-Shift)
= $ 15.33/Ton
From this bonus rate, the estimate incentive earnings for 
any stope can be calculated. For example, a 640 ton breast 
cut translates to $ 9,813.33. A stope projection sheet is 
illustrated for the core contract in Table 7-10. In this 
table, the relationship between cut completion time (i.e., 
tons excavated) and contract earnings has been quantified. 
The projected earnings for average production miners working 
at a days pay rate has been established at $ 165.00 per
shift or a rate of 22 percent above the days pay standard.
This rate is consistent with the normal range observed in 
the industry and will eliminate the problems associated with 
undermining the base wage system for higher paid employees. 
Furthermore, the projected average incentive earnings is 
higher than the adjacent operations which decreases the 
motivation for employee turnover and increases the degree of 
company access to the labor market.
There are other program considerations which must be 
addressed during this stage of contract evaluation,
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Includes: all activities associate with piping, raising, 
mining, stope clean out, raise timber, all sand 
prep, and safety.
STANDARD BACKSTOPE CUT
- 6 foot Cut Height
- 2 Chute Sets
- Double Breasted Stope
- Equipment: Stopers/Jacklegs and Slushers
- Single Slushing
- Rock Support as Needed
STOPE SPECIFICATIONS
- Length: North Side = 108 feet
South Side = 95 feet
- Stope Width: 9 - 1 1  Feet
- Stope Dip: 70 - 80 Degrees
Standard Productivity: 
Adjustments




























including the tonnage estimate variance, duration for 
contract advances, holdback percentages, surveying 
techniques and standards, grievance procedures, stope 
allocation considerations, formulation of partnerships, 
supplemental contract procedures, and a variety of operating 
issues (e.g., dilution). These factors dramatically 
influence the operation and acceptance of contract systems 
and are determined through the same iterative process. As 
with contract variables, these factors are constructed in 
consideration of historical operating practices, operating 
and managerial objectives, net benefit, and employee 
acceptance. For example, contract advances may be 
distributed on a weekly basis to coincide with the 
historical pay period.
Step #7 Contract Simulation and Evaluation
This step evaluates the contract incentive constructed 
in the previous steps to isolate the potential short-comings 
and benefits of these systems as well as their cost of 
implementation and operation. This is performed in order to 
optimize the contract design by simulating the operation of 
a proposed contract for different stope configurations. If 
factors arise which are not consistent with the objectives 
of the company or are detrimental, the contract is
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reexamined through another iteration of Steps #1 - #7. In 
addition, it is imperative that a benefit/cost analysis be 
performed. This analysis is actually part of the mine 
evaluation to determine if an operation is acceptable for 
the utilization of an incentive. The integral components of 
this simulation were illustrated in Chapter 3 and therefore, 




This chapter presents the conclusions culminating from 
this study and recommends topics related to this research 
for further study.
Conclusions
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate the operational 
role of Contract Incentives in the underground hardrock 
industry as well as their basic concepts and philosophies.
In addition, based on the observations and production data 
derived form of industrial sources, this study has presented 
an accurate account of the types of systems which exist, the 
factors that contribute and influence the success or failure 
of these systems, and established a preliminary set of 
guidelines which aid in the evaluation of these programs for 
site specific characteristics.
The application of Contract and Bonus/Group-Sharing 
Incentives presents a unique avenue through which an mine 
manager can influence operating factors that have direct 
bearing on the economic viability of his operation, not the 
least of which is employee productivity. There are, 
however, specific characteristics and requites an operation 
must possess in order to have any potential for achieving a
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net benefit. The most prominent of these factors include 
limited labor problems. The type of system amenable to a 
particular operation is determined by it's specific 
operating conditions and objectives. While the principle 
focus of this thesis has been on production, it has also 
examined the application and intent of both Bonus and 
Contract Systems in nonproduction and support activities.
The most common form of production incentive in 
underground vein applications is that of Contract Mining 
Systems. These programs are in essence a supplemental wage 
agreement between mine administrators and production 
employees to excavate ore where financial incentives are 
contingent upon the rate of production within prescribed 
guidelines. How this rate is quantified dictates the type 
of Contract Incentive utilized. The types of Production 
Contracts introduced include Piece-Rate, Time-Based, 
Volumetric, and Linear-Based. Each possesses unique 
qualities, where a particular contract is utilized to 
optimize objectives for a specific operation. These systems 
are introduced as a managerial tool to enhance productivity, 
influence employee attitudes and achieve a multitude of 
other goals and strategies.
Included within this study was a brief synopsis of 
managerial considerations affiliated with the implementation
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and operation of Contract Incentives. This discussion 
concentrated on issues which can effect the acceptance of 
incentives by the labor force and it's ability to 
effectively influence mine employees to achieve the 
incentive's designed performance and operating objectives.
In addition, a set of guidelines were formulated which 
enable a preliminary Contract System to be constructed for 
site specific characteristics.
Based on these guidelines, a model was constructed which 
simulates the process of integrating the physical 
characteristics and objectives of an operation into a 
preliminary contract design. This model was founded on data 
obtained from several mines in the Spanish Bar District of 
Colorado.
Recommendation
This study has shown the potential benefits derived 
from the utilization of Contract Incentives in operations 
possessing the proper ingredients for their application. It 
is imperative that a company investigate if an incentive is 
deemed appropriate and selectively design a system which 
corresponds to it's needs and optimally maximizes the net 
realization of it's objectives. The potential benefits, in 
terms of increased productivity and lower operating costs,
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can be substantial in specific operating conditions. 
Recommendations for Further Research
There is considerable amount of work that could be 
performed to aid operators in evaluating Contract and Bonus 
Incentives for their particular operation. Potential 
research areas include: quantitatively comparing the 
benefits derived by Contract, Bonus, and Conventional Base 
Wage Systems for a fixed set of operating parameters, a 
comprehensive investigation of the safety allegations 
against Contract Incentives, and the construction of an 
enhanced model which will aid operators in selecting and 
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Appendix C
TIME EVALUATIONS FOR SPECIFIED CRITICAL VARIABLES
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Time Evaluations for Specified Critical Variables
Program Configuration #1
Stope Width = < 9 Feet 
Vein Dip = < 70 Degrees
Activity Completion Time
Construct Temporary Station 10 Man-Hours
Move Equipment From Lower Cut 6 Man-Hours
Extend Utilities and Vent. Lines 16 Man-Hours
Drill Backstope 88 Man-Hours
Construct Temp. Blast Shield 7 Man-Hours
Blast Backstope 25 Man-Hours
Remove Shield and Fix Blast Damage 8 Man-Hours
Move and Set Slusher 5 Man-Hours
Extend Ore Chute and Insert Grizzley 44 Man-Hours
Bolt/Rock Support 11 Man-Hours
Insert Slusher Pins/Poles 3 Man-Hours
Slush Muck 131 Man-Hours
Stope Cleanout 54 Man-Hours
Construct Sandwall/Bulkhead 74 Man-Hours
Insert Fill and Drainage Lines 16 Man-Hours
Tear Down Temporary Station 6 Man-Hours
TOTAL 504 Man-Hours
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Time Evaluations for Specified Critical Variables
Program Configuration #2
Stope Width = < 9 Feet 
Vein Dip = 7 0 - 8 0  Degrees
Activity Completion Time
Construct Temporary Station 10 Man-Hours
Move Equipment From Lower Cut 6 Man-Hours
Extend Utilities and Vent. Lines 16 Man-Hours
Drill Backstope 74 Man-Hours
Construct Temp. Blast Shield 7 Man-Hours
Blast Backstope 20 Man-Hours
Remove Shield and Fix Blast Damage 8 Man-Hours
Move and Set Slusher 5 Man-Hours
Extend Ore Chute and Insert Grizzley 40 Man-Hours
Bolt/Rock Support 10 Man-Hours
Insert Slusher Pins/Poles 2 Man-Hours
Slush Muck 124 Man-Hours
Stope Cleanout 44 Man-Hours
Construct Sandwall/Bulkhead 61 Man-Hours
Insert Fill and Drainage Lines 15 Man-Hours
Tear Down Temporary Station 6 Man-Hours
TOTAL 448 Man-Hours
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Time Evaluations for Specified Critical Variables
Program Configuration #3
Stope Width = < 9 Feet 
Vein Dip = > 80 Degrees
Activity Completion Time
Construct Temporary Station 10 Man-Hours
Move Equipment From Lower Cut 6 Man-Hours
Extend Utilities and Vent. Lines 16 Man-Hours
Drill Backstope 70 Man-Hours
Construct Temp. Blast Shield 7 Man-Hours
Blast Backstope 18 Man-Hours
Remove Shield and Fix Blast Damage 8 Man-Hours
Move and Set Slusher 5 Man-Hours
Extend Ore Chute and Insert Grizzley 40 Man-Hours
Bolt/Rock Support 9 Man-Hours
Insert Slusher Pins/Poles 2 Man-Hours
Slush Muck 120 Man-Hours
Stope Cleanout 40 Man-Hours
Construct Sandwall/Bulkhead 59 Man-Hours
Insert Fill and Drainage Lines 15 Man-Hours
Tear Down Temporary Station 6 Man-Hours
TOTAL 431 Man-Hours
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Time Evaluations for Specified Critical Variables
Program Configuration #4
Stope Width = 9 - 1 1  Feet
Vein Dip = < 70 Degrees
Activity Completion Time
Construct Temporary Station 10 Man-Hours
Move Equipment From Lower Cut 6 Man-Hours
Extend Utilities and Vent. Lines 16 Man-Hours
Drill Backstope 92 Man-Hours
Construct Temp. Blast Shield 7 Man-Hours
Blast Backstope 25 Man-Hours
Remove Shield and Fix Blast Damage 8 Man-Hours
Move and Set Slusher 5 Man-Hours
Extend Ore Chute and Insert Grizzley 45 Man-Hours
Bolt/Rock Support 14 Man-Hours
Insert Slusher Pins/Poles 3 Man-Hours
Slush Muck 141 Man-Hours
Stope Cleanout 58 Man-Hours
Construct Sandwall/Bulkhead 75 Man-Hours
Insert Fill and Drainage Lines 16 Man-Hours
Tear Down Temporary Station 6 Man-Hours
TOTAL 527 Man-Hours
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Time Evaluations for Specified Critical Variables
Program Configuration #5
Stope Width = 9 - 1 1  Feet 
Vein Dip = 7 0 - 8 0  Degrees
Activity Completion Time
Construct Temporary Station 10 Man-Hours
Move Equipment From Lower Cut 6 Man-Hours
Extend Utilities and Vent. Lines 16 Man-Hours
Drill Backstope 78 Man-Hours
Secure Stope and Raise for Blasting 7 Man-Hours
Blast Backstope 22 Man-Hours
Remove Shield and Fix Blast Damage 8 Man-Hours
Move and Set Slusher 5 Man-Hours
Extend Ore Chute and Insert Grizzley 40 Man-Hours
Bolt/Rock Support 12 Man-Hours
Insert Slusher Pins/Poles 2 Man-Hours
Slush Muck 129 Man-Hours
Stope Cleanout 45 Man-Hours
Construct Sandwall/Bulkhead 62 Man-Hours
Insert Fill and Drainage Lines 15 Man-Hours
Tear Down Temporary Station 6 Man-Hours
TOTAL 4 62 Man-Hours
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Time Evaluations for Specified Critical Variables
Program Configuration #6
Stope Width = 9 - 1 1  Feet
Vein Dip = > 80 Degrees
Activity Completion Time
Construct Temporary Station 10 Man-Hours
Move Equipment From Lower Cut 6 Man-Hours
Extend Utilities and Vent. Lines 16 Man-Hours
Drill Backstope 75 Man-Hours
Construct Temp. Blast Shield 7 Man-Hours
Blast Backstope 21 Man-Hours
Remove Shield and Fix Blast Damage 8 Man-Hours
Move and Set Slusher 5 Man-Hours
Extend Ore Chute and Insert Grizzley 40 Man-Hours
Bolt/Rock Support 12 Man-Hours
Insert Slusher Pins/Poles 2 Man-Hours
Slush Muck 127 Man-Hours
Stope Cleanout 44 Man-Hours
Construct Sandwall/Bulkhead 61 Man-Hours
Insert Fill and Drainage Lines 17 Man-Hours
Tear Down Temporary Station 6 Man-Hours
TOTAL 457 Man-Hours
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Time Evaluations for Specified Critical Variables
Program Configuration #7
Stope Width = > 11 Feet 
Vein Dip = < 7 0 Degrees
Activity Completion Time
Construct Temporary Station 10 Man-Hours
Move Equipment From Lower Cut 6 Man-Hours
Extend Utilities and Vent. Lines 16 Man-Hours
Drill Backstope 101 Man-Hours
Construct Temp. Blast Shield 7 Man-Hours
Blast Backstope 28 Man-Hours
Remove Shield and Fix Blast Damage 10 Man-Hours
Move and Set Slusher 5 Man-Hours
Extend Ore Chute and Insert Grizzley 51 Man-Hours
Bolt/Rock Support 18 Man-Hours
Insert Slusher Pins/Poles 2 Man-Hours
Slush Muck 156 Man-Hours
Stope Cleanout 64 Man-Hours
Construct Sandwall/Bulkhead 79 Man-Hours
Insert Fill and Drainage Lines 17 Man-Hours
Tear Down Temporary Station 6 Man-Hours
TOTAL 57 4 Man-Hours
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Time Evaluations for Specified Critical Variables
Program Configuration #8
Stope Width = > 11 Feet 
Vein Dip = 7 0 - 8 0  Degrees
Activity Completion Time
Construct Temporary Station 10 Man-Hours
Move Equipment From Lower Cut 6 Man-Hours
Extend Utilities and Vent. Lines 16 Man-Hours
Drill Backstope 94 Man-Hours
Construct Temp. Blast Shield 7 Man-Hours
Blast Backstope 26 Man-Hours
Remove Shield and Fix Blast Damage 10 Man-Hours
Move and Set Slusher 5 Man-Hours
Extend Ore Chute and Insert Grizzley 46 Man-Hours
Bolt/Rock Support 16 Man-Hours
insert Slusher Pins/Poles 2 Man-Hours
Slush Muck 139 Man-Hours
Stope Cleanout 53 Man-Hours
Construct Sandwall/Bulkhead 65 Man-Hours
Insert Fill and Drainage Lines 15 Man-Hours
Tear Down Temporary Station 6 Man-Hours
TOTAL 515 Man-Hours
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Time Evaluations for Specified Critical Variables
Program Configuration #9
Stope Width = > 11 Feet 
Vein Dip = > 80 Degrees
Activity Completion Time
Construct Temporary Station 10 Man-Hours
Move Equipment From Lower Cut 6 Man-Hours
Extend Utilities and Vent. Lines 16 Man-Hours
Drill Backstope 92 Man-Hours
Construct Temp. Blast Shield 7 Man-Hours
Blast Backstope 25 Man-Hours
Remove Shield and Fix Blast Damage 11 Man-Hours
Move and Set Slusher 5 Man-Hours
Extend Ore Chute and Insert Grizzley 43 Man-Hours
Bolt/Rock Support 14 Man-Hours
Insert Slusher Pins/Poles 2 Man-Hours
Slush Muck 139 Man-Hours
stope Cleanout 51 Man-Hours
Construct Sandwall/Bulkhead 65 Man-Hours
Insert Fill and Drainage Lines 17 Man-Hours
Tear Down Temporary Station 6 Man-Hours
TOTAL 509 Man-Hours
